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The Eleventh Amendment is deceptively simple:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.1
Yet, in recent years, a vigorous debate has emerged about the
meaning and history of the Eleventh Amendment.2 The conven-
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to thank my colleagues and friends Willie Fletcher, Ray Forrester, Mary Kay Kane, William
Lockhart, Leo O'Brien, James Weinstein, and my wife, Martha Massey, for their helpful
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. I also thank John M. Sinclair for his research
assistance. The errors and omissions are all mine.
I US Const, Amend XI.
2 The debate has sharply divided the Supreme Court, four members of which urge that
Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1 (1890), the principal monument to the conventional under-
standing, be overruled. See Welch v State Dept. of Highways & Public Transp., 107 S Ct
2941, 2958 (1987) (Brennan dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens); Green
v Mansour, 474 US 64, 74 (1985) (Brennan dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens); Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan dissent-
ing, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens). Justice Kennedy has not had an opportu-
nity to express himself on this subject; his predecessor, Justice Powell, was a firm adherent
to the conventional wisdom embodied by Hans. See Welch, 107 S Ct 2941 (plurality opinion
of Powell). Justice Scalia avoided the issue when it was obliquely presented in Welch. See
Welch, 107 S Ct at 2957-58 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
While the academic commentary contains a variety of explanations of the Eleventh
Amendment, nearly all of it is critical of the conventional understanding that has been per-
suasive to a majority of the Supreme Court. See, for example, John V. Orth, The Judicial
Power of the United States: The Eleventh Amendment in American History 74-77 (Oxford,
1987) ("The Judicial Power"); Clyde E. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign
Immunity 160-64 (Greenwood, 1972); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
173-195 (Foundation, 2d ed 1988); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
Yale L J 1425, 1466-92 (1987); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Elev-
enth Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather
than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan L Rev 1033 (1983); Martha A. Field, The
Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 126 U Pa L Rev 515 (Part I), and
126 U Pa L Rev 1203 (Part II) (1978); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum L Rev 1889 (1983); David L. Sha-
piro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Harv L Rev 61,
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tional interpretation, which still commands at least a plurality of
the Supreme Court,3 is that the amendment made constitutional
an original understanding that the states were immune from pri-
vate suits in the federal courts. According to this interpretation,
the amendment created a presumptive jurisdictional bar to private
claims in federal court against states,4 in the absence of either the
state's consent or an explicit congressional abrogation of the state's
immunity.5 The conventional doctrine has its modern origin in
Hans v Louisiana,6 an 1890 opinion that construed the amendment
to grant to the states this broad right of sovereign immunity. The
amendment was a reaction to the Supreme Court's 1793 decision in
Chisholm v Georgia,7 which upheld federal jurisdiction over a suit
against a state by a citizen of another state. This decision, accord-
ing to the Court in Hans, created "a shock of surprise throughout
the country" 8 by altering what had supposedly been the original
constitutional understanding that the states would be immune
from suit in federal court without their consent. The Eleventh
Amendment merely restored that original understanding.
The revisionist interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
generally holds that the amendment was intended merely as a nar-
row limitation upon the state-citizen diversity clause of Article III.
The revisionists assert variously that the amendment has no inde-
pendent prohibitory force,10 that it simply fails to authorize certain
party based assertions of federal jurisdiction and does not limit the
67-71 (1984); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Ac-
tion Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, 75 Colum L Rev 1413 (1975).
3 See, for example, Welch v State Dept. of Highways & Public Transp., 107 S Ct 2941
(1987) (plurality opinion of Powell).
4 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89 (1984); Edelman v Jor-
dan, 415 US 651, 678 (1974) (the Eleventh Amendment "sufficiently partakes of the nature
of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court"). The Supreme Court
is by no means consistent in this characterization; Eleventh Amendment doctrine has also
been described as an example of the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity or an
embodiment of the federalist ideal of state sovereignty. The confusion of labels is not helped
by the Court's propensity to employ all three at once. See, for example, Pennhurst, 465 US
89, 98, 100, 116-117 (1984). See also note 14.
' Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 242 (1985).
6 134 US 1 (1890).
2 US (2 Dali) 419 (1793).
8 Hans, 134 US at 11 (1890).
1 See Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1062 (cited in note 2) ("the amendment was designed
merely to require a limiting construction of the state-citizen diversity clause"); Amar, 96
Yale L J at 1482-83 (cited in note 2). The "revisionists" are not a monolithic bloc; no sug-
gestion is made here that each revisionist shares all the views of the other revisionists.
10 See Field, 126 U Pa L Rev at 549 (cited in note 2).
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federal courts' power to hear suits against states founded upon a
federal question,"1 and that, in any case, Congress may use its pow-
ers to strip the states of whatever sovereign immunity was con-
ferred upon them by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment. 12
Both positions abound with difficulties. The conventional view
takes great liberties with the amendment's text, for it operates to
foreclose private claims in federal court against a state by its own
citizens that arise under federal statutory or constitutional law.
The text of the amendment is wholly silent about such claims, yet
since Hans they have been barred because it would be "anoma-
lous" to permit them.'3 Moreover, by endorsing congressional abro-
gation of state sovereign immunity, the conventional doctrine in-
dulges in an untenable analytical process. It construes the
Eleventh Amendment as a bar to the exercise of federal subject
matter jurisdiction and simultaneously embraces the curious no-
tion that Congress may still confer such jurisdiction on the federal
courts by statutorily abrogating the constitutionally mandated bar
of state sovereign immunity. 4 Almost as odd is the century old
doctrine that the states may confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts by waiving the constitutional barrier.15 If the amendment
" See Welch, 107 S Ct at 2964-68 (Brennan dissenting); Atascadero, 473 US at 247-304
(Brennan dissenting); Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1934-38 (cited in note 2).
"I See Tribe, American Constitutional Law 178-89 (cited in note 2); Nowak, 75 Colum
L Rev 1468-69 (cited in note 2).
" Hans, 134 US at 10.
14 The Court's clearest indication that it believes the Eleventh Amendment constitu-
tionalizes state sovereign immunity as a barrier to the exercise of federal jurisdiction may be
seen in Pennhurst, 465 US 89 (1984); Green v Mansour, 474 US 64(1985); and Edelman v
Jordan, 415 US 651, 677-78 (1974). Professor Tribe concurs. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law 191 n 6 (cited in note 2). Yet the Court plainly concedes both the legitimacy of
congressional abrogation of this doctrine and conferral of jurisdiction by a state's consent.
Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234 (1985) (congressional abrogation); Fitz-
patrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445 (1976) (same); Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651 (1974) (con-
sent); Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436, 447-48 (1883) (same). These twin positions seemingly
repudiate the settled axioms that the limitations of Article III jurisdiction can not be ex-
panded by legislation, Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), nor by consent.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v Mottley, 211 US 149, 152 (1908) (federal question jurisdic-
tion); Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v Swan, 111 US 379 (1884) (diversity juris-
diction). It may be that the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly repeals the Eleventh Amend-
ment so that the Congress has the power to confer jurisdiction within the limits of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 451-56 (1976). If so, the
continuing existence of any state sovereign immunity in Fourteenth Amendment cases can
only be justified as a prudential limitation derived from the Tenth Amendment rather than
as a jurisdictional bar imposed by the Eleventh Amendment.
15 See Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 671-74 (1974). Compare Clark v Barnard, 108
US 436, 447-48 (1883) (state may waive sovereign immunity because immunity is concep-
tually like a personal right). A doctrinal justification is that the Eleventh Amendment is not
jurisdictional at all; it merely confers a wavable immunity. Proponents of this reading must
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constitutionalized state sovereign immunity, it did so not by creat-
ing a waivable immunity doctrine, but by carving out of the federal
judicial power a class of cases: private claims against states. As a
result of this prohibition upon subject matter jurisdiction, the fed-
eral judiciary lacks any constitutional authority to hear and decide
such cases. It is a miraculous doctrine that enables either Congress
or a litigant state to confer this authority. 6
The revisionist position carries its own conceptual baggage.
Much of the revisionists' argument is historical. They contend that
the Eleventh Amendment was never intended to do more than re-
strict the scope of the state-citizen diversity clause in order to frus-
trate foreign creditors, 17 and that the amendment was so inter-
preted prior to the Reconstruction."" While some academics might
contend that history is simply not relevant, 9 the larger problem
with the revisionists' historical argument is that it is unpersuasive.
The historical facts relied upon by the revisionists serve as readily
to refute as to confirm their conclusions.2
Some revisionists, such as Professor Amar, offer an argument
that is more conceptual than historical. Having argued that the
necessarily contend that the amendment employs the language of jurisdiction to create a
personal immunity rule. Moreover, early cases dealing with the immunity from suit of for-
eign governments make plain that foreign sovereign immunity exists not by right of the
foreign nation, but by the consent of the forum nation. See, for example, The Schooner
Exchange v McFaddon, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is nec-
essarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself...
[A]ll sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice... of that absolute and complete
jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers."). This resolution
also meshes poorly with the text of the amendment and has never been wholeheartedly
embraced by the Court, which continues to characterize the amendment as alternatively a
jurisdictional bar, an exemplification of sovereign immunity, or an embodiment of federalist
ideals of state sovereignty. See note 4.
16 If Congress possesses the authority to confer jurisdiction beyond the limits of Article
Ill, it ought to be able, for example, to force the federal courts to deliver advisory opinions
notwithstanding the established view that Article III does not vest the judiciary with such
authority. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hun-
dred Years, 1789-1888, 6-14 (Chicago, 1985) (discussing the origins of the advisory opinion
limitation). Whatever the constitutional limitations on the Court, individual Justices have
from time to time dispensed extra-judicial advice. See, for example, Bruce Allen Murphy,
Fortas: The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Court Justice 186-211 (Morrow, 1988); Alan F.
Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme Court Justices, 1790-1962:
Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 Colum L Rev 633 (1962).
17 See Orth, The Judicial Power at 12-29 (cited in note 2); Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at
1934-38) (cited in note 2); Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1060-62 (cited in note 2).
18 See Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1968 (cited in note 2).
19 See, for example, Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understand-
ing, 60 BU L Rev 204 (1980).
10 See text at notes 186-360.
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federalist Constitution was predicated upon notions of sovereignty
vested in one national people, and not their several state agencies,
Amar asserts, soundly enough, that current Eleventh Amendment
doctrine is incoherently at odds with this bedrock principle. To
rescue the Eleventh Amendment, he conveniently ignores the debt
avoidance history of the amendment and asserts that it always was
intended as a:
simple elimination of two categories of diverse party jurisdic-
tion: those involving noncitizen or foreign plaintiffs and state
defendants. This jurisdictional repeal, however, was not
designed as a barrier cutting across the other jurisdictional
grants of Article III. The party alignments specified by the
Eleventh Amendment would no longer provide an indepen-
dent basis for jurisdiction (as they had in Chisholm), but the
existence of such an alignment would not oust jurisdiction
that was independently granted - for example, in federal
question or admiralty cases.21
The thin support offered for this conclusion fails to rebut contrary
historical evidence. The conceptual flaw in Amar's analysis is that
he insists on believing that the Eleventh Amendment was part of
his vision of the federalist Constitution. Amar discounts the possi-
bility that the Eleventh Amendment represents a rare anti-federal-
ist constitutional victory; were he to entertain the idea seriously, it
might not seem such "an inexplicable throwback to the jurisdic-
tional regime of the Articles of Confederation." 2
If one side of the debate is historically wrong, and the other
side is trapped in a conceptual quagmire, some other explanatory
resolution is badly needed. I propose that we take Eleventh
Amendment text and the history of its enactment at face value.
The amendment sought to create a party based denial of jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts that sweeps across all the jurisdictional
heads of Article III. Just as Article III confers jurisdiction via a
number of independent heads, the Eleventh Amendment consti-
tutes a separate head for denial of jurisdiction. In a sense, the
Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional trump card. Whatever the
Article III source of jurisdiction-principally diversity or federal
question-if the party alignment is within that prohibited by the
Eleventh Amendment, the federal courts are deprived of jurisdic-
21 Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1474-75 (cited in note 2) (footnotes omitted). See also Fletcher,
35 Stan L Rev at 1060-62 (cited in note 2).
22 Id at 1477.
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tion. Since this jurisdictional denial is constitutionally mandated,
parties may not confer jurisdiction by waiver nor may Congress
override the ouster by legislation. While this construction immu-
nizes the states from some private suits in federal court, this im-
munity is a by-product of the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdic-
tional ouster, and not the result of a broad grant of immunity
within the amendment itself. In my view, the conventional doc-
trine spawned by Hans is wrong primarily because it relies on the
Eleventh Amendment for its constitutional foundation. The notion
of state sovereign immunity embraced by Hans may have been
perfectly sound, but both the dimensions of that immunity and its
constitutional anchor are more properly found in the Tenth
Amendment.23
When the conventional doctrine is viewed as a Tenth Amend-
ment guarantee, and the Eleventh Amendment is seen as a head of
jurisdictional denial sweeping across the landscape of Article III,
many of the problems posed by the current debate are resolved.
The view advanced here is consistent with constitutional text, the
historical evidence surrounding adoption of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment prior to
the Civil War. More significantly, it eliminates several thorny is-
sues surrounding congressional abrogation of state sovereign im-
munity. If state sovereign immunity is reconceived as an attribute
of the residual state sovereignty preserved by the Tenth Amend-
ment, then Congress may use any of its delegated powers to invade
that immunity. The principal limitation, of course, is that Congress
may not confer the jurisdiction that the Eleventh Amendment ex-
pressly denies. Thus, Congress could enable the federal courts to
hear claims against a state made by its own citizens asserting a
violation of a federal statutory or constitutional right. Congress
could not, however, enable the federal courts to hear the identical
claim presented against a state by a citizen of another state.
Justice Bradley was undoubtedly correct when he observed, in
Hans, that it would be anomalous to open the federal courts to
federal claims against a state by its own citizens but close those
courts to federal claims against a state by foreigners or citizens of
23 US Const, Amend X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
Justice Blackmun apparently shares this view: "[T]hough of more mature vintage, the
Court's Eleventh Amendment cases spring from the same soil as the Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence recently abandoned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528 (1985)." Atascadero State Hospital, 473 US at 303 (Blackmun dissenting).
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another state. 4 A rule that permits the states to violate the federal
rights of non-citizens and avoid direct accountability in federal
court for those actions seems most peculiar, indeed, almost per-
verse. That, however, may be the legacy left by the "unflinchingly
political"25 decision to enact the Eleventh Amendment in order to
avoid state liability to British creditors and to loyalists seeking to
reclaim their seized property. The contemporary consequences of
this anomaly might cause the modern American polity to question
whether the Eleventh Amendment should continue to enjoy consti-
tutional status. Whatever the answer to that question, to the ex-
tent that the anomaly is unacceptable, it might be partially over-
come by a legislatively mandated extension of Testa v Katt2 8 that
would require the states to afford a state forum for the vindication
of federal statutory or constitutional rights asserted against a state
by a non-citizen of the defendant state.
In order to test the thesis of this article, it is useful to begin by
surveying the current state of affairs in Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. Following this exercise, section II will
summarize the history of sovereign immunity in America prior to
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. Section III traces the
history of the Eleventh Amendment in the courts prior to Recon-
struction. Section IV recounts the creation of the Hans doctrine,
and then attempts to recast modern state sovereign immunity doc-
trine as a Tenth Amendment principle. Finally, section V elabo-
rates upon the implications of this article's proposed reconceptual-
ization of state sovereign immunity, in part by using Pennsylvania
v Union Gas Co27 as a paradigm case for exploring these matters.
I. THE CURRENT LAW OF THE TENTH AND ELEVENTH
AMENDMENTS
A. The Eleventh Amendment
The conventional interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
is that it embodies an overarching principle of state sovereign im-
munity from federal court jurisdiction. This view holds that a state
can never be sued by name in a federal court without its consent.2 8
24 Hans, 134 US at 10.
" Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 2003 (cited in note 2).
2 330 US 386 (1947).
2' Cert granted, 108 S Ct 1219 (1988), reported below as, United States v Union Gas
Co., 832 F2d 1343 (3d Cir 1987).
2 Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1 (1890), is the standard citation. See, for example, Welch
v State Dept. of Highways & Public Transp., 107 S Ct 2941, 2945 (1987) (plurality opinion);
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Although the amendment purports to deny federal jurisdiction
only over claims "in law or equity... against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State,"29 the conventional interpretation treats the
text as emblematic of a much broader immunity from suit in fed-
eral court. The metamorphosis began with Hans v Louisiana,
which concluded that it would be "anomalous" to permit a federal
claim against a state by its own citizens while denying identical
claims by citizens of other states.30 In Ex parte New York (No.l),3'
the Supreme Court rejected a long standing interpretation of the
amendment that had treated admiralty cases as exempt from the
Eleventh Amendment bar because they were not "in law or eq-
uity." 2 In 1934 the erosion of the amendment's explicit party
alignment limitation became complete with the decision in Monaco
v Mississippi33 that the jurisdictional bar extended to suits against
states by foreign governments themselves.
Although the Court has employed the Eleventh Amendment
as a symbol for state sovereign immunity, it has not pressed this
immunity to its ultimate limits. In recognition of federal union the
Court has construed Article III to permit the United States to sue
the states,3 4 and the states to sue each other.35 Nor does the immu-
nity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment extend beyond the fed-
eral courts; states are susceptible to suit by private citizens in the
courts of their sister states.3 Finally, although counties and other
subdivisions of a state are treated as state actors for Fourteenth
Florida Dept. of State v Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 US 670, 683 n 17 (1982) (plurality
opinion); Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 662-63 (1974).
29 US Const, Amend XI.
30 134 US 1, 10 (1890).
256 US 490 (1921).
32 For a discussion of the earlier cases treating private suits in admiralty as exempt
from the Eleventh Amendment, see notes 299-319 and accompanying text. The Ex parte
New York Court dismissed the prior tradition by concluding that state sovereign immunity
"is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence ... of which the Amendment is but an exemplifica-
tion." Ex parte New York 256 US at 497. This "exemplification" notion continues to echo.
See Pennhurst, 465 US 89, 98-99 (1984).
33 292 US 313 (1934).
U4 United States v Mississippi, 380 US 128, 140-41 (1965).
31 Rhode Island v Massachusetts, 37 US (12 Pet) 657, 672-74 (1838); North Dakota v
Minnesota, 263 US 365, 372-73 (1923). But if a state attempts to sue another state on behalf
of a discrete group of private citizens, Eleventh Amendment immunity may successfully be
invoked. See New Hampshire v Louisiana, 108 US 76, 88-91 (1883); Hawaii v Standard Oil
Co., 405 US 251, 258-59 n 12 (1972). For discussion of New Hampshire v Louisiana, see
Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 118-21 (cited in note 2); Orth, The Judicial Power at 58-70
(cited in note 2).
'" Nevada v Hall, 440 US 410, 414-18 (1979).
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Amendment purposes, 7 they are not so regarded for purposes of
the Eleventh Amendment, 8 and thus they partake of none of the
immunity from suit available to states and their departmental
"iarms. 39
Because important individual federal rights can be trampled
upon by the states, various doctrines and fictions have arisen over
the years to ameliorate some of the harsher implications of state
sovereign immunity. In Ex parte Young, 0 the Court formulated
one of the most important of these by holding that a federal court
could enjoin a state officer acting in his official capacity, even
though the state itself is immune from suit. The fiction of Ex parte
Young is that if the state official's acts violate the Constitution "he
is in that case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his official
conduct. 4 1
The Ex parte Young rule is no panacea, however, for its scope
is restricted by the application of the abstention doctrines derived
from the Court's decision in Railroad Commission v Pullman Co.42
and Younger v Harris.4  These doctrines, discussed more fully in
the next subsection, restrain the federal courts from enjoining
state officials from allegedly unconstitutional action if there is a
real possibility the case may be decided on state grounds or if a
pending state court proceeding is adequate to hear the constitu-
tional claim. In Edelman v Jordan,44 the Court further limited the
application of Ex parte Young to instances other than when "pri-
37 See, for example, Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v City of Los Angeles, 227 US 278 (1913).
Compare Monell v Dept. of Social Services, 436 US 658, 690-91 (1978) (finding political
subdivisions of a state to be "persons" susceptible to private damage suits under 42 USC §
1983); and Smith v State, 428 Mich 540, 410 NW2d 749 (1987), cert granted, sub nom Will
v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 108 S Ct 1466 (1988) (holding that states are not "per-
sons" under § 1983).
3 Lincoln County v Luning, 133 US 529 (1890) (counties); Workman v New York City,
179 US 552 (1900) (municipalities); Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v Doyle,
429 US 274 (1977) (school boards).
39 The Court distinguishes between a state's political subdivisions (e.g., counties or mu-
nicipalities), which do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, and its departmental
"arms," which are clothed in such immunity. See, for example, Lake Tahoe Country Es-
tates, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 US 391, 400-02 (1979) (denying immu-
nity to an agency created by interstate compact because its function, structure, and compo-
sition was more akin to a subdivision than a departmental arm of the state).
40 209 US 123 (1908). See also Osborn v Bank of the United States, 22 US (9 Wheat)
738, 850-57 (1824), and text at notes 339-60.
41 Ex parte Young, 209 US at 160.
42 312 US 496 (1941). See also text at notes 98-112.
43 401 US 37 (1971). See also text at notes 91-97.
44 415 US 651 (1974).
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vate parties seek[] to impose a liability which must be paid from
public funds in the state treasury. '45 Moreover, while the Court in
Ex parte Young held that a federal court may enjoin a state official
from violating the federal constitutional rights of its citizens, in
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Halderman46 the Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited a federal court from en-
joining a state official from further violations of state law.
Although a state may expressly consent to suit against it in a
federal court, several doctrines operate to subject states to suit in
the federal forum even when they have not expressly consented.
Congress may, by legislation, abrogate state sovereign immunity
from suit in federal courts. In Fitzpatrick v Bitzer,47 the Court de-
termined that Congress was empowered to do so under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.4 8 In Fitzpatrick, the Court approved con-
gressional action that created a private right of action for money
damages against states that had engaged in employment discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.49 The Court
has left open the question of whether Congress may similarly abro-
gate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity under its Article I
powers.50 Whatever the source of power for such congressional ab-
11 Id at 663. But see Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678 (1978) (affirming award of attorneys'
fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988, to be paid by a state, on the theory that the monetary
grant was merely ancillary to the injunction entered by the court).
46 465 US 89 (1984).
47 427 US 445 (1976).
8 "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." US Const, Amend XIV, § 5. The Fitzpatrick principle was apparently ex-
tended to include the Fifteenth Amendment by City of Rome v United States, 446 US 156,
179-80 (1980). The Court has yet to decide whether a federal court private cause of action
against a state may be inferred directly from the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, or
any other constitutional provision. See Milliken v Bradley, 433 US 267, 290-91 n 23 (1977).
This position may have been implicitly rejected by the Court in Atascadero State Hospital
v Scanlon, 473 US 234 (1985), since it is an easy conceptual move to extend the Court's
"unmistakable and unequivocal" congressional abrogation test in Atascadero to the consti-
tutional text. See note 50 and accompanying text.
49 42 USC § 2000 et seq (1982). In amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat 103, codified at 42 USC 2000e (1982), Con-
gress included "governments" among the employers subject to the Act's prohibitions against
discriminatory employment practices and exposed to private employee actions for back pay.
See 42 USC § 2000e (a,b). This was sufficiently plain language to indicate congressional
intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Fitzpatrick, 427 US at 451-52.
50 See County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation, 470 US 226, 252 (1985). In Welch v
State Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 107 S Ct 2941 (1987), the Court hinted that
congressional power to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity may not be confined
to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment: "We assume, without deciding or intimating a
view of the question, that the authority of Congress to subject unconsenting States to suit in
federal court is not confined to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at 2946 (plurality
opinion of Powell); and 2957-58 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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rogation, Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon 1 requires that
Congress "mak[e] its intention [to abrogate] unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute. '5 2 The articulation of this requirement
coincided with the downfall of the less stringent "constructive
waiver" doctrine that allowed courts to infer state consent to suit."
Current Eleventh Amendment law is beset by problems.
Courts and litigants expend vast amounts of energy in determining
whether the state is the real party in interest, whether the relief
sought is permissible under Edelman, or whether a statute con-
tains unmistakable and unequivocal evidence of congressional in-
tention to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.54 Even more
energy will be expended upon debate over the permissible limits, if
any, on congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment im-
munity. While Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co.55 presents the Su-
preme Court with a splendid opportunity to resolve this lingering
At least five circuits agree with Justice Powell's quoted assumption: United States v Union
Gas Co., 832 F2d 1343 (3d Cir 1987), cert granted sub nom Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co.,
108 S Ct 1219 (1988) (Congress may create federal cause of action against an unconsenting
state under the Commerce Clause); In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F2d 311 (7th Cir 1987),
cert denied, 108 S Ct 227 (1987) (Congress may create federal cause of action against an
unconsenting state to recover preferential transfer in bankruptcy); County of Monroe v
Florida, 678 F2d 1124 (2d Cir 1982) (Congress may create federal cause of action against a
state under its extradition power); Peel v Florida, 600 F2d 1070 (5th Cir 1979) (Congress
may create federal cause of action against a state under its war powers); Mills Music v
Arizona, 591 F2d 1278 (9th Cir 1979) (Congress may create federal cause of action against a
state under the Copyright and Patent Clause). Of course, acting pursuant to any of its pow-
ers, Congress is free to create a right for the United States to sue a state and state sovereign
immunity will pose no obstacle.
473 US 234 (1985).
6' Id at 242. The Court elaborated on this theme: "Congress must express its intention
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself.... A
general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory lan-
guage sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment." Id at 243, 246.
53 See Welch, 107 S Ct at 2948 (plurality opinion of Powell), and 2958 (Scalia concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). Constructive waiver originated in Parden v
Terminal Ry., 377 US 184 (1964), in which the Court held that a state's employment of
persons in activities subject to the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 USC § 51 et seq,
operated as a "constructive waiver" by the state of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
Welch Court concluded that the constructive waiver doctrine was incompatible with the
level of unmistakable, unequivocal congressional intention required by Atascadero. Al-
though the Welch Court expressly overruled Parden, it did not reach the issue of the scope
of congressional power over state immunity, and thus it left standing Parden's conclusion
that Congress possesses sufficient power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Welch, 107 S Ct at 2948 n 8 (plurality opinion), and
2957-58 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
For an example of precisely this phenomenon see In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812
F2d 311 (7th Cir 1987).
55 Cert granted, 108 S Ct 1219 (1988), reported below as, United States v Union Gas
Co., 832 F2d 1343 (3d Cir 1987).
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uncertainty, the Court's disposition might very well increase,
rather than diminish, the confused state of the Eleventh
Amendment. 6
Most of these problems can be ameliorated if the concept of
state sovereign immunity that current doctrine locates within the
Eleventh Amendment is treated as part of the residual state sover-
eignty preserved by the Tenth Amendment.57 Although a full dis-
cussion of this thesis is deferred until sections IV and V, it is im-
portant to survey briefly the current state of Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence before exploring the history of the Eleventh
Amendment.
B. The Tenth Amendment
Since the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Garcia v San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority5 it is tempting to treat
the Tenth Amendment as having been consigned to the nether
world of non-justiciability. The Garcia decision overruled National
League of Cities v Usery,59 a case that had held that the Com-
merce Clause60 did not empower Congress to enforce the minimum
wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act61
against the states "in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions. ' 62 In Garcia, five justices joined in a majority opinion that,
in effect, concluded that if states desire to preserve any aspect of
their sovereignty within the federal system they must look to Con-
gress, and not to the courts.6 3 The Court accepted the Tenth
" See notes 413-19 and accompanying text.
See text at notes 399-406. Not every problem is eliminated. The issue of ascertaining
congressional intent to abrogate Tenth Amendment state sovereign immunity might well
remain, for the Atascadero Court's requirement that Congress make its intent "unmistaka-
bly clear in the language of the statute" would presumably survive transfer of state sover-
eign immunity from the Eleventh to the Tenth Amendment. See Atascadero, 473 US at 242.
58 469 US 528 (1985).
59 426 US 833 (1976).
o US Const, Art I, § 8.
61 The specific statute in question was the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of
1974, § 6(a), Pub L No 93-259, 88 Stat 58, amending 29 USC § 203(e) (1970).
62 National League of Cities, 426 US at 852.
6" "[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself." Garcia, 469 US at
550. "[T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal
power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself,
rather than in discrete limitations on objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests,
then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id at 552. The Court
has expanded upon this view in South Carolina v Baker, 108 S Ct 1355 (1988), characteriz-
ing Garcia as holding that Tenth Amendment "limits are structural, not substantive-i.e.,
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Amendment as an affirmation of state sovereign authority but "the
fact that the States remain sovereign as to all powers not vested in
Congress or denied them by the Constitution offers no guidance
about where the frontier between state and federal power lies. In
short, we have no license to employ freestanding conceptions of
state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause.
64
If the frontier is to be found anywhere, it is to be found on the
outer edges of congressional power under the Constitution:
[T]he sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution
itself. A variety of sovereign powers ... are withdrawn from
the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8 of the same Article
works an equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty by au-
thorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative pow-
ers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI) to displace contrary state legislation."'
Several themes flow from Garcia's restatement of these familiar
principles. The concept of state sovereignty is implicitly recognized
as predating constitutional union. The Tenth Amendment is
treated as a statement that states possess residual sovereign pow-
ers, but the extent of those sovereign powers is measured by the
area left for state action after Congress has validly exercised its
delegated powers . 6 This approach to the Tenth Amendment as-
sumes that the task is simply to describe the limits of federal
power; whatever remains is state sovereignty. An alternative ap-
proach is to start with state power: all powers are reserved to the
states except those prohibited and those delegated. Thus, unless
Congress acts pursuant to a power that is comfortably within the
zone of authority delegated to it, Congress has usurped authority
belonging to the states. Though the end result is theoretically iden-
tical, the manner in which the inquiry is formulated suggests a
that States must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national
political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity." Id at
1360.
" Garcia, 469 US at 550.
65 Id at 548.
61 Professor Berns contends that the Tenth Amendment, by itself, "is not and cannot
provide a rule of law of the Constitution," and hence its legal meaning is supplied only in
reference to the limitations on valid congressional power. Walter Berns, The Meaning of the
Tenth Amendment, in Robert A. Goldwin, ed, A Nation of States 139, 146, 158-61 (Rand
McNally, 2d ed 1974). But see Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design 84 (U Okla,
1987) ("Why does not the express reservation of undelegated powers equally furnish the
'terms' of constitutional adjudication?").
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great deal about the likely conclusions concerning distribution of
state and federal power.17
The Court's decision in National League of Cities was a short-
lived effort to find in the Tenth Amendment a principle of state
sovereignty that insulated some state activities from congressional
regulation that would otherwise be valid as applied to private par-
ties. The abandonment of this enterprise in Garcia signals the
Court's unwillingness to stake out a boundary to congressional
power as applied to the states any more restrictive than that appli-
cable to private entities. The conventional reading of Garcia is
that the "Court abdicate[d] tenth amendment questions. 6 8 While
it may have done so formally, in effect the Court simply trans-
ferred attention to Article I in the judicial interpretive task of sur-
veying the federal-state frontier. Generous readings of congres-
sional power push the federal boundary well into state territory;
revisionist notions of congressional power promise a reversal of this
trend. 9 It is on this turf that many future battles will be fought,
but not the entire war.
There remain a number of "freestanding" conceptions sur-
rounding "federalism" that have at their core notions of state sov-
ereignty very much like the sovereignty principles abandoned to
the political arena in Garcia. If these principles were to be thought
of as Tenth Amendment guarantees,70 or simply as rooted in Tenth
Amendment principles of residual sovereignty, rather than seem-
ingly unconnected and disparate doctrines, courts would be re-
quired, or at least encouraged, to rethink the permissible limits of
67 A good example of this approach is Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
Chief Justice Marshall observed that "[c]ommerce among the states" does not "comprehend
that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a
state, or between different parts of the same state.... [T]he enumeration of the particular
classes of commerce to which the [commerce clause] power was to be extended ... presup-
poses something not enumerated; and that something... must be the exclusively internal
commerce of a state." Id at 194-95. Thus, when Marshall correctly observed that "the sover-
eignty of congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects" (id at
197), it is evident that his starting point was the reserved powers of the states to regulate
their internal commerce.
'8 A. E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recur-
rence to Fundamental Principles, 19 Ga L Rev 789, 793 (1985).
" See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73
Va L Rev 1387 (1987); Berger, Founders' Design (cited in note 66).
70 The Court has begun to provide verbal, if not substantive, recognition of this point:
"We use 'the Tenth Amendment' to encompass any implied constitutional limitation on
Congress' authority to regulate state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth Amendment
itself or in principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution." South Caro-
lina v Baker, 108 S Ct 1355, 1360 n 4 (1988).
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congressional action and state sovereignty. Moreover, to the extent
these freestanding sovereignty notions are treated as aspects of a
state's residual sovereignty preserved by the Tenth Amendment, it
becomes apparent that, despite protestations to the contrary in
Garcia, the Court is constantly engaged in a judicial patrol of the
frontier between federal and state sovereignty. A brief examination
of some of these sovereignty principles may serve to clarify the
point.
These principles may best be understood in terms of the broad
rationales that seem to unite disparate sovereignty doctrines. First,
under both the Erie doctrine and the adequate and independent
state grounds principle, the Court has relied on the premise that a
jurisdictional grant does not automatically confer substantive law-
making authority. Thus, the Court has recognized the principle of
state sovereignty by its deference to state law as the dispositive
rule of decision in these cases. Second, even when a substantive
issue of federal law is clearly present in a case and no dispositive
issue of state law is present, the Court has refrained from exercis-
ing the full force of federal question jurisdiction in order to accom-
modate perceived state sovereignty interests. This pattern is seen
most readily in such doctrines as abstention, exhaustion, and the
statutory commands of the Anti-Injunction Act. Finally, in deter-
mining the scope of the Article I prohibitions upon state power,
the Court has fashioned tests that defer to state interests so long
as federal authority is not thereby impaired. The Court's Compact
Clause jurisprudence is perhaps the clearest example.
1. Adequate and independent state grounds.
The United States Supreme Court has "from the time of its
foundation . . . adhered to the principle that it will not review
judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent
state grounds." 71 This doctrine has proved to be a "vexing issue '72
as the Supreme Court has struggled with the problem of deciding
whether a state ground has been passed upon and, if so, whether
that ground is sufficiently adequate and independent of federal
claims present in the litigation to support the state court's deci-
71 Herb v Pitcairn, 324 US 117, 125 (1945). This proposition follows from the fact that
the Supreme Court's statutorily created appellate jurisdiction of state court judgments has
always been limited to review of federal questions decided by the state courts. See 28 USC §
1257 (1948); see also note 76.
" Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1038 (1983).
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sion.73 Where federal claims are present, the adequate and inde-
pendent state grounds doctrine can be claimed to be constitution-
ally required, 4 compelled by statute," or merely prudential.76
11 See generally Thomas E. Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State
Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a M6bius Strip, 19 Ga L Rev 799 (1985);
Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum L Rev 943 (1965); Tribe, American
Constitutional Law at 162-73 (cited in note 2).
"" The argument begins with the proposition that where a state court judgment rests on
adequate and independent state grounds the federal courts are deprived of jurisdiction of all
claims in the case, including the federal ones. If this is so, it must be because of the respect
due one sovereign by another. Though "tihe jurisdiction of the nation ... is susceptible of
no limitation, not imposed by itself," The Schooner Exchange v M'Faddon, 11 US (7
Cranch) 116, 136 (1812), that self-imposed limitation can be read into the principle of
residual state sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment. This idea derives some sup-
port from Murdock v Memphis, 87 US (20 Wall) 590 (1874), in which the Court expressed
doubt about the power of Congress to enable the federal courts to review and decide issues
of state law independently of the state courts. Id at 626, 633. Professor Tribe contends that
Murdock bars the Court from "reviewing federal issues in those cases which also contain
state issues dispositive of the case." Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 163 (cited in
note 2) (emphasis in original). This is because Murdock has a "constitutional resonance"
that prevents the Congress from authorizing the Supreme Court to decide state law issues.
Id at 380. See also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
Colum L Rev 489, 503 (1954).
" Congress, of course, has authority under the "exceptions and regulations" Clause to
restrict the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. US Const, Art Ill, § 2, cl 2. See also Ex
parte McCardle, 74 US (7 Wall) 506 (1868) (recognizing at least a limited power for Con-
gress to withdraw the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in appeals from lower
federal courts). From the Judiciary Act of 1789 on, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion over state courts has been limited to cases posing certain federal issues. See Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch 20, § 25, 1 Stat 73, 85-87, codified as amended at 28 USCA § 1257 (Supp
1989). In 1867 Congress removed a proviso in § 25 of the 1789 Act that limited the Court's
appellate jurisdiction to the review of federal issues. Act of Feb 5, 1867, ch 28, § 2, 14 Stat
385, 386-87. In Murdock v Memphis, 87 US (20 Wall) 590 (1874), the Court concluded that
Congress had not intended to confer jurisdiction over state law matters since the repeal of
the 1789 proviso was not a sufficiently clear statement of such intent. Id at 619, 630. Con-
gress has never responded by an explicit grant of such jurisdiction, apparently content that
its statutory directives are satisfied by the Court's employment of the adequate and inde-
pendent state grounds doctrine. Murdock is commonly regarded as a germinal source of the
adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, though that reading of Murdock has re-
cently been criticized. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 Harv L Rev 881, 920-22 & nn 180-81 (1986); Richard A. Matasar and Gregory S.
Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 Colurn L Rev 1291, 1317-22 (1986).
" Ever since Martin v Hunter's Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304 (1816), the Supreme
Court has possessed power to review state court judgments of federal statutory or constitu-
tional law. As a theoretical proposition, a case containing a federal issue confers federal
jurisdiction; the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is not a jurisdictional bar
but is a judicial refusal to exercise its jurisdiction. Matasar and Bruch contend that Martin
also "broadly authorizes federal review of state law matters." Matasar & Bruch, 86 Colum L
Rev at 1297 (cited in note 75), (emphasis in original). More precisely, their contention is
that, in deciding the case prior to Martin, the Court was compelled to pass upon the validity
of Hunter's title under Virginia law. Fairfax's Devisee v Hunter's Lessee, 11 US (7 Cranch)
603 (1813); see also Matasar & Bruch, 86 Colum L Rev at 1297-98. In fact, the ultimate title
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Because Congress has never conferred upon the Supreme Court
the power to review state court determinations of state law in fed-
eral question cases,7 7 the issue of the constitutional validity of fed-
eral judicial review of purely state claims has never squarely
arisen.78 If Congress did so act, the Court would have to decide
whether Congress can deprive the states of their lawmaking auton-
omy in order to effectuate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The conclusion of two esteemed commentators that such congres-
sional action would violate the Tenth Amendment and "related
principles of state autonomy" 79 surely indicates a belief that the
Tenth Amendment, even after Garcia, possesses some normative
core of its own. 0 It is within that core-which includes the "tacit
determination hinged on federal treaty law issues. Martin, 14 US (1 Wheat) at 358. Inquiry
into the state of title under Virginia law was simply a "preliminary inquiry" undertaken in
order to "construe the treaty in reference to that title." Id. See also Smith v Maryland, 10
US (6 Cranch) 286, 305-07 (1810) (similar inquiry made into Maryland law in order to de-
termine treaty issues). Matasar and Bruch also cite Osborn v Bank of the United States, 22
US (9 Wheat) 738 (1824), in support of the proposition that the federal courts may take
jurisdiction of a case if it contains any federal issue and thereafter decide both state and
federal issues presented. 86 Colum L Rev at 1299-1300 (cited in note 75). But this reading of
Osborn is overbroad, for Osborn does not purport to hold that the federal courts may decide
state law independently and thereafter bind the states through the Supremacy Clause.
While the federal courts might have wielded such power under the diversity clause prior to
Erie R.R. v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938), they have never had such power in federal ques-
tion cases.
7 See note 75. If federal courts possessed the power of appellate review of pure state
law issues, the exercise of that power would result in the creation of a federal common law
that would displace state law. The alternative is the untidy phenomenon of a federal court
altering settled interpretations of state law under the pretense of acting as a state's final
court of appeal. For example, in a case posing the issue of the legal effect of a plaintiff's
negligence under California law, a federal court might conclude that California's rule of
comparative negligence is displaced by a federal rule of contributory negligence, rather than
asserting the power to revise settled California law by substituting contributory for compar-
ative negligence as a matter of California law. Although the former notion bears some simi-
larities to the doctrine of Clearfield Trust Co. v United States, 318 US 363 (1943), which
fashioned a post-Erie federal common law with respect to commercial paper issued by the
United States, either idea carries in it the germ of a wholesale destruction of a state's inde-
pendent law making power. This potential for elimination of state sovereignty thus strongly
suggests that federal review of pure state law issues does not comport with the residual state
sovereignty preserved by the Tenth Amendment. Professor Merritt has argued that, unless
the states "retain sufficient autonomy to establish and maintain their own forms of govern-
ment" they are deprived of the federal government's pledge to "guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government." US Const, Art IV, § 4. See Deborah Jones
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
Colum L Rev 1, 2 (1988).
" But see discussion of Martin v Hunter's Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304 (1816) and
Fairfax's Devisee v Hunter's Lessee, 11 US (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), in note 76.
7' Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 163 (cited in note 2); Field, 99 Harv L Rev at
919 n 174 (cited in note 75).
80 This normative core of state sovereignty can also be derived from the delegated and
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postulates""1 of the Constitution with respect to state sover-
eignty-that the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine
resides.
2. The Erie doctrine.
The familiar rule of Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins8 2 partakes
heavily of the Tenth Amendment. Federal courts sitting in diver-
sity are bound by state decisional law to the same extent as state
courts, and may not infer from the grant of diversity jurisdiction
itself a power to contravene state precedents by fashioning a fed-
eral common law.8 3 Even in federal question cases involving state
law issues, Erie commands that state decisional law be observed.8 4
When considered with Murdock v Memphis, 5 which holds that the
Supreme Court will not review issues of state law,86 the Erie doc-
trine preserves the integrity of state law from federal judicial ero-
sion. While the long history of a general common law as the rule of
decision in federal courts prior to Erie prevents any flat assertion
that the Tenth Amendment compels the holding in Erie, the mod-
ern entrenchment of Erie doctrine is further evidence that the
"tacit postulates" of state sovereignty continue to prosper.
3. Abstention.
Although the federal courts have, since Marbury v Madison,8 7
recognized their "virtually unflagging obligation.., to exercise the
jurisdiction given them"' s the Supreme Court has fashioned sev-
eral abstention doctrines "to promote the integrity of state law and
respect the autonomy of state judicial officers."8 9 Though it is gen-
erally agreed that abstention doctrines are not constitutionally re-
quired,90 they nonetheless derive considerable support from the
limited nature of the powers given Congress under Article I. The result is the same as if the
Tenth Amendment were read to impose the limits.
81 Nevada v Hall, 440 US 410, 433 (1979) (Rehnquist dissenting).
82 304 US 64 (1938).
83 For a restatement of this familiar principle, in the context of a much larger work, see
Field, 99 Harv L Rev at 915-27 (cited in note 75).
8, Id at 912 n 141.
85 87 US (20 Wall) 590 (1874).
88 See note 75.
87 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
88 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v United States, 424 US 800, 817 (1976).
89 Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 196 (cited in note 2).
98 See, for example, Matasar & Bruch, 86 Colum L Rev at 1337-38 (cited in note 75)
(abstention is "founded solely on judicial policymaking"); Michael Wells, Why Professor
Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 Ga L Rev 1097 (1985) (abstention is a federal com-
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"tacit postulates" of state sovereignty that pervade the Constitu-
tion and are most explicitly recognized in the Tenth Amendment.
In Younger v Harris,91 the Supreme Court held that principles
of "comity and federalism" prevented the federal courts from en-
joining state criminal prosecutions. That doctrine has been ex-
tended to actions seeking declaratory relief concerning criminal lia-
bility"2 and, most recently, to state civil proceedings.9 3 Although
the Court makes no claim that abstention is constitutionally re-
quired, its discussion of the applicable principles has proceeded
from constitutional norms. In Younger itself the Court emphasized
that "the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments ... [and] the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their sepa-
rate functions in their separate ways." 4 Similarly, later courts
have described Younger as resulting from a desire to avoid the
"unseemly failure to give effect to the principle that state courts
have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts 'to
guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the
mon law doctrine). See also Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allo-
cation of Judicial Power 233-321 (Michie, 1980); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation
of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L J 71 (1984) (abstention vio-
lates separation of powers).
91 401 US 37 (1971)
92 Samuels v Mackell, 401 US 66, 69-74 (1971).
93 It is not clear that Younger applies to all civil litigation. The Younger doctrine was
first extended to civil proceedings in Huffman v Pursue, Ltd., 420 US 592 (1975), but in
Juidice v Vail, 430 US 327 (1977), the Court indicated that Younger policies are fully appli-
cable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved, id at
333-34, and saved "for another day" the broader question of whether Younger applies to all
civil proceedings. Id at 336 n 13. While the Court has still not expressly answered the ques-
tion reserved in Juidice, it has implicitly done so in Pennzoil Co. v Texaco, Inc., 107 S Ct
1519 (1987) (extending Younger to judgment lien and appeal bond requirements in private
state civil actions). Justice Blackmun thought the reasoning of the Pennzoil majority
threatened to expand Younger to apply "whenever any State proceeding is ongoing, no mat-
ter how attenuated the State's interests .... ." Id at 1534 (Blackmun concurring in judg-
ment). The Court's decision in Pennzoil thus does what Justice Brennan thought the
Juidice decision had done sub rosa. Juidice, 430 US at 345 n * (Brennan dissenting)
(describing the Juidice reservation for another day as a "tongue in cheek ... signal that
merely the formal announcement [of Younger's application to all civil proceedings] is being
postponed").
"1 Younger, 401 US at 44. Following the Pennzoil Court's extension of Younger deeply
into the civil arena, see note 93, "it is certainly clear.., that the most basic underpinning of
the Younger doctrine is not any special equity concept but, rather a federalism-based notion
of comity." Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 203-04, n 9 (cited in note 2). (emphasis
in original). See also Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and
State Power, 100 Harv L Rev 1485, 1488-89, 1531-34 (1987) (at the core of Younger doctrine
is a concern for protecting role of state courts as independent adjudicators of state and
federal constitutional issues).
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Constitution of the United States.'"" The Supremacy Clause both
imposes this responsibility and limits the discretion of the sover-
eign state courts: violations of federally protected rights are sus-
ceptible to correction in the federal courts. 6 Thus, while Younger
abstention is framed in the rhetoric of discretion and prudence, it
has roots in two inextricably linked constitutional guarantees:
residual state sovereignty and supremacy of federal law.9 7 The
Younger doctrine recognizes the state courts' residual sovereignty
by permitting them to complete their own judicial proceedings
without federal intrusion and recognizes the supremacy of federal
law both by reminding the states of their duty to observe and en-
force that law and by permitting collateral review of state court
judgments in the federal courts.
Similar reasoning informs the Burford" and Pullman99 ab-
stention doctrines. The Burford doctrine represents the prudential
judgment of the Court that state regulatory schemes involving is-
sues of overriding state concern should be left to the state
courts. 100 Implicit in this doctrine is the view that the states'
residual sovereignty ought to be respected. 101 Indeed, one of the
" Steffel v Thompson, 415 US 452, 460-61 (1974), quoting Robb v Connolly, 111 US
624, 637 (1884).
,' Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and collateral review via habeas
corpus are the principal avenues for such correction. See 28 USC § 1257, 2241, 2254.
"' These same principles inform the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 USC § 2283 (1982). See
text at notes 113-20.
91 Burford v Sun Oil Co., 319 US 315, 318 (1943) (federal courts should refrain from
exercising jurisdiction in order to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state
of its own affairs). See also Kaiser Steel Corp. v W.S. Ranch Co., 391 US 593 (1968); United
Gas Pipe Line Co. v Ideal Cement Co., 369 US 134 (1962); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n. v
Southern Ry. Co., 341 US 341 (1951).
'9 Railroad Comm. of Texas v Pullman Co., 312 US 496 (1941) (federal courts should
refrain from exercising jurisdiction if the case presents an unsettled issue of state law, the
resolution of which might avoid a federal constitutional question).
100 In Burford, Texas had created an administrative system to review decisions of the
Texas Railroad Commission, which regulates Texas' important oil and gas industry. The
administrative scheme was designed to achieve uniformity and to effectuate the substantive
policies of Texas. The Court concluded that abstention from consideration of Sun Oil's chal-
lenge to a licensing order of the Railroad Commission was necessary in order to avoid under-
mining the state's substantive and procedural policies embedded in the administrative
scheme. Burford, 319 US at 325-34.
101 The Supreme Court has since stated that Burford abstention applies whenever fed-
eral review of a state question "would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern." Colorado River Water Cons.
Dist. v United States, 424 US 800, 814 (1976). While this appears to be an acknowledge-
ment of residual state sovereignty, some commentators believe that the rationale underlying
Burford is not clear. See Wells, 19 Ga L Rev at 1115-18 (cited in note 90); Comment, Ab-
stention by Federal Courts in Suits Challenging State Administrative Decisions: The Scope
of the Burford Doctrine, 46 U Chi L Rev 971 (1979).
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variants upon the Burford doctrine, Thibodaux' abstention, ap-
plies to cases that present "difficult questions of state law bearing
on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar."'10 3 In other words,
the federal courts have no business making important state policies
by deciding issues of state law. If this is not a recognition of
residual state sovereignty, the principle simply does not exist.
Pullman abstention is a doctrine by which federal courts defer
to the state courts by permitting them to solve on their own unset-
tled issues of state law, rather than exercising federal jurisdiction
to determine the case on federal constitutional grounds. Pullman
is perhaps the most deferential doctrine, for it counsels abstention
even when there is no assurance that the state courts will act to
decide the case on state grounds.104 It requires that "when a fed-
eral constitutional claim is premised on an unsettled question of
state law, the federal court should stay its hand in order to provide
the state courts an opportunity to settle the underlying state law
question and thus avoid the possibility of unnecessarily deciding a
constitutional question."'1 5 Its purpose is to avoid interference
with state courts in their role as "the principal expositors of state
law"'106 by channeling the resolution of state issues to the state
courts and reserving to the federal courts the unavoidable federal
claims. 107 While federal courts exercising Pullman abstention gen-
erally retain jurisdiction by staying the federal action pending
state law clarification, 08 and while the Court has "repeatedly
102 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v Thibodaux, 360 US 25 (1959).
Colorado River, 424 US at 814.
104 Of course, if the case is decided on federal grounds, or on an ambiguous mixture of
federal and state grounds, the Supreme Court may exercise jurisdiction on certiorari. Michi-
gan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1037-42 (1983). See also notes and text at notes 71-81.
105 Harris County Comm'rs Court v Moore, 420 US 77, 83 (1975) (emphasis added).
Pullman abstention only applies when a constitutional issue is posed; the presence of a
federal statutory issue is not enough. Propper v Clark, 337 US 472, 490 (1949). The defini-
tive treatment of Pullman abstention is Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional
Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U Pa L Rev 1071 (1974).
106 Moore v Sims, 442 US 415, 429 (1979).
107 Pullman abstention may also seem to borrow from Justice Brandeis's explication of
the devices the Court has used to avoid deciding constitutional issues. See Ashwander v
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis concurring). A crucial differ-
ence may be seen by supposing a case where the only federal issue posed amidst a host of
state law issues is one concerning the Constitution. If a federal court were to ignore the
Pullman doctrine and exercise its jurisdiction, but then apply the Ashwander doctrine to
avoid reaching the constitutional issue, Erie-type federalism problems would be raised since
a federal court might be tempted to refashion state law. Pullman abstention thus plays a
key role in avoiding such federal-state conflict.
101 Harris County, 420 US at 83. A litigant cannot be compelled to submit her federal
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warned" the federal courts that Pullman abstention should only be
invoked in "special circumstances,"' 10 9 the rationale underlying the
Pullman doctrine partakes heavily of the "tacit postulates" of
residual state sovereignty.
That the abstention doctrines are rooted in conceptions of
state sovereignty, whether expressed as comity or as a constitu-
tional right reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment,
can be seen even more clearly in what the Supreme Court consid-
ers to be outside the abstention pigeonhole. Commentators speak
of Colorado River abstention'" as a doctrine that "involves paral-
lel actions filed in both state and federal courts .... [and] autho-
rizes federal courts to decline their jurisdiction to foster sound
management of cases.""' Yet, the Court does not regard the Colo-
rado River rule as a true abstention doctrine because it is not
founded upon "considerations of state-federal comity or... avoid-
ance of constitutional decisions.""' If this foundation is the sine
qua non of abstention, then abstention ranks in the first order of
the Constitution's "tacit postulates" of residual state sovereignty.
Moreover, given the constitutional obligation of federal courts to
exercise their jurisdiction, their failure to do so can best be ex-
plained by positing a judicial recognition that, in a dual sover-
eignty system, each sovereign must be the master of its own laws.
Like a mountain range that has been thrust upward by the colli-
sion of tectonic plates, abstention is a doctrine that has grown up
by the collision of constitutional principles. The discretionary na-
ture of abstention does not reflect a lack of constitutional founda-
tion so much as it illustrates the continually shifting, and hard-to-
locate, frontier of federal and state sovereignty. The Court has
been able to keep the sentry post manned here; there is no reason
to think that its abandonment of the Garcia post presages a gen-
eral retirement from the frontier.
4. Anti-Injunction Act.
A concept related to abstention is to be found in the Anti-
claims to the state court for final adjudication. See England v Louisiana State Bd. of Medi-
cal Examiners, 375 US 411, 415-17 (1964).
109 Harris County, 420 US at 83.
110 Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v United States, 424 US 800 (1976). See, for ex-
ample, Matasar & Bruch, 86 Colum L Rev at 1337 n 232, 1342 (cited in note 75).
m Matasar & Bruch, 86 Colum L Rev at 1342 (cited in note 75).
11 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v Mercury Construction Corp., 460 US 1, 14-15
(1983).
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Injunction Act, 13 which prohibits federal courts from enjoining
state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect
or effectuate its judgments.' 1 4 It has been a continuous limitation
upon federal invasion of state sovereignty since its enactment as
part of the Judiciary Act of 1793.115 While its express terms pre-
sume congressional authority to vest federal courts with the power
to invade state judicial sovereignty, its existence since the forma-
tion of the federal union is a powerful signal of a fundamental
limit upon federal authority. The Court's recognition of that limit
can be seen most plainly in the interaction between the Anti-In-
junction Act and the Younger doctrine. For example, a federal
court in a § 1983 action may enjoin state court proceedings because
§ 1983 is deemed to be sufficient "express authorization" by Con-
gress to escape the statutory bar of the Anti-Injunction Act."'
Nevertheless, the mere removal of the statutory bar does not
"qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity and federalism
that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state pro-
ceeding.""" Thus, the Younger doctrine seems both to compel a
more stringent prohibition than the Anti-Injunction Act, and to
derive its compulsive force from mandatory principles of "equity,
comity and federalism." If state sovereignty principles possess such
clout, it is difficult to accept that the Tenth Amendment, the clear-
est textual expression of these values, is no more than a descriptive
and passive placeholder.'"
This conclusion is not rooted solely in the Younger doctrine,
1. 28 USC § 2283 (1982).
114 Id.
" Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat at 334, 335 (1793) ("a writ of injunction [shall not]
be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state"). This provision has been codified as
Rev Stat § 720 (1878); Judicial Code § 265 (1911); 28 USC § 379 (1940); and finally at 28
USC § 2283 (1982).
16 Mitchum v Foster, 407 US 225 (1972).
17 Id at 243 (emphasis added). This principle was emphatically reaffirmed in Pennzoil
Co. v Texaco, Inc., 107 S Ct 1519, 1525-26 (1987).
18 The intersection of the Anti-Injunction Act and Younger principles casts doubt on
the glib observation in United States v Darby, 312 US 100 (1941), that the Tenth Amend-
ment is a "truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." Id at 124. If a
federal court in a 42 USC § 1983 action has the power to enjoin a state court (because
Congress has authorized it to do so) but it may not exercise that power due to principles of
"equity, comity and federalism," it appears that something exists that vetoes congressional
attempts to exercise its powers. That "something" may be a recognition that Congress is
acting beyond its delegated powers, an exercise of judicial prudence, or a recognition that
retained state sovereignty occupies a sphere that, in some instances, trumps congressional
power.
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however. The rules embodied in the Anti-Injunction Act may well
be constitutionally required.119 If the boundaries of state sover-
eignty, preserved by the Tenth Amendment, are defined by the
limits of the powers entrusted to the federal government, 120 the
federal courts must possess the power to intrude upon state juris-
diction when Congress so directs through a valid exercise of its leg-
islative powers, or when necessary to preserve the valid jurisdic-
tional limits of the federal courts. But surely the federal courts are
not able to restrain state courts if the Congress directs them to do
so pursuant to an illegitimate claim of authority, or if the federal
courts themselves act outside their jurisdictional grant. From this
perspective, the Anti-Injunction Act is more than a monument to a
customary practice since the nation's beginning; it is another em-
bodiment of the Constitution's tacit postulates of twin
sovereignties.
5. Exhaustion of state administrative remedies.
Another doctrine related to Tenth Amendment principles is
the requirement that plaintiffs contending that a state has violated
their constitutional rights must first exhaust their state adminis-
trative remedies before seeking relief in the federal courts. 2' The
Supreme Court has justified this rule as necessary to provide the
states an opportunity to protect federal constitutional rights
through their own systems, to ensure that the litigant's assertions
of state misconduct are correct, and to avoid an unnecessary con-
stitutional decision when the states may obviate the claim by their
119 More strictly, part of the Anti-Injunction Act is a canon of statutory construction,
which the Court might read into all statutes under Younger-type principles even in the
absence of the Act; part of the Act is constitutionally compelled, so that Congress might not
be able to order the federal courts to enjoin state proceedings merely to effectuate the fed-
eral courts' diversity jurisdiction.
120 Of course, the limits of state sovereignty are also defined by the prohibitions upon
the states contained in the Constitution. US Const, Amend X.
121 See, for example, Illinois Commerce Comm'n v Thompson, 318 US 675, 686 (1943);
First Natl Bank of Greely v Board of County Comm'rs, 264 US 450 (1924). Suits under 42
USC § 1983 are exempt from the requirement. See Patsy v Board of Regents of Florida, 457
US 496 (1982). But see note 118 and accompanying text (abstention applies even to § 1983
actions). In general, there is no requirement that a litigant exhaust state judicial remedies.
See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v Los Angeles, 227 US 278, 284-86 (1913) (interpreting the Four-
teenth Amendment); Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 183 (1961) (construing 42 USC § 1983).
But see Prentis v Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 US 210, 229-30 (1908) (litigant must exhaust
both state administrative and judicial remedies if the state courts participate in the admin-
istrative process); 28 USC § 2254 (exhaustion of state judicial remedies required for habeas
corpus); 28 USC § 1341 (state tax collection issues); 28 USC § 1342 (state utility rate
orders).
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own action.122 In its frank concern for the role demanded of the
states by the Supremacy Clause in preserving federal constitu-
tional rights, the exhaustion requirement echoes one aspect of the
Younger rationale.123 While the Supremacy Clause obligates the
states to enforce the Constitution, residual state sovereignty prin-
ciples should, and often do, operate to give the state courts and
administrative systems the first opportunity to fulfill their obliga-
tion. The role of the federal judiciary is only to act as a corrective
in cases of state inaction or misconduct.
6. Compact Clause.
The Court has also applied Tenth Amendment notions of
state sovereignty, while not openly acknowledging its debt, in in-
terpreting the Compact Clause, which provides that "[n]o state
shall, without the consent of Congress,... enter into any Agree-
ment or Compact with another State .... "I24 The Clause has been
interpreted to require congressional consent only for those com-
pacts that infringe upon "the political power or influence" of a
state or that encroach "upon the full and free exercise of Federal
authority.11 25 Thus, for example, reciprocal tax statutes are
deemed beyond the requirements of the Compact Clause because
they neither compromise the state's authority nor intrude upon
federal authority. 2 6
Since it prohibits the states from exercising the full range of
their authority, the Compact Clause forms part of the frontier of
the states' residual sovereignty. In charting this segment of the
frontier, the Court has chosen a test that sensibly defers to state
interests so long as federal authority is not thereby impaired. If the
shaping influence of residual state sovereignty was not at work
here, there would be no need for a test that gives ample latitude to
states. A rigid textualist, oblivious to state sovereignty themes,
"I See, for example, Prentis v Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 US 210, 230 (1908).
M' See text at notes 95-97.
11. US Const, Art I, § 10, cl 3.
'" Virginia v Tennessee, 148 US 503, 520 (1893).
M' See United States Steel Corp. v Multistate Tax Commission, 434 US 452 (1978), in
which 21 states created a joint commission to coordinate state taxation of businesses operat-
ing in multiple states. Although the tax compact increased the power of the states relative
to the corporate taxpayer, the Court found that comparison irrelevant, noting that the test
was "whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government." Id at
473. See also Bode v Barrett, 344 US 583, 586 (1953) (Court upholds the validity of an
Illinois state tax challenged under the Compact Clause. The tax exempted non-residents if
their home states reciprocated and granted like exemptions to Illinois residents).
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might simply declare that the Compact Clause requires congres-
sional approval of every interstate agreement, no matter what its
impact may be on the apportionment of sovereign authority be-
tween the states and the national government. The Court's rejec-
tion of this approach is another sure indication of the vitality of
state sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment.
A curious anomaly thus emerges in the current law of the
Tenth Amendment. The state-federal frontier formed by Tenth
Amendment jurisdictional doctrines is willingly policed by the
Court as it relates to Article III. But where the border is delineated
by the extent of congressional legislative power, the Court is sim-
ply not willing to find any independent limiting force in the Tenth
Amendment itself,127 nor does it appear willing to reconsider the
limits of congressional authority (particularly under the Commerce
Clause) 128 in light of the Constitution's explicit and tacit com-
mands to preserve state sovereignty.
Current Tenth Amendment doctrine may be classified within
the mainstream of the "cooperative federalism" doctrine decried
by Professor Corwin. 29 While cooperative federalists posit a sys-
tem embodying a sharing of functions between the state and fed-
eral governments, the system in reality is one of ever expanding
federal authority at the expense of the states. 30 The implicit adop-
tion of cooperative federalism by a majority of the Supreme Court
best explains the unwillingness of the Court to recognize the scat-
tered manifestations of state sovereignty as part of a single Tenth
127 See South Carolina v Baker, 108 S Ct 1355 (1988), in which the Court concluded
that the Tenth Amendment afforded no limitation upon congressional power to tax interest
income paid on state bearer bonds. The Court treated Congress' action "as if it directly
regulated States by prohibiting outright the issuance of bearer bonds," but concluded that it
was not one of the "extraordinary defects in the national political process [that] might
render congressional regulation of state activities invalid under the Tenth Amendment." Id
at 1360. The Court did not furnish much illumination concerning the nature of the "ex-
traordinary defects" that breathe life into the Tenth Amendment, hinting only that a state's
exclusion from the political process or its subjection to invidious discrimination might be
sufficient. In essence, the Court concluded that so long as Congress operates in a procedur-
ally regular fashion within its delegated powers, the states may not use the Tenth Amend-
ment to shield themselves from such action. While this conclusion simply restates the no-
tion that the boundaries of state-federal sovereignty are determined by the valid exercise of
federal powers, it fails entirely to account for the Court's vigorous use of its power to guard
the sovereignty frontier in the jurisdictional sector.
1'8 Of course, the Court's view of the commerce power has vacillated over time. See
generally Epstein, 73 Va L Rev 1387 (cited in note 69); Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce
Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite (Quadrangle, 1937); Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law § 5-4, 305-10 (cited in note 2).
"9 Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va L Rev 1 (1950).
130 Id at 2.
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Amendment guarantee of such sovereignty. Moreover, the explicit
recognition of state sovereignty as a constitutional principle would
require the Court to acknowledge other difficult propositions: 1)
the national government possesses only a few enumerated powers
and purposes; 2) within their respective spheres the states and the
national government are each wholly sovereign; and 3) there is a
natural and continuing tension between these respective sovereign-
ties.' If the Court was to return to a concept of dual sovereignty,
its immediate task would be to rein in congressional actions that
transgress the limited, enumerated powers that the Constitution
vests in Congress. If those limits were policed, consignment of the
Tenth Amendment to the political realm of Congress under Garcia
would be far less damaging to state sovereignty; residual state sov-
ereignty would necessarily expand as the Congress became more
effectively tethered to its limited and enumerated powers.
Whatever the future development of Tenth Amendment juris-
prudence, its current split personality can accommodate much of
current Eleventh Amendment doctrine. Sections IV and V of this
article attempt to demonstrate that the state sovereign immunity
principles that the Court found in the Eleventh Amendment a cen-
tury after its enactment s2 more properly belong with the collection
of Tenth Amendment jurisdictional doctrines that the Court is
currently willing to enforce. For that demonstration to be convinc-
ing, it is necessary first to sketch the evolution of state sovereign
immunity in America, in order to defuse Justice Bradley's asser-
tion in Hans that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to con-
stitutionalize a broad principle of state sovereign immunity from
suit in the federal courts.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN AMERIcA: A BRIEF HISTORY
At least four hundred years before the first English coloniza-
tion of America, during the reign of Henry III, English common
law held that, while the king could not be sued in his own courts,
he was obliged, as the source of justice, to redress wrongs done to
his subjects under color of royal authority. This obligation was
partly moral and partly legal, but not susceptible to judicial en-
forcement.'3 3 During the reign of Henry III's successor, Edward I,
at the turn of the fourteenth century, these conceptions were
131 Id at 4.
"' See Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1 (1890).
33 William Holdsworth, 9 A History of English Law 8 (Metheun, 3d ed 1926)
("Holdsworth").
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transformed into definite procedures to enable subjects to obtain
redress from the crown.' 3 4 The principal device was the petition of
right, which permitted proceedings against the crown by name. 3 5
In theory the king could deny a petition of right, thereby prevent-
ing the subject's recovery from the royal purse. In practice, the pe-
tition of right was issued, not as a matter of royal discretion, but in
conformity with law. Petitions were routinely granted whenever
plaintiffs made out a prima facie claim for redress. 36 Issuance of
the petition of right merely authorized trial on the merits, but a
successful claimant was entitled to recovery directly from the
crown.
137
Other remedies against the crown were also available. The
Court of Augmentations,"8" Court of Wards,"3 9 and Court of Sur-
veyors"1° was each vested with statutory jurisdiction of claims
against the crown. Through these courts, English subjects were af-
forded a right to proceed against the crown for recovery of money
or debts, and such recovery was a common occurrence. 4' More-
over, whatever theoretical immunity the crown possessed, it did
not extend to other government officers or to corporate bodies
chartered by the Crown.'42 Accordingly, a suit against such entities
134 Id.
135 Its close cousin was the "monstrans de droit," the literal translation of which is
"manifestation of right." The procedure was employed when a subject contested the crown's
claim to property and sought to vindicate his. claim solely by reference to the record upon
which the crown's claim was based. See 9 Holdsworth at 24-26 (cited in note 133). Both
procedures are discussed by Blackstone. See William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the
Laws of England *256-57 (Chicago, 1979) ("Blackstone").
13' See 9 Holdsworth at 15 (cited in note 133); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Govern-
ments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv L Rev 1, 4 (1963); Edwin M. Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L J 1, 6-7, 31-32 (1924); Edwin M. Borchard, Gov-
ernmental Responsibility in Tort V, 36 Yale L J 757, 758 (1926); Jacobs, Sovereign Immu-
nity at 6 (cited in note 2).
137 See, for example, Pawlett v Attorney General, 145 Eng Rep (Hardres 465) 550 (Ex
1668) (recovery by citizen of property that had wrongfully escheated to the crown); Bankers'
Case, 14 Howell State Cases 1 (1700) (judgment for citizens against the crown for damages
from breach of a contract to pay annuities).
138 The court was created by statute, 27 Hen VIII, c 27 (1536), to deal initially with the
vast quantities of lands confiscated from monasteries following their suppression by Henry
viii.
... The court was created by statute, 32 Hen VIII, c 46 (1540), to manage the crown's
feudal revenues.
140 The court was created by statute, 33 Hen VIII, c 39 (1541), to manage the portions
of the royal estates not administered through the Court of Wards.
14 See Walter C. Richardson, History of the Court of Augmentations, 1536-1554 384
(LSU, 1961). See also H. E. Bell, An Introduction to the History and Records of the Court
of Wards and Liveries (Cambridge, 1953).
14 See Jaffe, 77 Harv L Rev at 3, 9-16 (cited in note 136).
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was governed by ordinary common law.
In eighteenth century colonial America there was no universal
belief that the sovereign was immune from suit. The colonial char-
ters themselves commonly contained express provisions that the
colonial governments could sue and be sued. These provisions can
be found in the Massachusetts charters of 16201"3 and 1629,14 the
1662 Connecticut charter,4  and Rhode Island's 1663 charter.4 6
Other colonial charters were silent on the subject but since they
were either corporate or individual charters the colonial govern-
ments were amenable to suit under ordinary common law princi-
ples. When the colonies gained independence and adopted consti-
tutions, not a single colony wrote into its constitution a general
grant of sovereign immunity.14 7 Indeed, Connecticut and Rhode Is-
land opted for contrary provisions by adopting their pre-existing
charters as state constitutions. 4 8 Both Delaware 4 9 and Pennsylva-
nia150 adopted constitutional provisions that permitted the state to
143 F. Thorpe, ed, 3 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters and Other
Organic Laws 1827, 1831 (GPO, 1909) ("Thorpe"); W. Swindler, ed, 5 Sources and Docu-
ments of United States Constitutions 16, 19 (Oceana, 1975) ("Swindler"):
And further, our Will and Pleasure is, that the said Councill, for the time being, and
their Successors, shall have full Power and lawful authority, by the Name aforesaid, to
sue and be sued; implead and be impleaded; answer, and to be answered, unto all Man-
ner of Courts and Places that now are, or hereafter shall be, within this our Realme
and elsewhere, as well temporal as spiritual, in all Manner of Suits and Matters what-
soever, and of what Nature or Kinde soever such Suite or Action be or shall be.
14 See 3 Thorpe at 1846, 1852 (cited in note 143), and 5 Swindler at 32, 36 (cited in
note 143):
[The Colony] shall and maie be capeable and enabled aswell to implead, and to be
impleaded, and to prosecute, demaund and aunswere, and be aunswered unto, in all
and singular Suites, Causes, Quarrells, and Accons, of what kinde or nature soever.
145 1 Thorpe at 529, 530 (cited in note 143) (cited in note 145); 2 Swindler at 131 (cited
in note 143):
[the Colony is] ... capable in the Law, to plead and to be impleaded, to answer and to
be answered unto, to defend and to be defended in all and singular Suits, Causes,
Quarrels, Matters, Actions, and Things, of what Kind or Nature soever.
146 6 Thorpe at 3211, 3213 (cited in note 143); 8 Swindler at 363 (cited in note 143):
[The Colony is] ... capable, in the lawe, to sue and bee sued, to pleade and be im-
pleaded, to answeare and bee answeared unto, to defend and to be defended, in all and
singular suites, causes, quarrels, matters, actions and things, of what kind or nature
soever ....
147 Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1897-98 (cited in note 2).
148 Id at 1898, n 42.
" 1 Thorpe at 568-69 (cited in note 143); 2 Swindler at 205-06 (cited in note 143)
("Suits may be brought against the State, according to such regulations as shall be made
law.")
150 5 Thorpe at 3092, 3101; 8 Swindler at 286, 293 ("Suits may be brought against the
commonwealth in such manner, in such courts, and in such cases as the legislature may by
law direct.")
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waive sovereign immunity.
The evidence of colonial Americans' rejection of sovereign im-
munity is not limited to the charter provisions. To be sure, Black-
stone restated the fiction that the "king can do no wrong"''1 1 and
proceeded to argue that "whatever may be amiss in the conduct of
public affairs is not chargeable personally on the king; nor is he,
but his ministers, accountable for it to the people."' 52 But even
Blackstone admitted that this doctrine was not a barrier to private
recovery from the crown; though the petition of right was obtain-
able as "a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion,' 53 it
would of course be granted, for "to know of any injury [to his sub-
jects] and to redress it are inseparable in the royal breast,... [The
law] issues as of course, in the king's own name, his orders to his
judges to do justice to the party aggrieved.' 54 These principles
and procedures were transplanted to early America. St. George
Tucker, commenting in 1803 on Blackstone's Commentaries, noted
that "[a]ny person who is entitled to demand against the common-
wealth any right in law or equity, may petition the high court of
chancery or the district court, holden at Richmond, for redress,
and such court shall proceed to do right thereon. 5
Moreover, despite Blackstone's importance to colonial law, he
was not considered infallible. James Wilson, in his law lectures de-
livered at the College of Philadelphia in 1790-91, frankly stated
that "I cannot consider him [Blackstone] as a zealous friend of re-
publicanism.' 56 In discoursing upon Blackstonian conceptions of
sovereignty, Wilson commented: "The dread and redoubtable sov-
151 3 Blackstone at *254 (cited in note 135).
152 Id at *254-55.
"Is 1 id at *236.
154 3 id at *255 (emphasis in original). This concept has long been fundamental to En-
glish legal thought. Chief Justice Holt phrased it most broadly when he opined that if the
plaintiff "has a right .... of necessary consequence he has an action to vindicate and main-
tain that right .... It is a vain thing to imagine that there should be a right without a
remedy; want of right and want of remedy are termini convertibles [reciprocal] .... [I]t is
without a precedent to a have a right without a remedy." Ashby v White, 6 Mod Rep 45, 53,
87 Eng Rep 808, 815 (QB 1702). The concept was readily transferred to America. See Feder-
alist 43 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 271, 274 (Mentor, 1961).
("But a right implies a remedy. . ."). See also Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137,
162-63 (1803) (quoting 3 Blackstone at *23, *109 (cited in note 135), to the same effect).
There is still vitality to the notion. See Cal Civ Code § 3523 (West 1984) ("for every wrong
there is a remedy").
111 St. George Tucker, 2 Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of Reference, to the
Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States: and of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia 242-43 n 5 (Birch & Small, 1803).
116 Robert Green McCloskey, ed, 1 The Works of James Wilson 79 (Harvard, 1967).
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ereign, when traced to his ultimate and genuine source, has been
found, as he ought to have been found, in the free and indepen-
dent man. This truth, so simple and natural, and yet so neglected
and despised, may be appreciated as the first and fundamental
principle in the science of government.' 1 57 From this principle it
was an easy step to denial of any principle of sovereign immunity:
[Tihe only reason, why a free and independent man was
bound by human laws was this-that he bound himself. Upon
the same principle on which he becomes bound by the laws,
he becomes amenable before the courts of justice, which are
formed and authorized by those laws. If one free and indepen-
dent man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why may not
an aggregate of free and independent men, a collection of orig-
inal sovereigns, do this likewise? The dignity of the state is
compounded of the dignity of its members. If the dignity of
each singly is undiminished, the dignity of all jointly must be
unimpaired. Is a man degraded by the manly declaration, that
he renders himself amenable to justice? Can a similar declara-
tion degrade a state?158
At the core of these pronouncements is the belief that the only
true sovereignty is that which resides in the people themselves. Ac-
cordingly, these original sovereigns gave to their governmental
agents, both national and state, certain limited powers. Professor
Amar has contended that this fundamental principle knocks the
props out of the argument that governments, national or state,
ought to possess immunity from accountability for their wrongdo-
ing.' "59 But the theory of popular sovereignty does not answer the
jurisdictional question of which court system will hear claims
against the states. In antebellum America a bitter debate raged
over whether the locus of sovereignty was in the people of each
state, or the people of the nation as a whole.160 If sovereignty was
157 Id at 81.
18 McCloskey, 2 Works of James Wilson at 497 (cited in note 156). Wilson's lectures
on sovereignty presaged his opinion in Chisholm v Georgia. See text at notes 221-28. To be
sure, Wilson was rather extreme in his views of popular sovereignty. Not every colonial
American shared his views on this subject. Compare Patrick Henry's comments in the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention, quoted in note 168.
151 Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1484-92 (cited in note 2).
"0 In the first half of the nineteenth century, Northerners and Southerners alike
manipulated state sovereignty principles to serve their immediate political objectives. When
the War of 1812 threatened New England's shipping and commercial interests, New Eng-
land Federalists called the Hartford Convention to consider seriously the wisdom of seces-
sion. See generally James M. Banner, To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the
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vested in the people of the constituent states, it would make sense
to deny the federal courts the power to hear claims against the
states, for those governments were the corporate agents of the peo-
ple of each state, and the federal government was the mere agent
of the states. But if sovereignty was vested in the people of the
entire nation, state governments could claim no paramount role,
for the federal government was the sovereign's agent, and the state
governments acted as agent for slivers of the whole. While this de-
bate died in the bloody woods and fields of Virginia and was in-
terred at Appomattox Courthouse,161 it had currency when the
Constitution was framed and the Eleventh Amendment adopted.
Original conceptions of sovereignty and sovereign immunity cannot
be understood without keeping these opposing poles of thought in
Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (Knopf, 1969). Twenty years later,
when the "Abominable Tariff" of 1832 was enacted, South Carolinians preached John C.
Calhoun's doctrine of nullification. See generally David Franklin Houston, A Critical Study
of Nullification in South Carolina (Russell & Russell, 1896); Robert V. Remini, Andrew
Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832 137, 160, 232-37, 381, 387-89
(Harper & Row, 1981); Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American
Democracy, 1833-1845 8-44 (Harper & Row, 1984).
In another twenty years, radical northern abolitionists embraced nullification principles
in order to defeat the operation of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat 462. The Act was
passed in part as a result of Prigg v Pennsylvania, 41 US (16 Pet) 539 (1842), and the
subsequent northern state legislative responses to Prigg that sought to vitiate the existing
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. The new Act vested in the federal courts effective machinery for
the claim and delivery of apprehended fugitive slaves. Some northern states reacted by de-
claring that the federal courts had no power to review state court grants of habeas corpus to
petitioners seeking freedom from federal custody. See In re Booth, 3 Wis 1, 157 (1854). The
United States Supreme Court firmly rejected this position in Ableman v Booth, 62 US (21
How) 506 (1859), but the states remained obdurate. See Oberlin Rescue Cases, 9 Ohio St 77
(1859). See also Charles Warren, 3 The Supreme Court in United States History 42-79
(Little, Brown, 1922).
There is no reason to think that this pattern of manipulation died with the Civil War.
Consider, as just one example, the pre- and post-1937 interpretations of the Commerce
Clause. See Epstein, 73 Va L Rev 1387, 1399-1454 (cited in note 69) Moreover, following
Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954), eight southern legislatures formally "nulli-
fied" Brown. See Alabama's nullification resolution, reprinted in William Murphy, et al,
American Constitutional Interpretation 280-81 (Foundation, 1986). Of course, this effort
failed. See also Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958), and compare Edwin Meese HI, The Law
of the Constitution, 61 Tulane L Rev 979, 986-87 (1987) (criticizing the Court's dictum in
Cooper v Aaron that the decisions of the Supreme Court are nothing less than "the supreme
law of the land." Cooper, 358 US at 18).
161 The conventional labels placed on this conflict contain an implicit endorsement of a
particular sovereignty locus. "Civil War" indicates a belief that sovereignty was vested in
the people of the whole nation; "War Between the States" suggests equally strongly that the
conflict was between independent sovereigns. The unconventional "War for Southern Inde-
pendence" is descriptive without carrying a commitment to a sovereignty viewpoint. Never-
theless, to avoid confusion I have used the conventional and prevailing term, "Civil War,"
throughout this article.
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mind.
Though there is little historical evidence bearing on what the
general "understanding" of state sovereign immunity was at the
time of the Constitution's adoption, some help can be found in the
debates of the several state ratifying conventions. The issue arose
in the context of enforcement of the 1783 peace treaty between
Britain and the nascent United States. 212 The treaty required the
British to evacuate all military posts in America and to leave be-
hind all slaves. The Americans agreed not to frustrate collection of
American debts by British creditors and to refrain from any fur-
ther escheat of loyalist property by the states. The British did not
comply with the provisions requiring their abandonment of
slaves.16 3 Angered by the violation, southern states retaliated by
imposing statutory obstacles to the collection of debts by British
creditors.16 4 Thus, when the several states debated ratification of
the Constitution, delegates were concerned both with the possibil-
ity that British creditors might be able to enforce their claims
against states and private citizens in the federal courts and with
the fear that the nation might not survive if it could not enforce
the peace treaty. In the major state conventions, these issues were
raised in debates over the scope of the judicial power. Opponents
of ratification argued that the federal judicial power would be used
to entertain suits against the states by British creditors.165 Those
in favor of ratification generally agreed."6 A few proponents, such
as James Madison, may have dissembled by suggesting that a state
could not be sued without its consent,6 7 but this suggestion was
161 For the provisional peace treaty, see Treaty of Nov 30, 1782, 8 Stat 54; for the final
treaty, see Treaty of Paris, 8 Stat 80 (1783).
16 Samuel F. Bemis, Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy 63, 130-31
(Yale, 1962).
164 See Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States 72 (Holt, Rine-
hart & Winston, 1936); Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1900-1902 (cited in note 2).
16 See, for example, George Mason's arguments in the Virginia convention, Jonathan
Elliot, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions of the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 526-27 (2d ed 1836) ("Elliot's Debates").
166 See, for example, James Wilson's remarks in the Pennsylvania convention, 2 Elliot's
Debates at 490 (cited in note 165). See also Paul L. Ford, ed, Pamphlets on the Constitu-
tion of the United States 149 (Da Capo, 1888) (Tench Coxe asserted that Article Ill permit-
ted a citizen to sue a state in federal court rather than in "a court constituted by the state,
with which.., his dispute is.") Professor Jacobs contends that the Committee of Detail of
the Constitutional Convention, which drafted the final version of Article III, probably inter-
preted it to permit suit by a citizen of one state against another state. Jacobs, Sovereign
Immunity at 25 (cited in note 2).
67 In rebutting Mason, Madison asserted that it "appears to me that... [Article III]
can have no operation but this-to give a citizen the right to be heard in the federal courts;
and if a state should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it." 3
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hotly denounced as a perverse fiction by such Constitutional oppo-
nents as Patrick Henry.168
In Federalist 81, Alexander Hamilton declared that "[iut is in-
herent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of
every State in the Union. ' 169 But, as Judge Gibbons has demon-
strated,7 ° this passage does not suggest that the federal courts lack
jurisdiction over a private claim against a state, but rather that no
substantive right of action against a state for its pre-Constitution
public debt could exist absent a state's consent to grant such a
right. While the Constitution would vest the federal courts with
jurisdiction to hear claims made against a state by foreigners or
the citizens of another state, it would not displace state law as the
rule of decision. Thus, if a state provided that it could not be held
liable on its debts by reason of its sovereign immunity, the federal
courts, though invested by Article III with jurisdiction to hear the
issue, would apply the state law shield of immunity to defeat any
claim. 71 Certainly Judge Gibbons's view is more consistent with
Elliot's Debates at 533 (cited in note 165). Jacobs argues that Madison took this position
only to secure ratification in the Virginia Convention. Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 34
(cited in note 2).
168 Henry's response to Madison was as follows:
If gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language
of the people, there is an end of all argument. What says the paper? That it shall have
cognizance of controversies between a state and citizens of another state, without dis-
criminating between plaintiff and defendant. What says the honorable gentleman? The
contrary-that the state can only be plaintiff. When the state is debtor, there is no
reciprocity.
3 Elliot's Debates at 543 (cited in note 165). John Marshall replied to Henry:
I hope that no gentleman will think a state will be called at the bar of the federal court.
Is there no such case at present? Are there not many cases in which the legislature of
Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued? It is not rational to suppose that the
sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to
recover claims of individuals residing in other states. I contend this construction is
warranted by the words.... I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does
not prevent its being plaintiff.
3 id at 555-56.
109 Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in Federalist Papers at 481, 487 (cited in note 154) (em-
phasis in original).
170 Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1908-12 (cited in note 2).
'1 Justice Brennan and some commentators have contended that the fundamental er-
ror of Chisholm v Georgia, 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793) was in failing to recognize that, while
the Court may have jurisdiction over the matter, the rule of decision should be that indi-
cated by state law. Atascadero, 473 US at 282-83, and at 289 (Brennan dissenting); Amar,
96 Yale L J at 1469-73 (cited in note 2); Note, More Plenary Than Thou: A Post-Welch
Compromise Theory of Congressional Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 88
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Hamilton's contemporaneous comments in Federalist 80 to the ef-
fect that federal courts under the Constitution would possess
power to enforce claims based on violations of federal law directly
against a state and its public fisc.17 2 Even more revealing is a con-
temporary remark of Hamilton following Chisholm. Hamilton de-
scribed opposition to Chisholm as "opposition to the Constitu-
tion, t17 3 a view that reinforces Judge Gibbons's interpretation of
Hamilton's intent in penning Federalist 81.
Furthermore, too much emphasis can be placed on The Feder-
alist. The Federalist essays were basically newspaper propaganda
designed to secure an immediate political result. Like all political
campaigners, Hamilton may not have been above a little strategic
prevarication; his principal co-author later admitted that The Fed-
eralist essays were branded with the "zeal of advocates. 1 74 Thus,
Colum L Rev 1022, 1031 (1988). This point is taken too far, for the majority decided only
the jurisdictional issue; the rule of decision on the merits of Chisholm's assumpsit claim was
expressly left open. See text at notes 188-259.
"" Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1910 & n 104 (cited in note 2). In Federalist 80, Hamil-
ton observed that the Constitution prohibits the states from a variety of actions, including
the "imposition of duties on imported articles and the emission of paper money ... No man
of sense will believe that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded, without some
effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power
must either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in the federal courts, to
over-rule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of Union." Federalist 80
(Hamilton), in Federalist Papers at 475, 475-76 (cited in note 154). Hamilton also cited the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, US Const, Art IV, § 2, cl 1, for the proposition that "the
national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed
to another State or its citizens." Federalist 80 (Hamilton), in Federalist Papers at 475, 478
(cited in note 154). Nevertheless, Hamilton observed that "the state governments would
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by
that act, exclusively delegated to the United States." Federalist 32 (Hamilton), in Federal-
ist Papers at 197, 198 (cited in note 154) (emphasis in original). From this premise, Hamil-
ton constructed an argument that the states and federal government possessed concurrent
authority over a wide range of subjects, a necessary consequence of the Constitution's "divi-
sion of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not
explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor ... ." Id at 201.
Hamilton admitted that the exercise of concurrent authority "might now and then not ex-
actly coincide, and might require reciprocal forbearances." Id at 200. The collision of federal
court jurisdiction over claims against states with concurrent state authority to determine the
limits of its liability may have been thought by Hamilton to be such an instance.
Professor Nowak argues that Federalist 80 and 81 can be reconciled on the basis that
Hamilton thought Article III did not vest automatic jurisdiction in the federal courts to
entertain suits against a state by citizens of another state, but that Article I did give Con-
gress the power to grant jurisdiction in such cases. Nowak, 75 Colum L Rev at 1429 (cited in
note 2).
17 Harold Syrett, ed, 17 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 9, 12 & n 13 (Columbia, 1972)
(Minutes of Conference of Aug 2, 1794), quoted in H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Original-
ists, 73 Va L Rev 659, 681 n 51 (1987).
"1 3 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 435-36 (Lippincott, 1865) (Letter
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when Hamilton asserts flatly that sovereign immunity "is now en-
joyed by the government of every State in the Union," 175 there is
no reason uncritically to accept this as an accurate statement of
law. Virginia, for example, followed English procedure in permit-
ting private citizens to sue the state by name.176 Zephaniah Swift,
in his commentaries upon Connecticut law, does not discuss state
immunity from suit, but does indicate that neither state officials 77
nor municipalities' 8 were immune.
In his comprehensive survey of the debates, Judge Gibbons
concludes that "the best evidence is that each convention inter-
preted the judiciary article, as originally written, to allow the
states to be sued in the federal courts."' 7 9 Yet, as recently as 1974,
the Supreme Court has claimed that a belief in state sovereign im-
munity was "the prevailing view at the time of the ratification of
the Constitution." 8" By 1987, only a mere plurality Court would
continue to rely on isolated statements of Madison, Marshall, and
Hamilton to support the conclusion that a belief in state sovereign
immunity prevailed at the time of the ratification,181 and even that
plurality had to concede that "the intentions of the Framers and
Ratifiers were ambiguous" on the issue.182
from Madison to Edward Livingston, April 17, 1824).
"I See Federalist 81 (Hamilton) in Federalist Papers at 481, 487 (cited in note 154)
(emphasis in original).
' ' See text at note 155.
177 Zephaniah Swift, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 541-48 (Con-
verse, 1822). State officials did not enjoy immunity because an official acting in violation of
law was acting outside the scope of his agency. See generally, David E. Engdahl, Immunity
and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 Colo L Rev 1 (1972).
17' Swift, Laws of Connecticut at 552 (municipalities liable for injuries sustained due to
negligent repair of bridges and roads); and at 589 (process served on municipality by serving
selectman). Too much significance can be attached to the susceptibility of municipalities to
private damage actions. In eighteenth and early nineteenth century America, municipalities
were treated as corporations, not sovereigns. See James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American
Law 275 (Halsted, 1826). They were, however, public corporations invested with a sliver of
the state's sovereignty. See Arthur J. Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sover-
eignty and Associations in the Common Law, 29 Buff L Rev 599 (1980). Thus, Chief Justice
Jay argued in his Chisholm opinion that the exposure of municipal public corporations to
private suit was a basis for denying immunity to its functional equivalent, a state. Chisholm,
2 US (2 Dall) at 472-73.
17 Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1913 (cited in note 2). See also Jacobs, Sovereign Im-
munity at 40 (cited in note 2). But see Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United
States History 91 (Little, Brown, 1923).
180 Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 660-62 n 9 (1974).
'8' See notes 167-69.
"' Welch, 107 S Ct at 2951. Most commentators conclude that the records of the Con-
stitutional Convention are of no help whatsoever, but contend that evidence extrinsic to the
Convention suggests that no universal belief in state sovereign immunity existed at the time.
See, for example, Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 21-25 (cited in note 2); Nowak, 75 Colum
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What did exist in 1787 was a robust debate over the nature of
sovereignty. Certain Federalists, such as James Wilson, were out-
spoken in their conviction that sovereignty was exclusively vested
in the people of the nation as a whole.183 The anti- Federalists were
equally fervid in their contention that the states possessed sover-
eignty that ought not be compromised by constitutional union.1 8 4
Professor Orth aptly declares that "[t]he search for the original
understanding on state sovereign immunity bears this much resem-
blance to the quest for the Holy Grail: there is enough to be found
so that the faithful of whatever persuasion can find their heart's
desire." 185 If there can be no objective certainty to that quest, per-
haps some enlightenment can be attained by a perusal of the his-
tory of the Eleventh Amendment in the courts.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL UNION TO RECONSTRUCTION
Most histories of the Eleventh Amendment in the courts are
tales of doctrine responding to the felt political necessities of the
times. 86 These accounts conclude that the notion of state sover-
eign immunity was grafted onto the Eleventh Amendment as a
wrong, or at least unprincipled, act. These histories variously con-
clude that the amendment's reception in the courts prior to Recon-
struction confirms that the amendment was then regarded as noth-
ing more than a narrowing construction of one affirmative
jurisdictional grant of Article III, having no impact whatever on
the "arising under" head of jurisdiction in Article III."'7 This ac-
count is incomplete and unpersuasive.
L Rev at 1422-1430 (cited in note 2).
113 See, for example, James Wilson's opening comments to the Pennsylvania ratification
convention on December 1, 1787. 2 Elliot's Debates at 443-44 (cited in note 165).
18, Emblematic of these thinkers was Patrick Henry:
Who authorized them [the federal convention] to speak the language of, We, the peo-
ple, instead of, We, the states? States are the characteristics and the soul of a confeder-
ation. If the states be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great, consoli-
dated, national government, of the people of all the states .... Here is a resolution as
radical as that which separated us from Great Britain. It is radical in this transition;
our rights and privileges are endangered, and the sovereignty of the states will be relin-
quished: and cannot we plainly see that this is actually the case?
3 Elliot's Debates at 22, 44 (cited in note 165) (emphasis in original).
'Orth, The Judicial Power at 28 (cited in note 2).
188 See, for example, Orth, The Judicial Power (cited in note 2); Jacobs, Sovereign Im-
munity (cited in note 2); Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev 1889 (cited in note 2).
18' See Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1060-61 (cited in note 2); Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev
at 1941-68 (cited in note 2); Field, 126 U Pa L Rev at 541 (cited in note 2). See also Justice
Brennan's views in cases cited in note 2.
1989]
The University of Chicago Law Review [56:61
A. Chisholm v Georgia
The story inevitably begins with Chisholm v Georgia.'88 The
case cannot be understood apart from the context of efforts by the
Washington Administration to enforce the peace treaty of 1783
with Great Britain in order to validate the infant American repub-
lic's foreign policy. Among the salient provisions of the treaty was
an article guaranteeing that British creditors "shall meet with no
lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling
money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted."' 9 Yet, many
states had enacted statutes expropriating debts due British credi-
tors and making Continental paper currency or bills of exchange
legal tender.'90 If the young nation could not enforce the terms of
the peace treaty at home, it would be unable to command either
respect or reciprocal enforcement abroad. Closer to home, the Brit-
ish refused to evacuate seven frontier posts in the Northwest Ter-
ritory until the Americans had complied with their end of the
bargain. 9'
Chisholm did not directly involve the peace treaty; rather, it
was a superficially simple contract action arising under the federal
courts' jurisdiction over controversies "between a State and Citi-
zens of another State."' 92 In 1777, Robert Farquhar, a South Caro-
lina merchant, sold Georgia military goods for use in the revolu-
'1 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793). Chisholm was the first case to be specifically overruled by
constitutional amendment. The other such constitutional amendments and the cases to
which they were directed are: US Const, Amend XIV, § 1, Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19
How) 393 (1857); US Const, Amend XVI, Pollock v Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 US 429
(1895); US Const, Amend XXVI, Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970).
'89 8 Stat at 56.
110 See Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1899-1902 and sources cited at 1901 n 55 (cited in
note 2). It is incorrect to imply, as does Gibbons, that Southern planters were almost univer-
sally opposed to the provisions of the peace treaty securing the claims of British creditors.
To support this contention, Gibbons cites Professor Morris's account of George Mason's
May 6, 1783 letter to Patrick Henry. See id at 1901 n 59. But Morris misses the full import
of the correspondence, for Mason actually approved of the treaty, was greatly concerned
that state attempts to frustrate British creditors would rekindle hostilities, and thought that
any repudiation of debts would be both dishonorable and "short sighted Policy." Letter to
Patrick Henry, May 6, 1783, in Robert A. Rutland, ed, 2 The Papers of George Mason 770-
71 (U NC, 1970). The passage quoted by Morris actually reads in full:
In Conversation upon this Subject, we sometimes hear a very absurd Question 'If we
are now to pay the Debts due to British Merchants, what have we been fighting for all
this while?' Surely not to avoid our just Debts, or cheat our Creditors; but to rescue our
Country from the Oppression & Tyranny of the British Government, and to secure the
Rights & Liberty of ourselves, & our Posterity; which we have happily accomplished.
Id at 771.
1"' See, for example, Orth, The Judicial Power at 17 (cited in note 2).
192 US Const, Art III, § 2, cl 6.
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tionary war effort. Although Georgia had authorized payment to
Farquhar, the state failed to do so during Farquhar's life.19s Alex-
ander Chisholm, Farquhar's executor and a fellow South Carolin-
ian, was rebuffed by the Georgia legislature in his attempts to se-
cure payment of the debt. Accordingly, Chisholm brought suit in
the federal trial court for Georgia, invoking the court's diversity
jurisdiction to assert his claim in assumpsit.9 4 Georgia's defense
was simply to assert that it was immune from suit in any court.19 5
That was good enough for Justice Iredell, riding circuit, and Dis-
trict Judge Nathaniel Pendleton, for they promptly dismissed the
complaint.1 96
Unwilling to forget his £100,000 claim,197 Chisholm filed the
action again, this time as an original proceeding in the Supreme
Court. Georgia refused to appear, again claiming sovereign immu-
nity and challenging the Court's jurisdiction. 98 Chisholm's counsel,
Attorney General Edmund Randolph,99 moved for a default judg-
I" See Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 47 (cited in note 2).
194 Farquhar's Executor v Georgia, (CC D Ga 1791), an unreported case discussed in
Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 47 & n 29 (cited in note 2).
"' "[T]he state of Georgia cannot be drawn or compelled to answer against the will of
the said State before any Justices of any Court of Law or Equity whatsoever." Farquhar's
Executor v Georgia, (CC D Ga 1791), quoted in Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 47.
196 Id. It is possible that Iredell, sitting as a circuit judge, was unpersuaded by Georgia's
immunity claim but thought the court lacked jurisdiction. The 1789 Judiciary Act did not
confer state-citizen diversity jurisdiction on the circuit courts. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch
20, § 11, 1 Stat 73, 78-79.
11" The original contract, negotiated with Farquhar by Georgia's commissioners, speci-
fied a purchase price of £63,605, South Carolina currency. Chisholm's prayer in his circuit
court action was for £100,000 sterling. See Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 47 (cited in note
2). The difference represented pre-judgment interest at less than 5% annually. Chisholm's
claim was quite large. Assuming an approximately equal rate of exchange, at London prices
in 1790, £100,000 sterling would have purchased approximately 285,000 bushels of wheat.
See Samuel Blodget, Economica: A Statistical Manual for the United States of America
147 (Blodget, 1806). By comparison, that same quantity of wheat would cost at least $1.1
million today. Cash Prices, Wall St J C12 (Feb 24, 1989). While Chisholm's claim was large,
the original contract appears to have been negotiated at arm's length, so Georgia's rancor
was probably not born out of a belief that the contract price was padded.
198 Counsel for Georgia did not appear before the Court to argue the case, but did de-
liver a written remonstrance, the text of which was also published in a Philadelphia newspa-
per. See Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall) at 419; Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1468 and n 176 (cited in note
2). In substance, Georgia contended that Article III's state-citizen diversity clause should be
read to confer jurisdiction only when a state sued an out-of-state citizen, but not the
reverse.
199 It was common practice in the early republic for the nation's attorney general to
carry on a private practice while performing his public functions. See Albert J. Beveridge, 2
Life of John Marshall 122-23 (Houghton Mifflin, 1916); Moncure Daniel Conway, Omitted
Chapters of History Disclosed in the Life & Papers of Edmund Randolph 133, 135 (New
York, 1888). It is also possible that Randolph's representation of Chisholm was merely a
convenient device to enable Randolph to assert the national government's position in a case
19891
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ment. The implications of Georgia's position were clear: if states
could not be compelled to answer in a federal court, British credi-
tors would be forced to seek recourse in hostile state courts where,
through defenses provided by state statutes designed to frustrate
British creditors, the American states would always win. Similarly,
loyalists invoking the 1783 peace treaty to recover property confis-
cated by the states would be forced into state courts. 00 Thus, en-
forcement of the peace treaty effectively depended upon permit-
ting British creditors to sue the states, their officers, and the
individual debtors in federal courts.
In urging the five justices20 1 to find for Chisholm, Randolph
devoted the bulk of his argument to defending the proposition that
the Supreme Court had jurisdiction. He contended that constitu-
tional authority was granted both by the literal text of Article III
and by "the spirit of the constitution, or rather its genuine and
necessary interpretation.'"202 Because the Constitution imposes a
number of restrictions upon the states, 20 3 Randolph argued, it was
surely contemplated that states be legally accountable for violation
of these restrictions. Such accountability required the susceptibil-
ity of states to suit, for "unconstitutional actions must pass with-
of great importance to the allocation of power between the states and the federal govern-
ment. On at least one prior occasion, in Hayburn's Case, 2 US (2 Dall) 409 (1792), Ran-
dolph's representation of a private party was undertaken for similar reasons of state. See
Maeva Marcus and Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988
Wis L Rev 527, 534-41.
200 Article V of the peace treaty obligated the United States to "recommend" to the
states that they return loyalist property that had already been completely confiscated. 8
Stat at 56. Article VI of the treaty prohibited further confiscations and barred the comple-
tion of pending escheats. Id.
20' The Court heard and decided Chisholm in Philadelphia's intimate Old City Hall, its
quarters while Philadelphia served as the nation's capital. The Court had six seats, but
there was one vacancy when Chisholm was heard and decided. The Chief Justice was John
Jay, author of The Federalist, one of the negotiators of the 1783 peace treaty, and delegate
to New York's ratification convention. His fellow justices were James Wilson, legal scholar,
delegate to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, member of that Convention's Committee on
Detail, and delegate to Pennsylvania's ratifying convention; John Blair, delegate to the 1787
Convention and to Virginia's ratifying convention; James Iredell, pro-ratification leader of
the North Carolina ratifying convention; and William Cushing, chairperson of the Massa-
chusetts ratification convention. Surely this was a Court magnificently equipped to under-
stand whatever original understanding there may have been with respect to state immunity
from suit.
2 Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall) at 421 (argument of Randolph) (emphasis in original).
203 Randolph cited as examples the prohibitions against unwarranted suspension of
habeas corpus, bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, entry into treaties, granting of
letters of marque, coinage, issuance of paper money or bills of credit, impairment of con-
tracts, imposition of import, export or tonnage duties, and maintaining armed forces. Id at
421-22.
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out censure, unless States can be made defendants.... These evils
... cannot be corrected without a suit against the state ' 204 by ag-
grieved citizens.
Randolph's conclusion derived further support from his own
view of the nature of the federal union. Just as individual Ameri-
cans had created the states, the states had created the national
government with their "free will, arising from absolute indepen-
dence. '20 5 Randolph extended the analogy to the ability of the sov-
ereign to subject to legal liability those who formed it. "The states
are in fact assemblages of these individuals who are liable to [legal]
process. The limitations which the federal government is admitted
to impose upon their powers, are diminutions of sovereignty, at
least, equal to the making of them defendants. ' 20 6 Any other result
would risk domestic and international strife.207
Not only, Randolph argued, did Article III confer jurisdiction
undisturbed by any reservation of state sovereignty, but Congress
had acted to empower the federal courts to exercise that jurisdic-
tion. He seized on § 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, which gave the
federal courts power to issue all writs "which may be necessary for
the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the
principles and usages of law. '20 8 Surely this Act gave the Court
power to employ the full panoply of legal procedure, argued
Randolph.09
Randolph then briefly addressed the subsidiary issue: did an
action of assumpsit lie against Georgia? While this issue was laden
with all the questions concerning the existence of a general federal
common law as recognized by Swift v Tyson 10 and later repudi-
ated by Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins,211 Randolph dismissed the
matter as one of capacity: "Is not a state capable of making a
promise? Certainly; as a state is a moral person, being an assem-
blage of individuals, who are moral persons. 2 1 2 Neither Randolph
nor the justices addressed a key aspect of this issue: was the rule of
204 Id at 422.
205 Id at 423.
200 Id.
20 Id at 424-25.
200 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 14, 1 Stat 73, 82, quoted in Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall)
at 426.
2o Chisholm, 2 US (2 DalI) at 426-27. Apparently, the principle that the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction is derived directly from the Constitution was not firmly estab-
lished at this time.
210 41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
21 304 US 64 (1938).
212 Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall) at 428.
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decision one of local, federal, or general common law?21 3 While §
34 of the Judiciary Act compelled the Court to follow "the laws of
the several states .[as] rules of decision" in trials at common
law2 14 its applicability to Chisholm went wholly unmentioned in
Randolph's argument and in the justices' opinions.
Perhaps the simplest explanation is that the four justices in
the majority-Jay, Wilson, Blair, and Cushing-viewed the case as
wholly jurisdictional.215 Georgia had refused to appear, vehemently
denying jurisdiction, and Chisholm sought a default judgment. The
Court did not grant Chisholm's request; it merely asserted its juris-
diction and gave Georgia almost a year in which to appear and
contest the case on the merits in order to avoid entry of a default
judgment.26 The nature of this order is a strong indication that
the majority only reached and decided the threshold issue of juris-
diction. Issues of law applicable to the merits of the claim were
reserved for Georgia's hoped-for appearance.217 Thus, it is incor-
213 These were terms of art. Local law encompassed a state's legislation and judicial
decisions that established principles deviant from the common law. Certain subjects, like
real property, were presumptively local. Federal law included the Constitution, treaties, and
federal statutes, and there was debate over whether it also included the common law. See
St. George Tucker, 1 Blackstone's Commentaries at 379-80 (cited in note 135) (noting that
Justices Oliver Ellsworth and Bushrod Washington considered the common law to be fed-
eral law, and arguing against their position since it would remove all limits to federal juris-
diction). Common law was the non-statutory decisional law common to all of the states. It
was of general applicability and transcended state borders, although it was not considered
federal law. Though interstitial, it was "ready to pour in at every opening it could find."
Peter Stephen DuPonceau, A Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the Jurisdiction of
the Courts of the United States 88 (Small, 1824, reprinted Arno, 1972).
21, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 34, 1 Stat 73, 92. Professor Fletcher has argued per-
suasively that § 34 required that federal courts look to "local" statutory or common law in
cases where it applied. See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv L Rev 1513, 1527-
38 (1984). This lex loci principle applied to matters of a peculiarly local concern, such as
title to real property, id at 1527-28, 1536-38, and where a state had established a local law
deviant from the general common law, either by statute or judicial decision. Id at 1531-36.
Section 34 not only contemplated the displacement of local law by federal statutory law, it
implicitly recognized that in cases where neither federal nor local law applied, federal courts
were free to apply a general, trans-state, common law. Id at 1516-27.
"I It is also possible that all of the justices simply assumed that, once Georgia's sover-
eign immunity was swept away, liability under general common law would automatically
follow. This is Professor Fletcher's position. See Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1070-71 (cited in
note 2). The Court's actual judgment in Chisholm renders this possibility unlikely. See text
at notes 216-17.
216 Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall) at 479.
21 Justice Blair evidently felt that the Court need do no more than decide the jurisdic-
tional issue, for in dismissing the argument that § 14 of the Judiciary Act failed to provide a
mode of enforcement of a judgment against a state, Blair noted that "this argument takes it
for granted, that the judgment of the court will be against the state; it possibly may be in
favor of the state...." Id at 452. Judgment against Georgia "by default, in the present stage
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rect to contend, as the revisionists do, that Chisholm displaced
"the prevailing state common law of government immunity [with a
federal common law of state liability] ... in a case presenting no
question of substantive federal law." ' As will be seen, this view is
the linchpin of revisionist theory. In fact, Chisholm decided only
that there was no constitutional jurisdictional barrier to the fed-
eral courts hearing claims made against a state by a citizen of an-
other state. The issue of whether local law or general common law
might operate as the rule of decision on the merits and insulate the
state from liability was reserved for another day. That day never
came, for Georgia remained obdurate and the Eleventh Amend-
ment prevented further development of the principles in question.
For the majority, the jurisdictional issue was relatively easy. It
was enough for Justice Blair that the federal courts had been given
the power to hear "controversies between a state and citizens of
another state."2 19 The Constitution was supreme, and Article III's
grant of authority was plain. To the argument that the clause was
intended only to create federal jurisdiction when the state was a
plaintiff, Blair responded that it was still a controversy between
the named parties, no matter what status the state happened to
occupy: "A dispute between A. and B. is surely a dispute between
B. and A."'220
The issue for Justice Wilson was no less grave than whether
of the business ... would be too precipitate in any case, and too incompatible with the
dignity of a state in this." Id at 452-53. Accordingly, Blair proposed that the Court issue the
order it did. Justice Cushing adopted Randolph's argument, viewing Georgia's liability in
assumpsit as a matter of capacity. "assumpsit will lie... ; provided a state is capable of
contracting." Id at 469. Given the Court's order, Cushing's view is dictum and, in any case,
it could be interpreted to mean that, if Georgia law controlled and immunized the state
from liability in assumpsit, it did so by rendering the state incapable of contracting. Arguing
from "general principles of right and equality," Justice Wilson offered similar dictum that
"a state, for the breach of a contract, may be liable in damages." Id at 456, 465. Chief
Justice Jay thought "a state is suable by citizens of another state; [but] ... such suability
may nevertheless not extend to all the demands, and to every kind of action; there may be
exceptions." Id at 479. Whether Jay meant these exceptions to be jurisdictional, or rooted in
the so-called Rules of Decision Act, is not at all clear. What is clear is that the majority
justices focused their argument on the jurisdictional issue and dealt hardly at all with the
secondary issue of the controlling substantive law. This focus, coupled with the Court's dis-
positional order, makes clear that jurisdiction, not substantive liability in assumpsit, con-
cerned the majority.
"' Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1474 (cited in note 2) (emphasis omitted). See also Atascadero,
473 US at 262-63, and at 289 (Brennan dissenting); Field, 126 U Pa L Rev at 541 (cited in
note 2); Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1056-58 (cited in note 2).
21' Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall) at 450.
220 Id.
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"the People of the United States form a Nation?" 2 1 To answer
this momentous inquiry, Wilson turned first to political theory.
Wilson declared governments to be "inferior contrivance[s] of
man" 222 and so were to "be considered as subordinate to the Peo-
ple. '223 A state was a mere artificial person, "a complete body of
free persons united together for their common benefit, to enjoy
peaceably what is their own, and to do justice to others. '224 Like
its constituents, a state could "acquire property... [,] incur debts.
• [, and] be bound by contracts."22 5 Sovereignty provided no es-
cape from the legal obligations created by such arrangements, for
Wilson considered the sovereign's immunity from suit a despotic
notion unfit for post-revolutionary America.226 Nor had Georgia re-
tained immunity from suit as part of its residual sovereignty, for as
to the purposes of the Union, Georgia had handed its sovereignty
to the national government. The key, then, was "[w]hether the ju-
dicial decision of this cause is, or is not, one of those purposes. '227
Wilson evidently meant this question to encompass two inquiries:
whether the people had the power to give the federal courts juris-
diction over states, and whether they had actually done so. In the
end, Wilson had little difficulty finding the power, and even less in
finding its tangible expression in the literal language of Article
III.228
After Justice Cushing offered a short literalist reprise of Blair
in his opinion, Chief Justice Jay delivered the final opinion. Jay
first sought to describe the sovereignty possessed by the states of
the federal Union. He invoked the notion that sovereignty had
passed from the Crown to the people of the United States at the
time of the Revolution, 22 and that, in 1787, "the people acting as
221 Id at 453.
222 Id at 455.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
22. For Wilson, the proof of this assertion was that "[iln one sense the term sovereign
has for its correlative, subject... [and under the] Constitution there are citizens, but no
subjects." Id at 456 (emphasis in original). In his law lectures Wilson declared that "[i]n
controversies, to which the state or nation is a party, the state or nation itself ought to be
amenable before the judicial powers." 2 The Works of James Wilson 497 (1967) (cited in
note 156). For further analysis of Wilson's view's on sovereignty, see text at notes 156-58.
Wilson also thought that a repudiation of federal sovereign immunity was embodied in Arti-
cle III's declaration that the judicial power extends "to controversies to which the United
States are a party." Id. In this, he differed from Chief Justice Jay. See text at notes 234-36.
227 Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall) at 457.
228 Id at 461-66.
229 Id at 470.
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sovereigns . . . establish[ed] a constitution by which it was their
will, that the state governments should be bound. 2 30 Clearly then,
to the extent constitutional authority had been given the federal
courts to entertain suits against states, the states were bound by
the grant.
Jay next concluded that there was nothing incompatible be-
tween state sovereignty and state susceptibility to suit. His argu-
ment centered on the artificiality of state personhood, and echoed
Wilson's contention that states were assemblages of free persons.
For Jay, it was enough to remark upon the absurdity of a rule that
would subject the forty thousand citizens of Philadelphia to suit in
their municipal capacity while immunizing their fifty thousand
neighbors in Delaware simply because their representative agency
was styled a state.2 3'
Jay's final concern was with the Constitution itself. He con-
cluded initially that its design was one for national union, and that
the jurisdictional heads of Article III were a tangible expression of
that design. Jay found the jurisdictional grant in the state-citizen
diversity clause to be plain on its face, 2 warranted by sound pol-
icy'3 and necessitated by the constitutional design. For to read Ar-
ticle III as immunizing states from suit
would contradict and do violence to the great and leading
principles of a free and equal national government, one of the
great objects of which is, to ensure justice to all: To the few
against the many, as well as to the many against the few. It
would be strange, indeed, that the joint and equal sovereigns
230 Id at 471.
13 Id at 472-73. See also note 178.
23' Discussing the clause, Jay observed:
If the Constitution really meant to extend these powers only to those controversies in
which a state might be plaintiff, to the exclusion of those in which citizens had de-
mands against a state, it is inconceivable that it should have attempted to convey that
meaning in words, not only so incompetent, but also repugnant to it...
Id at 476.
233
[Blecause in case a state (that is, all the citizens of it) has demands against some citi-
zens of another state, it is better that she should prosecute their demands in a national
court, than in a court of the state in which those citizens belong; the danger of irrita-
tion and criminations arising from apprehensions and suspicions of partiality, being
thereby obviated. Because, in cases where some citizens of one state have demands
against all the citizens of another state, the cause of liberty and the rights of men
forbid, that the latter should be the sole Judges of the justice due to the latter; and
true republican government requires that free and equal citizens should have free, fair
and equal justice."
Id at 475-76.
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of this country, should, in the very Constitution by which they
professed to establish justice, so far deviate from the plain
path of equality and impartiality, as to give to the collective
citizens of one state, a right of suing individual citizens of an-
other state, and yet deny to those citizens a right of suing
them.23
4
Even so, Jay conceded that the national government was prob-
ably immune from suit without its consent because "in cases of
actions against the United States, there is no power which the
courts can call to their aid. ' 235 Thus, Article III's grant of jurisdic-
tion over controversies to which the United States is a party car-
ried with it an implied prudential exception not contained in the
similar clause conferring jurisdiction over diverse state-citizen con-
troversies. But that exception was one born of sheer practical ne-
cessity, a consideration not as pressing with respect to claims
framed against states.236
It is an axiom of both conventional and revisionist Eleventh
Amendment doctrine that the amendment implicitly incorporated
Justice Iredell's dissent.23 7 Whatever the merits of the axiom, the
rival camps remain in fundamental disagreement over the rationale
of Iredell's opinion2 s and, for that reason, this opinion must be
scrutinized with particular care.
Iredell began by informing his audience, seated on backless
benches in the small high-ceilinged chamber, that he conceived the
issue before the Court to be whether "an action of assumpsit [will]
lie against a state?" It was not, he asserted, the larger and more
general question of "[w]hether, a State can in any instance be
2' Id at 477.
235 Id at 478 (emphasis added).
238 See Jaffe, 77 Harv L Rev at 3 (cited in note 136) (discussing Maitland's view of
English sovereign immunity. Maitland believed that it would be logically inconsistent for a
lord to issue a writ against himself in his own courts and that "this is true of every petty
lord in every petty manor; that there happens to be in this world no court above [the king's]
court is, we may say, an accident." Jay seems to adopt a logic similar to Maitland: the
United States cannot be sued in federal courts merely because of the "accident" that there
is no higher authority to enforce the judgment.)
137 For the conventionalists, see Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 12-19 (1890). For the
revisionists, see Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1482 (cited in note 2); Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1077
(cited in note 2); Field, 126 U Pa L Rev at 541-43 (cited in note 2); Welch, 107 S Ct at 2966
(1987) (Brennan dissenting).
I" Compare Welch, 107 S Ct at 2951 n 16 (1987) (Powell for the Court) (emphasizing
Iredell's constitutional objections to suits against states) with id at 2966-68 (Brennan dis-
senting) (emphasizing Iredell's discussion of a lack of federal legislation to abrogate, in a
diverse party suit, a state's common law sovereign immunity).
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sued?""' For a private claimant to maintain an action for assump-
sit against a state, "it must be in virtue of the constitution of the
United States, and of some law of congress conformable
thereto." ' Since Article III vested the Court with jurisdiction
over controversies between a state and citizens of another state,
the immediate constitutional hurdle was surmounted.24
1
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act gave the Court original but not
exclusive jurisdiction "of all controversies of a civil nature ... be-
tween a State and citizens of other States. '242 Since Iredell read
this statutory grant as co-extensive with the limits of Article III
extending jurisdiction to all such "controversies," the interpreta-
tion of the statutory language was transformed into the constitu-
tional question of "[w]hat controversy of a civil nature can be
maintained against a State by an individual [under the grant of
jurisdiction in Article III] ? ' 243 Either the framers meant "to refer
to antecedent laws" for the answer, or they meant "[tio enable
congress .. .to pass all such laws as they' might deem necessary
and proper to carry the purposes of this Constitution into full ef-
fect .... 244 Iredell never clearly answered this question, for he
immediately turned back to interpreting the Judiciary Act. Thus,
Iredell's opinion ultimately rested on statutory grounds, although
at the very end of his opinion he did intimate that Congress might
not be able to authorize suit against a state.24 5
Iredell focused the remainder of his opinion on § 14 of the
Judiciary Act, which empowered the federal courts to issue all
writs "agreeable to the principles and usages of law. 246 Either this
phrase referred to "1st. Those of the particular laws of the state,
against which the suit is brought. Or 2d. Principles of law common
to all the states. '24 7 By "particular laws" Iredell meant local law,
particularly legislation, existing at the time the Judiciary Act was
passed. In dismissing this leg of the inquiry, he noted that neither
in Georgia nor in any other state was there:
23, Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dali) at 430.
240 Id.
241 "The Constitution ... provides ... jurisdiction ... [over] [c]ontroversies between a
state, and foreign states, citizens or subjects." Id at 431.
242 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 13, 1 Stat 73, 80.
243 Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dal) at 432.
244 Id.
2,1 See text at notes 263.
214 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 14, 1 Stat 73, 82, quoted in Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dali)
at 434.
247 Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall) at 434.
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any particular legislative mode, authorizing a compulsory suit
for the recovery of money against a State,... either when the
Constitution was adopted, or at the time the judicial act was
passed. Since that time an act of assembly for such a purpose
has been passed in Georgia. But that surely could have no in-
*fluence in the construction of an act of the legislature of the
United States, passed before.
The only principles of law, then, that can be regarded, are
those common to all the states. 4
Before continuing with the thread of Iredell's thought, con-
sider the implications of this passage to the revisionist theme.
Some revisionists contend that Iredell simply foreshadowed Erie
by referring, in a diverse party case, to antecedent state law as the
rule of decision.24 9 But Iredell both dismissed the relevance of a
Georgia statute that contravened its common law immunity and
embraced a trans-state common law as the rule of decision. 50 If he
was truly looking to state law as the rule of decision in a diverse
party case, Iredell would have done neither of these things. In-
stead, he construed a federal statutory reference to the "principles
and usages of law" as incorporating either local law or general
common law. Moreover, in ascertaining local law, Iredell looked to
local state law as it existed when the Constitution and Judiciary
Act of 1789 were adopted. This static view seems at odds with the
language in § 34 of the Judiciary Act and is, of course, quite differ-
ent from modern Erie doctrine. Iredell evidently was not looking
to local state law; rather, he read federal law as incorporating local
state law at the time of its enactment. Thus, Iredell's rule of deci-
sion was a federal one, given content either by local state law at a
moment frozen in time or by a general trans-state common law.251
So directed, Iredell focused his inquiry on whether, prior to
constitutional union, a Chisholm-like action could have been main-
248 Id at 434-35.
2,9 See Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1472 (cited in note 2); Welch, 107 S Ct at 2966-68 (1987)
(Brennan dissenting).
250 There was nothing unusual about Iredell's willingness to refer to a common law gen-
eral to all of the states as the rule of decision. This practice was extremely common in the
early federal courts, long before the rule of Swift v Tyson, 41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842). See
generally Fletcher, 97 Harv L Rev 1513 (cited in note 214).
251 Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall) at 435-37. A similar approach was explicitly embedded in
the federal Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, which provided that the federal courts were to
follow the rules of procedure "as are now used or allowed in the [state] supreme courts." Act
of Sept. 29, 1789, ch 21, § 2, 1 Stat 93, and Act of May 8, 1792, ch 36, § 2, 1 Stat 275, 276
(emphasis added). See Charles A. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 61 (West, 4th ed
1983).
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tained against a state under the general common law. "If it could,.
it is now maintainable here: [i]f it could not,... it is not main-
tainable...., 52 This formulation demanded a lengthy excursion
into the English common law of state immunity. Since there was
no provision under the common law for suit against the Crown ex-
cept by its consent, Iredell concluded that the Judiciary Act's ref-
erence to "principles and usages of law" was simply inadequate to
vest in the federal courts jurisdiction of a private claim against a
sovereign state.253
Of course Iredell deliberately did not consider the question of
whether the Court's federal question jurisdiction would render a
state susceptible to suit in federal court; as a diverse party case,
Chisholm required no such inquiry. The revisionists contend, nev-
ertheless, that Iredell left distinct hints of his view that state sov-
ereignty was surrendered in such instances. They rely primarily on
the following passage:
The powers of the general Government, either of a Legislative
or Executive nature ... do for the most part ... affect indi-
viduals, and not states: they require no aid from State author-
ity .... The judicial power is of a peculiar kind. It is indeed
commensurate with the ordinary legislative and executive
powers of the general government.... But it also goes further.
Where certain parties are concerned, although the subject in
controversy does not relate to any of the special objects of au-
thority of the general government, wherein the separate sover-
eignties of the States are blended in one common mass of
supremacy, yet the general government has a judicial author-
ity in regard to such subjects of controversy, and the legisla-
ture of the United States may pass all laws necessary to give
such judicial authority its proper effect.2 54
251 Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall) at 437.
25. Id at 435-46.
254 Id at 435-36. The revisionists also rely on Iredell's off-hand observation that the
"authorities of the general government... are full and discretionary, within the restrictions
of the Constitution itself." Id at 432. The revisionists deduce an implicit corollary from this
statement that the federal judicial power pertaining to these authorities is similarly unfet-
tered. This corollary was certainly correct with respect to the original Constitution, but it
need not be true after the Eleventh Amendment expressly narrowed federal judicial power.
The amendment might well have made the federal judicial power less extensive than the
federal legislative power. That, of course, is a radical departure from Federalist principles:
"If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a govern-
ment being co-extensive with its legislative may be ranked among its number." The Federal-
ist 80 (Hamilton), in Federalist Papers at 475, 476 (cited in note 156). Whether this was, in
fact, the intention of the Eleventh Amendment will be considered in text at notes 260-98.
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From this some revisionists divine the conclusion that Iredell
saw state immunity as coextensive with its lawmaking capacity.
For example, Professor Amar reads this passage as concluding that
"[a] state could use its lawmaking power to adopt rules immuniz-
ing itself from liability, as long as such immunity frustrated no
higher-law restrictions on the state's limited sovereignty. 2 5 Such
higher-law restrictions were to be found in federal question juris-
diction, one "of the special objects of authority of the general Gov-
ernment, wherein the separate sovereignties of the States are
blended in one common mass of supremacy."2 5 There are two
problems with this reading of Iredell. First, even if accurate, it is
dictum of the most oblique sort. Second, it wholly ignores Iredell's
final and express statement about the constitutional status of state
immunity from suit. Iredell assured his audience that his "present
opinion [was] strongly against any construction of [the Constitu-
tion], which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit
against a state for the recovery of money. '2 57
While Iredell left few clues as to the nature of his perceived
constitutional impediment to suits against states, it is possible to
hazard a reconstruction of his objection. Iredell regarded the states
as islands of sovereignty:
Every state in the Union, in every instance where its sover-
eignty has not been delegated to the United States, I consider
to be as completely sovereign, as the United States are in re-
spect to the powers surrendered. The United States are sover-
eign as to all the powers of government actually surrendered:
each state in the Union is sovereign, as to all the powers re-
served. It must necessarily be so, because the United States
have no claim to any authority but such as the states have
surrendered to them: of course the part not surrendered must
remain as it did before.25
While in ratifying the Constitution the states had surrendered sov-
ereignty to the extent of the powers delegated to Congress and the
express prohibitions placed on state power, Iredell must have
"' Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1472 (cited in note 2).
256 Chisholm, 2 US (2 Dall) at 435.
257 Id at 449. Iredell was also undoubtedly aware of the passions the majority's judg-
ment would produce, for he concluded, "I pray to God, that if the Attorney General's doc-
trine, as to the law, be established by the judgment of this Court, all the good he predicts
from it may take place, and none of the evils with which, I have the concern to say, it
appears to me to be pregnant." Id at 450.
2& Id at 435.
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thought that an action for money against a state could never val-
idly be created pursuant to those delegated powers, nor could a
state be held so accountable for attempting to exercise a prohib-
ited power.259 Under Iredell's reasoning, either the judicial power
of Article III carried an implicit limitation or the Tenth Amend-
ment had independent normative content. Iredell did not tell us;
we can only guess.
B. Proposal and Ratification of the Amendment
Reaction to Chisholm was fierce. Georgia's House of Repre-
sentatives passed legislation declaring that any attempt to levy
judgment upon Georgia on behalf of Alexander Chisholm was a fel-
ony with a punishment of "death, without the benefit of the clergy,
by being hanged."2 60 Georgia also called for a constitutional
amendment to reverse Chisholm261 and, in this, was joined by Vir-
ginia and Massachusetts.262 These demands had already been an-
ticipated, for resolutions proposing a constitutional amendment to
reverse Chisholm had been introduced within days of the decision
itself. From the speed of the initial reaction, one might surmise
that the holding in Chisholm had, indeed, violated an original un-
derstanding of state immunity from suit in the federal courts. Such
an explanation is deceptively simple, for it took more than a year
and two sessions of Congress before the Eleventh Amendment was
sent to the states for ratification.263
Moreover, the legislative history suggests that Congress did
not regard the amendment as a blanket grant of immunity. Repre-
sentative Sedgwick of Massachusetts made the initial proposal in
the House on February 19, 1793, the day after the Chisholm
decision:
[T]hat no State shall be liable to be made a party defendant
250 Iredell's views apparently applied with equal force to suits for money brought
against states by either private citizens or the United States. In dictum Iredell asserts flatly
that the Constitution forbids "under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a state
for the recovery of money." Id at 449 (emphasis added). Iredell's careful limitation of this
immunity principle to suits for money leaves open the possibility of equitable remedies
against the states for their constitutional violations. Such injunctive relief is necessary to
implement the Supremacy Clause and has traditionally been cast in the nominal form of
suits against officers. See Osborn v Bank of the United States, 22 US (9 Wheat) 738 (1824);
Ex parte Young, 209 US 123 (1908).
"0 Augusta Chronicle (Nov 23, 1793), reporting legislative action of Nov 19, 1793,
quoted in Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 56-57 (cited in note 2).
2" Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 56 (cited in note 2).
24, Id at 57-60. See note 279 and accompanying text.
168 See 4 Annals of Congress 30-31, 476-77 (1794).
1989]
The University of Chicago Law Review [56:61
in any of the Judicial Courts established or to be established
under the authority of the United States at the suit of any
person or persons, citizens or foreigners, or of any body politic
or corporate whether within or without the United States.264
This was unvarnished state sovereign immunity in the federal
courts. If this proposal had been adopted, modern Eleventh
Amendment doctrine would make sense.285 At the very least, the
presence of the proposal is a vivid reminder that the Eleventh
Amendment's framers considered and apparently rejected a broad
constitutional immunity.
On the day after Sedgwick's proposal, an unknown senator in-
troduced a resolution in the Senate proposing the following consti-
tutional amendment:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to
any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citi- & of another State, or by
citizens or subjects of any foreign State.266
If this proposal had been intended to confer sovereign immunity
264 Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History 101 (Little, Brown,
1922). There is some dispute as to whether this resolution was actually introduced. Profes-
sor Nowak contends that Representative Sedgwick introduced a resolution for a constitu-
tional amendment that would have prohibited the federal courts from entertaining suits
against states by "any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or
foreigners, of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United States."
Nowak, 75 Colum L Rev at 1436 (cited in note 2), quoting Pennsylvania Journal (Feb 20,
1793). Charles Warren also insisted that such a resolution was introduced, although he
quoted it slightly differently and did not attribute it to Sedgwick. The resolution quoted by
Warren without source citation was identified by Professor Fletcher as from a contemporary
newspaper. See Pa J & Weekly Advertiser, Feb 27, 1793 at 1, col 2, quoted in Fletcher, 35
Stan L Rev at 1058-59 (cited in note 2). Judge Gibbons contends that "[t]he existence of
such a resolution ... appears dubious." Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1926 n 186 (cited in
note 2). Gibbons bases his conclusion on the absence of any such resolution in either the
Annals of Congress or the National Archives. Id. The existence of two contemporary news-
paper accounts of the resolution and its absence from the official records of the Congress
may suggest that the resolution was prepared but never formally introduced. Perhaps Rep-
resentative Sedgwick told the press he had introduced such a resolution when actually he
had failed to do so. Perhaps Sedgwick delivered remarks on the floor of the House that were
not in the form of a resolution and that went unrecorded in the Annals of Congress. How-
ever, it is at least equally likely that Sedgwick did precisely what the newspapers reported,
and that the event went wholly unrecorded. See, for example, James H. Hutson, The Crea-
tion of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex L Rev 1, 35-38
(1986).
"65 Indeed, this proposal would be even more stringent than current Eleventh Amend-
ment law. For example, the United States would be prohibited from suing the states, and
the states would not be able to sue each other in the Supreme Court.
266 3 Annals of Congress 651-52 (1793) (emphasis added).
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upon the states by a general denial of federal jurisdiction over suits
against states, it would have excluded the italicized phrase. 67
Since it did not, the final phrase must have been intended to have
some meaning. The revisionists contend that the phrase was in-
cluded in order to limit Article III's "specific grants of party status
jurisdiction, not its grant of subject matter jurisdiction." '268 But it
is at least as likely that the phrase was intended to provide a party
status basis for denial of jurisdiction. Support for this view may be
found in the historical evidence surrounding the Eleventh Amend-
ment's adoption.
The amendment was a product of Federalist political pru-
dence and congressional compromise. The Federalists were con-
cerned about rising Republican clamor in the states for a new con-
stitutional convention to advance extreme states' rights
positions.26 9 Moreover, such a convention was seen as fertile
ground for attempts by the French revolutionary government to
inveigle America into overt support for France in its war against
Great Britain, Holland, and SpainY.7 To avoid the calamity of a
convention, the Federalists conceded the Eleventh Amendment.
The Federalists may have had other motivations for support-
ing the amendment. They may have been simply bowing to popu-
lar anti-British sentiment;27 1 they may have regarded the amend-
ment as an effective device for limiting John Jay's room to
negotiate a final treaty settling the British debt issues;272 or they
may have thought that the amendment was "more formal than
real," for important constitutional prohibitions upon states could
be enforced without the necessity of joining states as defendants.273
Finally, the Federalists might have foreseen that some later Court
would construe the amendment as merely stripping the federal
courts of original jurisdiction over suits against states brought by
foreign citizens. 4 The British creditor who might lose in an Amer-
ican state court could still present the federal question of his
'M New York's ratification convention had proposed just such a general jurisdictional
denial: "[N]othing in the Constitution ... is to be construed to authorize any suit to be
brought against any state, in any manner whatever." 2 Elliot's Debates at 409 (cited in note
165).
"", Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1927 (emphasis omitted) (cited in note 2).
269 Id at 1930-32.
270 Id at 1928-30.
271 See Nowak, 75 Colum L Rev at 1438-40 (cited in note 2).
27 See Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of George Washington 144 (U Kan, 1974).
217 Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 74 (cited in note 2).
274 See, for example, Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832). See also text at
notes 330-35.
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treaty rights before the Supreme Court for appellate review. 5
Whatever other rationales the Federalists may have had for their
support, the amendment did serve its immediate political purpose
since its enactment successfully defused calls for a new constitu-
tional convention.
Even though the "roster of those favoring the amendment in-
cludes the names of ardent nationalists, as well as states' rights
men," 276 it is a fair inference that its proponents intended it to
deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over federal question
claims whenever the plaintiff was a foreigner or citizen of another
state. This conclusion is supported by the following historical
evidence.
First, Senator Gallatin proposed an amended version of the
Eleventh Amendment that would have permitted suits against
states by foreigners and citizens of other states, to the extent that
their claims arose under a federal treaty.27 7 Gallatin was evidently
concerned that such treaty claims might be foreclosed by the pro-
posed amendment. But his proposal was overwhelmingly defeated
because it would have permitted precisely the kind of action that
debtor states wished to eliminate. 8 Presumably, Gallatin's oppo-
nents thought that the unamended version would have the desired
effect of preventing the federal courts from hearing such federal
claims.
The states that were most ardent in advocating the amend-
ment-Massachusetts, Virginia, and Georgia-all faced pending
claims in the Supreme Court that posed issues turning upon inter-
pretation of the Constitution or federal treaties.279 After ratifica-
27' Even more important, from a practical standpoint of a British creditor, was the fed-
eral government's assumption of the major portion of the state debts. This, of course, elimi-
nated the necessity of suit against a balky state debtor. See Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at
69 (cited in note 2).
276 Id at 71.
277 Gallatin's proposed amendment read as follows:
The Judicial power of the United States, except in cases arising under treaties made
under the authority of the United States, shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.
4 Annals of Congress 30 (1794) (emphasis added).
278 See Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1930-34, 1936 (cited in note 2).
27 Virginia faced claims of over a million dollars from shareholders of the Indiana
Company, who asserted that Virginia had unlawfully seized land conveyed to them while
Virginia was still a colony. Hollingsworth v Virginia, 3 US (3 Dall) 378 (1798) and discus-
sion of the litigation in Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 57-60, 94 (cited in note 2). Georgia
faced a constitutional challenge, under the contracts clause, to its alteration of the terms of
an installment sale of land from the state to the South Carolina Yazoo Company. Moultrie v
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tion of the amendment, the Supreme Court dismissed all such
pending claims on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment de-
prived the Court of jurisdiction.280 If the amendment had been in-
tended merely to prune two twigs from Article III's diverse party
jurisdictional tree, the Court's dismissal simply would have placed
these claims in hibernation. For were Congress to act to confer
upon the federal courts original jurisdiction of claims arising under
the Constitution, treaties, or federal statutes, all of these claims (or
others very much like them) would emerge from their slumbers
and reassert themselves in federal courts. This was not merely idle
speculation, for only three years later Congress did just that.2"' It
strains credulity to suppose that Massachusetts, Virginia, and
Georgia, the chief architects of the amendment, would be so oblivi-
ous to their interests as to leave this possibility alive.
Moreover, those who construe the amendment as only a nar-
row limitation upon Article III's diversity jurisdiction are required
to amend its text in order to deliver their desired meaning. In revi-
sionist parlance, the Eleventh Amendment reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity founded upon a
diverse party head of jurisdiction, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
Those who read the amendment as a complete party-based ouster
of federal jurisdiction are comfortable with the unaltered text.
Finally, if the point of the amendment was simply to overturn
Chisholm's jurisdictional holding, and strip the federal courts of
Georgia, a largely unreported case discussed in Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 63-64 n 83,
94 (cited in note 2). Massachusetts was named defendant in a suit challenging its confisca-
tion of loyalist property in violation of the peace treaty. Vassal v Massachusetts, an unre-
ported case on the docket of the Supreme Court, discussed in Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity
at 60-62 n 72, 94 (cited in note 2). All three of these actions had been brought as original
proceedings in the Supreme Court, apparently on the strength of the state-citizen diversity
clause and § 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act.
111 See Hollingsworth v Virginia, 3 US (3 Dall) 378 (1798). The Court could not have
retained jurisdiction on federal question grounds because, under Article III, it lacked origi-
nal jurisdiction in such actions. Moreover, the suit could not be brought in any other federal
forum because the 1789 Judiciary Act failed to vest original federal question jurisdiction in
the lower federal courts. Congress first created federal question jurisdiction in the short
lived Judiciary Act of 1801. See Act of Feb 13, 1801, ch 4, 2 Stat 89, repealed by Act of
March 8, 1802, ch 8, 2 Stat 132. The first lasting grant of a general federal question jurisdic-
tion occurred in 1875. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch 137, 18 Stat 470.
"' See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch 4, 2 Stat 89, repealed by Act of March 8, 1802, ch 8, 2
Stat 132.
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the power to hear diverse state-party claims brought against states,
a constitutional amendment was unnecessary. The task could have
been neatly accomplished by amending § 13 of the Judiciary Act to
deprive the federal courts of such party-based jurisdiction.
The self-executing and irreducible nature of the Court's origi-
nal jurisdiction 282 does not undercut this conclusion. At the time,
there was no certainty on this point. In Chisholm itself, Justice
Iredell argued unnecessarily that the Court's original jurisdiction
was not self executing.2 83 In Federalist 81, Hamilton noted that the
Court's jurisdiction included "cases in which a state might happen
to be a party. 28 4 By contrast, in Federalist 80, after a summary of
the heads of federal jurisdiction (including state-party suits) Ham-
ilton concluded, without distinguishing between the Court's origi-
nal and appellate jurisdiction, that "the national legislature will
have ample authority to make such exceptions and to prescribe
such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove ... in-
convenience[] .1'285 If the self-executing nature of the Court's origi-
nal jurisdiction over state-party cases had been beyond cavil, the
First Congress would likely have felt it unnecessary to include such
a jurisdictional grant in § 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act.286 More-
over, the Judiciary Act itself only implemented part of the Su-
preme Court's original jurisdiction. s Even today, when the self
executing nature of the Court's original jurisdiction is settled,
there is room to argue that the Court's original jurisdiction over
state-party cases is not irreducible, but is subject to congressional
282 See Kentucky v Dennison, 65 US (24 How) 66, 98 (1861).
283 2 US (2 Dall) at 432. Iredell's argument was unnecessary because § 13 of the 1789
Judiciary Act clearly provided the Court with original jurisdiction over suits "between a
state and citizens of other states." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 13, 1 Stat 73, 80. Perhaps
for that reason, none of Iredell's brethren responded to his assertion. Additionally, Attorney
General Randolph's argument in Chisholm assumed that the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction needed the enabling legislation of the 1789 Judiciary Act. See text at notes 207-09.
2" Federalist 81 (Hamilton) in Federalist Papers at 481, 487 (cited in note 154).
288 Federalist 80 (Hamilton) in Federalist Papers at 475, 481 (emphasis in original)
(cited in note 154). While Hamilton was either disingenuous or confused about the opera-
tion of the Exceptions Clause, Professor Amar has provided an account of the Court's origi-
nal jurisdiction over state-party cases that would permit congressional regulation of this
jurisdiction under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, § 8. See Akhil Reed Amar,
A Neo-Federalist View of Article III. Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65
BU L Rev 205, 254-55 n 160 (1985).
288 See note 283.
287 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 13, 1 Stat 73, 80. See also Paul M. Bator, et al, Hart
and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 33 (Foundation, 3d ed 1988)
(noting that the statutory grant of original jurisdiction was "nearly but not exactly coexten-
sive with the constitutional grant.").
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restriction. 8
A constitutional amendment was desirable, however, for two
reasons. First, Chisholm had aggressively established the outer
boundaries of Article III jurisdiction by holding unequivocally that
the federal judicial power encompassed suits against states by out-
of-staters. A mere statutory response would not permanently inter
this disturbing precedent. Second, even Iredell had reserved judg-
ment on whether state immunity from suit was abridged in suits
founded on federal question jurisdiction. If immunity did not ad-
here to those cases, an act of Congress creating federal question
jurisdiction would bring the states once again to the bar of the fed-
eral courts. To avoid this, a constitutional amendment was needed.
The first attempted amendment, by Massachusetts Representative
Sedgwick, sought directly to secure a blanket grant of state immu-
nity. 28 When that failed, a compromise was struck that focused on
the class of plaintiffs that most troubled the states: foreign and
domestic out-of-state creditors and expatriate loyalists seeking to
recover their seized property. The compromise of the Eleventh
Amendment manipulated jurisdiction awkwardly in order to cre-
ate, in effect, a state immunity doctrine limited to a defined class
of plaintiffs.
There is only one significant indication to the contrary. In the
course of its congressional evolution, the first phrase of the amend-
ment-the "judicial power shall not extend"-was replaced by the
present language: "the judicial power shall not be construed to ex-
tend." This change has proved to be fertile ground for debate over
its substantive effect. Adherents of the conventional view interpret
the new language as confirming that the amendment was intended
to reaffirm a general understanding of state immunity existing at
the time Article III was adopted.290 Other scholars suggest that the
phrase was intended to "ensure retrospective application of the
amendment to suits already filed ... [or] to soften any supposed
288 Article III gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over "Cases ... in which a
State shall be a Party." US Const, Art III, § 2. Because of the long established principle that
the only state-party cases within the Court's original jurisdiction are those specifically enu-
merated in Article III, § 2-state:state, state:foreign state, state:out-of-state citizen,
state:alien-it is possible to read this clause as a permissive grant of jurisdiction, requiring
congressional action to effectuate and subject to congressional restrictions. See, for example,
Cohens v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 398 (1821). Surprisingly, a leading revision-
ist-Professor Amar-embraces precisely this reading. See Amar, 65 BU L Rev at 254 n 160
(cited in note 285).
'8, See note 264 and accompanying text.
290 Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 9-19 (1890). See also Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 68
(cited in note 2).
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rebuke to the Court." '291 The revisionist position is that the phrase
was intended to make the amendment "conform to the framers'
intent that the judicial power should not be construed to extend to
the enumerated diverse party suits as such, but would extend to
these diverse configurations whenever jurisdiction was indepen-
dently based on another affirmative jurisdictional grant."' '
Each interpretation is problematic. The conventional "reaffir-
mation" reading is belied by the demonstrable lack of original una-
nimity concerning state immunity.293 The revisionist reading de-
rives its support from the language of a constitutional amendment
first proposed by Senator John Breckenridge of Kentucky in 1805,
which employed the same phrase to eliminate all diverse party ju-
risdiction but leave intact federal question jurisdiction. 94 While it
is anomalous to read the Breckenridge proposal as repealing some
of the affirmative jurisdictional grants of Article III, and the iden-
tically phrased Eleventh Amendment as creating a new party-
based jurisdictional bar, the peculiar political realities of the com-
promise embodied in the Eleventh Amendment seem to confirm
the anomaly.
A related revisionist reading is that the language was simply
an interpretive directive to the courts. According to Professor
Fletcher, "[t]he amendment required that the [state- citizen diver-
sity] clause be construed . . to authorize federal court jurisdiction
only when the state was a plaintiff. In other words, the amendment
required that the clause be read to mean precisely what Marshall
291 Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 68-69 (cited in note 2).
2)2 Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1482 (cited in note 2) (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
292 See text at notes 133-85.
219 Breckenridge's proposed amendment provided 'that:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to controver-
sies between a State and the citizens of another State; between citizens of different
States.... ; and between a State and the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens,
or subjects.
14 Annals of Cong 53 (1805). Senator Samuel Maclay of Pennsylvania introduced the same
amendment the following year, 15 Annals of Cong 68 (1806), and Senator Henry Clay of
Kentucky introduced a similar amendment in 1807. 16 Annals of Cong 76 (1807). Represen-
tative Elliot of Vermont introduced in the House a resolution of the Vermont legislature
concurring with the "resolutions of the State of Kentucky, proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, 'for confining the judiciary power of the . . . United
States to cases ... arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States... ; cases
affecting Ambassadors ... ; cases of admiralty... ; controversies to which the United States
shall be a party; and to controversies between two or more States ... .'" Id at 216. Since the
proposed amendment spoke only of the remaining three diverse party categories of Article
III, § 2, the Vermont resolution is a plain indication that, at very least, the Vermont legisla-
ture read language similar to that used in the Eleventh Amendment in the way the revision-
ists now urge. See Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1482-83 n 233 (cited in note 2).
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and Madison had contended it meant during the Virginia ratifying
convention."295 While this reading is possible, it fails to account for
the clearly expressed desires of Massachusetts, Virginia, and Geor-
gia to bar the federal courts from hearing federal question claims
presented by out-of-staters. Following the Chisholm decision, the
Anti-Federalists wanted far more than mere constitutional confir-
mation of Madison's and Marshall's representations; they wanted
firm assurance that the federal courts would be permanently dis-
abled from hearing claims presented by the disfavored classes of
foreign creditors and expatriate loyalists. A narrowing construction
of the state- citizen diversity clause would not suffice; the stronger
medicine of jurisdictional ouster was needed to eliminate the possi-
bility of such claims reappearing via the back door of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. Thus, despite slender indications to the contrary,
the Eleventh Amendment was designed to cut a swath through all
the jurisdictional grants of Article III.
Far less clear is whether the amendment was also intended to
repudiate any implicit waiver of state sovereign immunity con-
tained in the jurisdictional grants of Article III. If this more ambi-
tious goal was contemplated, it is difficult to understand why it
was not plainly stated, as Representative Sedgwick had initially
proposed.296 Certainly the ratification debates concerning the scope
of Article III were fresh in the collective mind of the nation. If the
Court's opinion in Chisholm embodied a wrong-headed under-
standing of Article III as containing an implicit waiver of sovereign
immunity, one might have expected that the Eleventh Amendment
would have explicitly reversed that core misunderstanding rather
than simply carved out a broad, party-based head of jurisdictional
prohibition. The resort to the latter method suggests either that
the Eleventh Amendment was profoundly pragmatic or that its
framers never regarded Chisholm as doing more than announcing
pervasive federal jurisdiction over states, and leaving open the
possibility that the Court might employ a rule of decision that
could abrogate state common law immunity.
Pragmatically, Federalists supported the amendment as a nec-
essary price to avoid a constitutional convention; debtor states
supported it as a way to avoid their legitimate foreign obligations.
There is very little aroma of principle in the entire affair; while the
amendment reversed Chisholm it did so not on the broad ground
295 Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1061-62 (cited in note 2) (footnotes omitted). See also
notes 167-68.
2"6 See note 264.
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that Chisholm had articulated a fundamentally wrong princi-
ple-implicit waiver of sovereign immunity-but on the narrow
and crass ground that Chisholm left the states financially exposed
to claims by foreigners and citizens of other states. "
The more principled reading, which can coexist with the prag-
matic view, is that the amendment's framers responded directly to
the threat of Chisholm. If Chisholm announced a broad view of
Article III diversity jurisdiction, the framers wished to foreclose
the possibility that that jurisdiction might be used to devise rules
of decision that could abrogate the states' common law immunity.
While Congress could have accomplished much the same end by
simply enacting a statute that expressly directed the federal courts
to observe state common law immunity as the rule of decision in
Chisholm-type suits, such a compromise would have still left the
states open to the jurisdiction of an unfriendly forum in federal
question cases and, moreover, it could be repealed by a future ma-
jority in Congress. A constitutional denial of jurisdiction was more
certain and final, even if clumsy. Under this view, Congress used a
meat cleaver to trim a legal callus. Predictably, it caught a little
more flesh than was optimum.
C. Early Interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment
Few opportunities existed for interpretation of the new Elev-
enth Amendment because Jay's Treaty of 179498 created an inter-
national commission to adjudicate the claims of British creditors
and hence prevented further testing of the peace treaty in Ameri-
can courts. Those opportunities that did arise suggest that the
Eleventh Amendment was not regarded as a fount of general im-
munity from suit but was, rather, an overriding party-based juris-
dictional ouster cutting across the provisions of Article III. The
297 In the absence of original federal question jurisdiction, a foreigif creditor's assign-
ment of his treaty-based claim to a citizen of the defendant state, in order to circumvent the
Eleventh Amendment's party-based jurisdictional ouster, would be futile. Even assuming
the existence of federal question jurisdiction, the courts could have regarded § 11 of the
Judiciary Act as a two-edged sword. Section 11 deprived the circuit courts of diversity juris-
diction over suits brought by an assignee of a chose in action "unless a suit might have been
prosecuted in such court . . . if no assignment had been made." 1 Stat at 79. Collusive
attempts to defeat diversity of citizenship so as to escape the Eleventh Amendments party-
based withdrawal of jurisdiction might also have been precluded by § 11. See, for example,
the broader language in the modern analogue to § 11, 28 USC § 1359 (1976), which divests
the district courts from all jurisdiction when a "party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively ... joined to... invoke jurisdiction." Compare New Hampshire v
Louisiana, 108 US 76 (1883) (discussed in text at notes 370-74).
I9 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov 19, 1794, 8 Stat 116.
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cases that presented the issue arose in several different contexts:
admiralty, appeals under § 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, litigation
between the states themselves, and those vexing cases where claims
were framed not against the state but against governmental of-
ficers, or where the state claimed an interest in the litigation
though it was not a party.
1. Admiralty: Peters, Bright, and Madrazo.
In 1778, Gideon Olmstead, a citizen of Connecticut, and other
American sailors who had been impressed into naval service
aboard the British sloop Active mutinied and seized control of the
vessel. On its way to an American port, the Active was captured by
a Pennsylvania naval vessel. In the Pennsylvania admiralty court
Olmstead and his confederates claimed exclusive rights to the Ac-
tive as a prize of war. Pennsylvania resisted Olmstead's claim and
asserted an identical rival claim to the Active. Olmstead was
awarded one-fourth of the Active's value. He promptly appealed
the Pennsylvania court's decision to the Court of Appeals for prize
cases, a committee of the Continental Congress, which reversed the
prior award and sustained Olmstead's claim. Pennsylvania refused
to comply; instead, it paid over the proceeds of sale of the Active
to David Rittenhouse, the state treasurer.
By 1801, Rittenhouse was dead and Olmstead had renewed his
claim in the new federal courts. The Rittenhouse heirs, conscious
of the common law rule that an agent remained liable for all mon-
ies paid over to his principal if a rival claimant later defeated the
principal's claim, refused Pennsylvania's demand for the proceeds
held by them. In 1803, Philadelphia's federal trial judge, Richard
Peters, ruled in favor of Olmstead.""9 Pennsylvania reacted hysteri-
cally, adopting a legislative resolution declaring Peters's decree a
nullity, directing the Governor to prevent execution of the judg-
ment, and insisting that Peters had lacked jurisdiction over the
matter since he had acted "in manifest opposition to, and violation
of the [eleventh] amendment."300 Given the probability of organ-
ized and official defiance, Judge Peters prudently took no steps to
enforce his decree.
In 1808, however, Olmstead pressed the issue by asking the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus commanding
"' The early stages of this litigation are unreported but summarized in United States v
Peters, 9 US (5 Cranch) 115, 115-35 (1809).
100 Id at 132, quoting the resolution of the Pennsylvania legislature.
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Judge Peters to order an attachment and other process to enforce
his judgment against the Rittenhouse heirs. A unanimous Court
granted the writ. To the contention that the federal courts lacked
jurisdiction due to the Eleventh Amendment, Chief Justice Mar-
shall countered that the claim was "not instituted against the state
or its treasurer, but against the executrixes of David Rittenhouse,
for the proceeds of [the Active].... If these proceeds had been the
actual property of Pennsylvania, however wrongfully acquired, the
disclosure of that fact would have presented a case on which it is
unnecessary to give an opinion. .. "30 The "mere suggestion of ti-
tle" in Pennsylvania was not enough to invoke the jurisdictional
limits of the Eleventh Amendment. 2 Indeed, to Marshall "[t]he
amendment simply provides, that no suit may be commenced or
prosecuted against a state." ' The Peters decision simply stated
what would be underscored in Osborn v Bank of the United
States:304 the Eleventh Amendment bar applies only to actions
making a state the party defendant.
The rationale employed in Peters is not consistent with the
view that the Eleventh Amendment was only a narrow limitation
upon two heads of Article III's grant of diverse party jurisdiction.
Olmstead's suit was in admiralty and thus brought pursuant to an
independent head of jurisdiction. The Peters Court could simply
have declared that the Eleventh Amendment had no application to
suits grounded in a non-diverse party head of jurisdiction. That
the Court adopted a more labored route3 05 to reject Pennsylvania's
Eleventh Amendment claim suggests that the Court considered the
amendment as operating to oust federal courts of all jurisdiction,
whatever its Article III source, whenever the party alignment was
within the amendment's specifications.
Olmstead's saga did not end with the Peters decision. Penn-
sylvania's governor, Thomas McKean, an extreme Anti-Federalist,
ordered the state militia to deploy around Rittenhouse's home in
order to prevent execution of judgment. The United States Mar-
shal gathered his posse and an armed clash was averted only when
the Pennsylvanians capitulated upon President Madison's firm an-
301 Id at 139.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 22 US (9 Wheat) 738 (1824). See text at notes 339-54 for a discussion of Osborn.
311 While the Court's rationale was consistent with long standing views on the lack of
immunity of state officials acting in violation of law, see Engdahl, 44 Colo L Rev at 32-33
(cited in note 177), it was nevertheless the more indirect solution. Marshall was prone to
indirection whenever he needed to skirt unpleasantries.
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nouncement that he would use all available federal power to en-
force the decree.8 0 6 Michael Bright, the commander of the state
militia, was then prosecuted in federal circuit court before Justice
Bushrod Washington.3 0 7 Bright's defense was entirely legal; he con-
tended that the federal decree he resisted was void because of the
Eleventh Amendment and he insisted that a state militiaman fol-
lowing orders was immune from prosecution.308 Justice Washington
dispensed with this defense on two grounds. First, he elaborated
upon the Peters decision by holding that the Eleventh Amendment
made no alteration in the common law liability of individual gov-
ernmental officials.309 Next Washington declared that the amend-
ment applied only to suits in law and equity. Because the Olin-
stead litigation had been brought pursuant to the court's admiralty
jurisdiction conferred by Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789,
and since the Eleventh Amendment failed to restrict the exercise
of that jurisdiction, the amendment had no role to play.310
Justice Washington thus did what the entire Court could have
done in Peters. Although Washington was acting alone on circuit,
his exclusion of admiralty from the Eleventh Amendment bar ac-
quired force because the Supreme Court never explicitly passed on
this precise issue during the nineteenth century. Washington's po-
sition was finally repudiated by the Court in a post-Hans decision,
Ex parte New York (No. 1),'11 but for more than a century his
view was considered correct by such esteemed commentators as Jo-
seph Story and Peter DuPonceau 2 2
If Justice Washington's reading of the Eleventh Amendment
in the Bright case-that the amendment did not apply to cases in
admiralty-was clearly wrong, one might have expected John Mar-
shall to use the Madrazo litigation as a device for correction. In-
stead, Marshall went out of his way to avoid ruling on the issue.
The Madrazo litigation consisted of two decisions, Governor of
Georgia v Madrazo ("Madrazo /,)313 and Ex parte Madrazzo [sic]
I" Sharp criticism by other states of Pennsylvania's defiance may also have been a
factor in Pennsylvania's acquiescence to federal authority. See Warren, 1 Supreme Court at
374-87 (cited in note 264).
507 United States v Bright, 24 F Cases 1232 (Cir Ct D Pa 1809) (No 14,647).
508 Id at 1234.
309 Id at 1236.
310 Id.
311 256 US 490 (1921).
311 Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 560-61
(Hilliard, Gray, 1833, reprinted De Capo, 1970); Peter DuPonceau, A Brief View of the Con-
stitution of the United States 37-38 (L Acad Philadelphia, 1834).
313 26 US (1 Pet) 110 (1828).
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("Madrazo I/,,),314 in which Juan Madrazo, a Spanish national,
sought to recover a cargo of slaves, or the proceeds of their sale. In
1817 an American privateer captured Madrazo's slave ship and a
pirate prize court located off the coast of Florida sold the ship's
human cargo. Bowen, an American, bought ninety-five slaves and,
in violation of both United States and Georgia law, brought them
into Georgia. Bowen's slaves were seized and, in accord with appli-
cable law, delivered to an agent of the Georgia governor for sale.
Some were sold and the proceeds deposited in the Georgia treas-
ury. The American Colonization Society then intervened and re-
quested, as it was entitled to do under Georgia law, that the re-
maining slaves be delivered to it for reconveyance to Africa. Geor-
gia's governor instituted forfeiture proceedings in federal court to
accomplish this result.
The suit was opposed by Bowen, who still challenged the va-
lidity of Georgia's seizure of the slaves. Madrazo joined the fray by
filing a libel in admiralty to recover the unsold slaves and the sale
proceeds of those already sold. Both the governor and Bowen op-
posed this action. While Madrazo explicitly invoked the district
court's admiralty jurisdiction, the court failed to take custody of
the res, despite the fact that admiralty in rem jurisdiction required
it to have control of the disputed property. The court did acquire
in personam jurisdiction over the governor, however, and pro-
ceeded to render judgment for the governor in the consolidated ad-
miralty and forfeiture actions. On appeal, the circuit court held for
Madrazo and dismissed Bowen's and the governor's claims.3 15 Both
the governor and Bowen appealed to the Supreme Court where, for
the first time, Georgia contended that the lower courts lacked ju-
risdiction by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment.
Before the appeal was argued, Georgia and Bowen reached a
settlement whereby the state turned over the slaves to Bowen, de-
spite the illegality of his claim. The mood in Georgia had turned
ugly. Southern suspicion of northern intentions concerning slavery
was growing darker and Georgia was openly defiant of the at-
tempts of the John Quincy Adams administration to preserve In-
dian lands in Georgia from state exploitation. Thus, when the Mar-
shall Court decided Madrazo I it was a virtual certainty that any
decision in favor of Madrazo would also be openly defied. Mar-
shall, ever the master of judicial realpolitik, concocted a decision
that affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of both Bowen's and the
"' 32 US (7 Pet) 627 (1833).
315 Madrazo I, 26 US (1 Pet) at 111.
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governor's claim, but reversed the award to Madrazo on the ground
that "[t]he decree cannot be sustained as against the state, be-
cause, if the 11th amendment to the Constitution does not extend
to proceedings in admiralty, it was a case for the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court" because it was a suit between a state
and a citizen of a foreign state. 16 The suit was against the state
because the governor was sued "not by his name, but by his title"
and because "no case is made which justifies a decree against him
personally."3 17
Perhaps enlightened by Marshall's jurisdictional views,
Madrazo filed an original admiralty libel against Georgia in the Su-
preme Court. But now the Court was quick to point out that it
lacked original jurisdiction in admiralty because the disputed
property was not in possession of a court in admiralty.318 Thus, it
did not matter whether the Eleventh Amendment applied to admi-
ralty proceedings. The Supreme Court's only jurisdictional basis
was party alignment: Madrazo, a Spanish national, sought to sue
Georgia. Of course, it was precisely this party-based jurisdiction
that the Eleventh Amendment denied the federal courts. Unsur-
prisingly, Marshall dismissed Madrazo's claim as "a mere personal
suit against a state, to recover proceeds in its possession, and in
such a case, no private person has a right to commence an original
suit in this court against a state."1 9
As in Peters, Marshall's statement is broad enough to encom-
pass the possibility that he thought the Eleventh Amendment
barred actions against states rooted in federal question jurisdic-
tion. If that were the case it would seem likely that in the Madrazo
cases Marshall would have concluded that the Eleventh Amend-
ment barred actions against states arising under the then-principal
head of federal question jurisdiction-admiralty. Such a result
would have accomplished Marshall's probable desire to avoid im-
mersing the Court in the fiery crucible of Georgian defiance of fed-
eral authority, but would have come at the price of a substantial
diminution of federal judicial authority. Instead, Marshall skirted
the issue by crafting a disposition that avoided both confrontation
3" Madrazo I, 26 US (1 Pet) at 124. Even if Madrazo I was a suit between a foreign
national and a state, Marshall's reasoning seems flawed since § 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act
gave the Supreme Court original but not exclusive jurisdiction over these actions. 1 Stat at
80. Moreover, Article III does not confer original admiralty jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court.
31 Madrazo I, 26 US (1 Pet) at 123, 124.
318 Madrazo II, 32 US (7 Pet) at 632 (1833).
319 Id at 632.
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with Georgia and erosion of Marshall's nationalist ideals. Thus,
while Marshall may have thought, as the Court suggested in Pe-
ters, that the Eleventh Amendment was thought to be a party-
based jurisdictional ouster, he avoided ruling on the issue by ad-
hering doggedly to the amendment's text. At bottom, Madrazo lost
the second time around because the Court's only jurisdictional ba-
sis was not in admiralty (which would have required Marshall to
face the unpleasant task he avoided) but in state-alien diversity.
With that as the jurisdictional foundation for Madrazo's claim, the
Eleventh Amendment provided Marshall a simple textual answer.
In any case, what is clear from these cases is that in neither
case was there any suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment
might afford a general immunity from suit; rather, the focus in
both was upon identifying the categories of suits against states
that were barred from federal court by virtue of the Eleventh
Amendment.
2. Section 25 cases: Cohens and Worcester.
Pursuant to Article III's grant to the federal courts of power to
decide cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties,"320 § 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act
vested in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over certain
federal question claims litigated in state courts. Since the federal
courts did not receive original federal question jurisdiction until
1875, this section served as the principal avenue for presentation of
a claim that a state had acted in violation of a federal statute or a
Constitutional prohibition. It thus carried the potential to pose the
broad question of whether the Eleventh Amendment created a
general immunity from suit, including appeals of judgments ren-
dered in cases where the state had been the plaintiff, regardless of
the citizenship of the parties.
Precisely these issues came before the Court in Cohens v Vir-
ginia.32' The Cohen brothers had been convicted in a Virginia
court of the crime of selling lottery tickets. They appealed to the
Supreme Court on the basis of an act of Congress that authorized
the District of Columbia to organize a lottery. The Marshall Court
affirmed the convictions on the ground that the act did not author-
ize the sale of lottery tickets outside the District, but in reaching
this decision Marshall was able to sustain the Court's appellate ju-
... US Const, Art HI, § 2.
321 19 US (6 Wheat) 264 (1821).
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risdiction over a number of difficult constitutional objections. One
of these was the Eleventh Amendment. Virginia's counsel argued
that, because the state was a party, the federal courts were de-
prived of appellate jurisdiction.2 2 The principle Virginia urged on
the Court was that "a sovereign independent State is not suable,
except by its own consent. '3 2' The Cohens' counsel responded by
asserting that it was Virginia that had sued the Cohens; it would
be a monstrous perversion of sovereign immunity to prevent an ac-
cused from appealing a conviction. 24
Rather than adopting the simple solution offered by the Co-
hens' counsel, Marshall reached out for a more complicated and
vastly broader answer. He began by asserting that the federal judi-
cial power conferred by Article III "extends to all cases arising
under the constitution or a law of the United States, whoever may
be the parties.' s2 5 Since Article III included all federal question
cases, the presence of a state as a party did not defeat jurisdiction.
Indeed, the Court must review "cases where a State shall prosecute
an individual who claims the protection of an act of Congress...
[for] the preservation of the constitution and laws of the United
States.328 The Eleventh Amendment did not alter this jurisdic-
tional grant for two reasons. The simple reason was that the Co-
hens were citizens of Virginia, not of another state2 7 The broader
reason was that the Cohens had originally been defendants, not
plaintiffs, and that, therefore, this was not "a suit commenced or
prosecuted against" a state.32 8
The Cohens decision presents a curious brew. By aggressively
asserting that there were no party-based limitations on federal
question jurisdiction and by framing the issue as one of sovereign
immunity, Marshall seemed poised to deliver dictum that a state
could be a party defendant in any federal question case.2 ' But by
offering the Cohens' Virginia citizenship as a reason for the inap-
plicability of the Eleventh Amendment, Marshall retreated from
311 Id at 302-09 (argument of Mr. Barbour), and at 315 (argument of Mr. Smyth).
11- Id at 380 (Marshall restating the argument of counsel).
3I Id at 350 (argument of Mr. Ogden), and at 366-67 (argument of Mr. Pinkney).
321 Id at 392 (emphasis added).
3.6 Id at 387, 391.
327 Id at 412.
328 Id at 406-12.
329 While Marshall conceded that a citizen might not be able to sue his own state to
recover an unconstitutional export tax, he reasoned that such a case arose under the com-
mon law of assumpsit rather than under the Constitution. Id at 402-03. Marshall did not
opine about the status of such a suit seeking a prospective injunction against collection of
such a tax.
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his earlier assertion and did not close out the possibility that at
least some federal question suits might be denied the federal
courts by the amendment. Clearly repudiated, however, was the
notion that the Eleventh Amendment afforded states a blanket im-
munity from federal court jurisdiction. That principle had been ar-
gued to the Court and rejected.
Some of the ambivalence of Cohens was removed eleven years
later with the Court's decision in Worcester v Georgia.3 0 For years
Georgia had sought to oust the Cherokee and Creek Indians from
their lands, and to remove the federal officials who administered
the lands."' Georgia's efforts were a plain violation of federal
law3 2 but generally went unpunished. As part of its effort, Georgia
required whites residing on Indian lands to obtain a license from
the state. Worcester, a Vermont missionary and federal postmas-
ter, was indicted and convicted in a Georgia court for failure to
obtain the required state license.333 Worcester invoked § 25 to ap-
peal his conviction to the Supreme Court. Although served with
process requiring it to respond to the Court's writ of error, Georgia
refused to appear.3 34 Given Georgia's contumacious history and the
especially nasty position it took with respect to Indian lands, it
was entirely predictable that Georgia would ignore a Supreme
Court decision adverse to it." 5 The politically easy solution would
have been to expand upon the reasoning of Cohens by holding that
the Eleventh Amendment barred Worcester's appeal because he
was a citizen of Vermont, not Georgia. Without discussion of the
Eleventh Amendment, the Court took jurisdiction and reversed the
conviction.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Worcester and Cohens
330 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832).
3" The entire sordid history may be perused in William G. McLoughlin, Cherokee Re-
nascence in the New Republic (Princeton, 1986). See also Warren, 2 Supreme Court at 189-
239 (cited in note 264); Albert J. Beveridge, 4 Life of John Marshall 539-51 (Houghton
Mifflin, 1919).
"I See Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1953-54 & n 346 (cited in note 2), for the statutory
history of this collision between Georgia and the United States.
113 Worcester, 31 US (6 Pet) at 537 (1832).
"s Id at 533-34 (order demanding that the state appear before the Court). See also
Beveridge, 4 The Life of John Marshall 548-49 (cited in note 331); Warren, 2 The Supreme
Court in United States History 214 (cited in note 264) (noting the absence of an appear-
ance on the part of Georgia).
"I Popular tradition has it that President Jackson greeted Marshall's reversal of
Worcester's conviction with the quip, "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him
enforce it." While Charles Warren doubted that Jackson ever uttered the phrase there is no
denying that Georgia's belligerence was real. See Warren, 2 Supreme Court at 219 (cited in
note 264).
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made clear that the Court's federal question appellate jurisdiction
was undisturbed by the Eleventh Amendment. Despite Hans and
its progeny, this rule continues to exist. Yet, if the Eleventh
Amendment was truly a complete grant of sovereign immunity,
Worcester's appeal would have been dismissed or, at the very least,
this rule would have died in the doctrinal furnace that has been
stoked since Hans. Of course, even after Hans, one easy explana-
tion for the rule's continued vitality could be Marshall's second
reason for upholding the Cohens' appeal: an appeal against a state
is not a suit "commenced or prosecuted" against a state. But if the
post-Hans conventional interpretation of the amendment ignores
the last fourteen words of the amendment in creating a broad im-
munity for the states, why should it be limited by any other words
in the text? That the rule of Cohens and Worcester has endured is
yet another indication that the broad immunity from suit in fed-
eral court enjoyed by the states after Hans has its conceptual roots
somewhere other than in the soil of the Eleventh Amendment.
3. Suits between states.
If, as the conventionalists contend, the Eleventh Amendment
had been intended to preserve inviolate state immunity from any
suit without its consent, the Court should have concluded that its
original jurisdiction over suits between the states had been eviscer-
ated with the amendment's ratification."'8 That, of course, did not
happen. In Rhode Island v Massachusetts the Taney Court ex-
pressly rejected Massachusetts's argument that the Eleventh
Amendment deprived the Court of any jurisdiction over suits be-
tween states."' 7 The case appears to be the only instance in which
a state took this position with respect to the Court's original juris-
diction over litigation between states. Indeed, in an earlier bound-
ary dispute between New York and New Jersey, the New York at-
336 The reasoning in Hans assumes that the Eleventh Amendment modifies Article I
by conferring a complete immunity from suit upon the states. Logically, this immunity
should extend to include suits between states or brought by the United States, but the
Supreme Court has never extended Hans this far. See United States v Mississippi, 380 US
128 (1965); Rhode Island v Massachusetts, 37 US (12 Pet) 657 (1838); North Dakota v
Minnesota, 263 US 365 (1923).
337 37 US (12 Pet) 657, 731 (1838). The Court's rationale was evidently rooted in the
Eleventh Amendments text: "while [the Eleventh Amendment] ... took from this Court all
jurisdiction, past, present, and future ... of all controversies between states and individuals;
it left its exercise over those between states as free as it had been before." Though Justice
Baldwin's description of the effect of the Eleventh Amendment is overbroad, it does support
the jurisdictional ouster view.
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torney general argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction on the
ground that the Court's original jurisdiction over interstate litiga-
tion was not effective without congressional legislation to imple-
ment the grant. 38 While this point followed Justice Iredell's infer-
ential suggestion in Chisholm that congressional action was needed
to subject a state to any suit in the federal courts, New York did
not explicitly urge the Eleventh Amendment as a jurisdictional
bar. If the amendment was thought to guarantee such expansive
immunity, it is most surprising that New York's attorney general,
already preoccupied with objections to the Court's jurisdiction,
failed to assert explicitly such a killing defense to New Jersey's
suit. Once more, the Eleventh Amendment was viewed, in the days
before Hans was decided, as only a jurisdictional trump of Article
III. Although this trump cut across all Article III grants of jurisdic-
tion, it was limited to its text. Thus, the amendment did not apply
to suits brought by states simply because they were not "Citizens
of another State."
4. The Bank Cases: When the state is not the state.
When Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United
States, it made it "able and capable.., to sue and be sued.., in
any circuit court of the United States."339 In reliance upon that
provision the Bank sued in federal circuit court Ralph Osborn,
Ohio's auditor, and other Ohio officials. The Bank sought recovery
of a crushing $100,000 tax which Ohio had assessed upon the Bank
and collected by force, 40 in defiance of the Supreme Court's ruling
in McCulloch v Maryland.34 1 The Court heard and decided the
matter in conjunction with the less famous case of Bank of the
United States v Planters' Bank of Georgia,42 in which the Bank
invoked the same charter provision to sue in federal circuit court
the Planters' Bank for payment in specie of its notes, which the
11 New Jersey v New York, 28 US (3 Pet) 461, 464 n (a) (1830).
3, Bank of the United States Act, ch 44, § 7, 3 Stat 266, 269 (1816). A similar provision
in the act creating the first Bank of the United States, though without specific mention of
the federal courts, had been construed as conferring only capacity, not federal jurisdiction.
Bank of the United States v Deveaux, 9 US (5 Cranch) 61, 85-86 (1809). As a result, the
first Bank was forced to litigate in the first instance in state courts; federal appellate review
was available only by virtue of § 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act. Some commentators believe
this jurisdictional rule played an important role in preventing the first Bank from function-
ing as a true central bank. See Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1956 n 358 (cited in note 2).
340 Osborn v Bank of the United States, 22 US (9 Wheat) 738, 739 (1824).
341 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
342 22 US (9 Wheat) 904 (1824).
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Bank of the United States had acquired by assignment. In Osborn
v Bank of the United States, the Bank instituted suit in Ohio's
federal circuit court, citing the Bank charter provision as the basis
for federal jurisdiction. The circuit court awarded judgment to the
Bank and the Supreme Court affirmed.
In deciding these cases the Court was required to consider and
reject several objections to original federal court jurisdiction, in-
cluding one based on the Eleventh Amendment. Writing for the
Court, John Marshall first interpreted the Bank's congressional
charter as vesting original jurisdiction in the circuit courts. Next
Marshall concluded that this statutory grant of jurisdiction was
within the constitutional limits of Article III. He did so by main-
taining that the federal courts' original jurisdiction was as large as
its appellate jurisdiction, 4 and that since the Bank's capacity to
contract was a matter of federal law, there was a sufficient "origi-
nal ingredient in every cause" to support federal jurisdiction under
Article III1 . 4 Jurisdiction was thus in no way premised upon di-
verse parties but rested squarely upon the existence of a federal
question.3 45
Osborn raised the Eleventh Amendment issue by contending
that the Bank's attempt to obtain restitution from him, a state of-
ficer performing his official duties, was "substantially, though not
in form," a suit against the state.3 46 Marshall rejected the conten-
tion by arguing that such a conclusion would hamper the enforce-
ment of federal law, would be inconsistent with Article III's provi-
sion for federal jurisdiction of suits "affecting" ambassadors but
not those similarly "affecting" states, and would be at odds with
the analogous rule that an executor's citizenship rather than that
of the beneficiaries was dispositive for diversity purposes.347 Ac-
cordingly, Marshall concluded that the Eleventh Amendment was
"limited to those suits in which a state is a party on the record. 348
3 Osborn, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 821.
141 Id at 824. Marshall's position is extreme by modern standards, for his conception of
the requisite federal connection seems to permit federal jurisdiction founded on something
as remote as the acquisition of title by virtue of congressional action. See Shulthis v Mc-
Dougal, 225 US 561, 570 (1912) (rejecting such an expansive reading of federal question
jurisdiction).
315 In argument before the Court, all counsel agreed that the case was one "arising
under... [the] Constitution [and] Laws of the United States." US Const, Art. III, § 2, cl 1.
See Osborn, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 757 (argument of Mr. Hammond), 798 (argument of Mr.
Clay), 806 (argument of Mr. Wright). The Court agreed. Id at 818-28.
340 Osborn, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 846.
347 Id at 847-58.
318 Id at 857.
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Had Marshall and the Court believed that the Eleventh
Amendment merely constricted the federal courts' state-citizen di-
versity jurisdiction, as the revisionists now contend, it would not
have been necessary to create the party-of-record rule. For under
the revisionists' view, the Bank's claim, even if against the State of
Ohio, would have been exempt from the Eleventh Amendment
since it was founded upon a federal question. Precisely this con-
struction was urged upon the Court by Henry Clay, the Bank's
counsel.34 9 That Marshall eschewed Clay's straightforward ratio
decidendi is a strong hint that he viewed the amendment as oust-
ing the federal courts of jurisdiction under any head of Article III
whenever out-of- staters sued a state. But Marshall left even
firmer clues that this was his view. He expressly conceded that it
"was not in the power of the Bank" to make Ohio a party defend-
ant since "[t]he eleventh amendment . . . has exempted a state
from the suits of citizens of other states, or aliens.... Since
Marshall had already determined that the Bank's suit was prem-
ised on the federal question jurisdiction created by the Bank's
charter, he must have thought that the Eleventh Amendment op-
erated as a party-based ouster of federal jurisdiction even in fed-
eral question cases.
It is true that after describing the amendment as a "limitation
of a power supposed to be granted in the original instrument; and
to understand accurately the extent of the limitation, it seems
proper to define the power that is limited," Marshall began his
definitional effort by quoting the state-citizen and state-alien di-
versity clauses of Article III. 51 Later, in summing up the Eleventh
Amendment issue, Marshall observed that the "amendment, which
restrains the jurisdiction granted by the constitution over suits
against states ... has its full effect, if the constitution be construed
as it would have been construed, had the jurisdiction of the court
never been extended to suits brought against a state, by the citi-
zens of another state, or by aliens. 3 52 These statements seem to
M Clay contended that "even if the state be a party, that circumstance would not oust
the jurisdiction of the court, in a case arising under the constitution and laws of the Union.
There, the nature of the controversy, and not the character of the parties, must determine
the question of jurisdiction. Such is conceived to be the spirit and effect of the decision of
the court, in the case of Cohens v Virginia." Id at 798.
0 Id at 847. Marshall drove home the point two pages later: "That the Courts of the
Union cannot entertain a suit brought against a state by an alien, or a citizen of another
state, is not to be controverted." Id at 849.
351 Id at 850.
15' Id at 857-58.
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suggest Marshall thought that the Eleventh Amendment revived
an original implicit limitation in Article III upon federal jurisdic-
tion, and that this limitation applied only to suits originating
under the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses . 5 But if
this was Marshall's understanding, his rejection of Clay's identical
argument seems inexplicable and his painstaking construction of
the party-of-record rule would have been entirely unnecessary to
reach the Osborn result. Moreover, such an interpretation squarely
conflicts with Marshall's earlier more direct statement that the
amendment prohibited the joinder of Ohio as a defendant in this
federal question case.
While the party-of-record formulation neatly avoided any di-
rect examination of the Eleventh Amendment's applicability to
federal question cases, it proved to be too much even for Marshall.
In Madrazo 1&I he effectively sabotaged his rationale in Osborn by
dismissing a suit brought against the governor of Georgia in his
official capacity because in reality the suit was against the state.
Marshall's attempt to distinguish the cases is most unpersuasive.
However, by creating the inference that the presence of a state as a
party defendant in a federal question case would be enough to in-
voke the Eleventh Amendment, Marshall's reasoning in Osborn
was consistent with his suggestions in Peters. When all three cases
are considered, it is clear that Marshall avoided construing the
amendment as having no impact upon federal question jurisdic-
tion, even when such a construction was invited by the cases. The
Marshall Court must have believed, or at least feared, that the
amendment did just the opposite.
The companion to Osborn, Planters' Bank, raises even more
problems. In Planters' Bank the defendant was a bank partially
owned by the state of Georgia. Again jurisdiction was premised on
a federal question (the Bank's charter); again the defendant raised
the Eleventh Amendment as a defense; and again the Marshall
Court held that the defendant was not the state. Yet, in holding
that the suit was not against Georgia, Marshall provided more con-
clusions than rationales. The suit was "against a corporation," not
the state and, in any case, "when a government becomes a partner
in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character .... Geor-
"I This is the revisionist interpretation of Marshall's remarks. See Fletcher, 35 Stan L
Rev at 1086 (cited in note 2).
31" Governor of Georgia v Madrazo, 26 US (1 Pet) 110 (1828). See notes and text at
notes 313-17.
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gia, by giving the [Planters'] bank the capacity to sue and be sued,
voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character,... and waives
all privileges of that character .... "I
Marshall's assertion that Georgia was not a party was difficult
to reconcile with Bank of the United States v Deveaux,s5 s in which
a diversity suit by a corporation had been considered a suit by its
shareholders.357 Further, there is nothing in the Eleventh Amend-
ment itself that seems to exempt from its scope suits against states
acting in a "proprietary" as opposed to a "governmental" charac-
ter.35  As the dissenting Justice Johnson put it, every suit against a
state was in its sovereign capacity for "in what other capacity can a
315 Planters' Bank, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 906-08 (1824).
356 9 US (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
3'7 An attempt can be made to reconcile the two cases on the grounds that they serve
different policies. Deveaux viewed a corporation as a fictional aggregation of individuals in
order to uphold federal jurisdiction because it was feared that state courts might not "ad-
minister justice as impartially as those of the nation" to out-of-staters. Deveaux, 9 US (5
Cranch) at 87. That jurisdictional concern was not present in Planters' Bank due to the
federal jurisdiction conferred by the Bank's charter. See note 339. Instead, Marshall recog-
nized that corporations can and do act apart from their owner-shareholders. But, in De-
veaux, Marshall observed that outsiders "are not less susceptible of these apprehensions [of
state court favoritism] ... because they are allowed to sue by a corporate name." Deveaux, 9
US (5 Cranch) at 87. This statement suggests that the real basis for Deveaux is the view
that shareholders are the real parties in interest to corporate claims and defenses. If so, it is
hard to see why the separate legal personality of the corporation ought to be recognized in
Planters' Bank but not Deveaux.
"' The distinction is well recognized in modern American law concerning the immunity
from suit of a foreign sovereign. American courts apply the doctrine of restrictive immunity,
which immunizes a foreign sovereign for its "public" but not "private" acts. Restrictive im-
munity was adopted by the State Department in 1952. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting
Legal Advisor to the Dept. of State, to Philip P. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19,
1952), reprinted in 26 Dept State Bull 984 (1952). A slightly modified version of the rule was
eventually enacted into law by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-
583, 90 Stat 2892, codified at 28 USC § 1603 (1982). For a discussion of restrictive immunity
prior to the act, see Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
17 Colum J Transnatl L 33, 39-43 (1978); Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to
Immunity of Foreign Sovereign From Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 ALR3d 322, 332-
39 (1969). For a discussion of the effect of the act upon restrictive immunity, see von Meh-
ren, 17 Colum J Transnatl L at 48-54. For a discussion of problems with practice under the
act see Mary Kay Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 Stan L Rev
385 (1982). In Marshall's time, foreign sovereign immunity was thought to be absolute. See
The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Thus, Marshall pro-
posed differing immunity rules for states (Planters' Bank: restrictive immunity) and foreign
nations (The Schooner Exchange: absolute immunity). Nowhere does he explain the source
of these differences, although Marshall does recognize in The Schooner Exchange "a clear
distinction.., between the rights accorded to private individuals or private trading vessels,
and those accorded to public armed ships which constitute a part of the military force of the
nation." Id at 143. That distinction, however, is inadequate to encompass the restrictive
immunity doctrine proposed for states in Planters' Bank.
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state appear, or even exist? 3 59 Finally, by raising the issue of
waiver, Marshall enormously clouded his analysis of the Eleventh
Amendment. If the Eleventh Amendment operates as a limitation
upon the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction, its boundaries
cannot be waived.3 60 The waiver suggestion, therefore, raises the
implication that the immunity principles to which Marshall was
responding were located elsewhere.
While the Bank cases carry with them, perhaps more than any
other pre-Civil War cases, the seeds of a Tenth Amendment doc-
trine of state sovereign immunity disguised within the Eleventh
Amendment, that principle did not blossom until the Reconstruc-
tion. Generally, the pre-Civil War cases treat the Eleventh Amend-
ment as a party-based jurisdictional ouster. Perhaps for that rea-
son the Marshall Court nibbled away at its edges, rather than
confronting the amendment, as part of that Court's long running
exercise in expanding the affirmative jurisdictional grant of Article
H.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT:
RECONSTRUCTION AND HISTORICAL REvIsION
It was not until the Reconstruction that current notions of
sovereign immunity began to emerge. The economic dislocations
occasioned by the Civil War and its aftermath caused many south-
ern states to repudiate their bond obligations .38  This wholesale re-
jection of the Constitution's Contract Clause 62 was deadly serious.
It was also no empty threat. In the wake of the Compromise of
187733 and its legislative progeny, the Posse Comitatus Act,3 64 the
federal government lacked both the will and the power to enforce
any judicial decisions ordering states to pay their bond obligations.
Thus, the Court was faced with the unpalatable choice of aban-
doning accepted Contract Clause doctrine or establishing the po-
tentially crippling precedent of state non-compliance with Su-
preme Court judgments. The Court's solution to this dilemma was
"5, Planters' Bank, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 912 (Johnson dissenting).
380 See notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
361 See generally Orth, The Judicial Power at 47-109 (cited in note 2).
362 US Const, Art I, § 10, cl 1.
313 See generally Paul L. Haworth, The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Presidential Election
of 1876 (Burrow Bros, 1906); Orth, The Judicial Power at 53-57 (cited in note 2); Comer
Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Recon-
struction (Little, Brown, 1951).
3" Act of June 18, 1878, ch 263, § 15, 20 Stat 145, 152. This Act severely circumscribed
the lawful use of the army to enforce the laws.
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to read the Eleventh Amendment as establishing, as a constitu-
tional principle, state sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court, whatever the asserted jurisdictional basis for the suit.
The history begins before the Compromise of 1877, with the
case of Board of Liquidation v McComb,365 a rare victory for a
bondholder. Already, the southern states were employing a daz-
zling array of devices to dilute their obligations and, predictably,
these moves were being challenged by aggrieved bondholders. Lou-
isiana had enacted a statute offering its creditors the opportunity
to exchange their old Louisiana bonds for new ones, called "consol-
idated bonds," bearing a higher interest rate. The catch for bond-
holders was that for each $100 of old bonds they would receive $60
in new "consolidated" bonds. McComb accepted the offer, and
then became incensed when Louisiana raised the exchange rate
from 60 percent to par value only for the benefit of the politically
powerful Louisiana Levee Company. McComb brought a diversity
action seeking to enjoin the Louisiana officials who composed the
state's Board of Liquidation from exchanging the Levee Com-
pany's bonds at par. For a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice
Bradley concluded that a private person may obtain injunctive re-
lief against state officers violating their constitutional duties. 66
The Eleventh Amendment was no barrier to the action because, in
the tradition of Osborn, the state was not a party on the record.
Shortly after the McComb decision the 1876 presidential elec-
tion produced the so-called Compromise of 1877, in which the
Republicans were given the presidency in exchange for an end to
federal intervention in Southern affairs. 67 Louisiana promptly
took advantage of this new freedom to adopt a new constitution,
replacing the Reconstruction constitution authored by carpetbag
Republicans. In the new 1879 constitution Louisiana included a
provision that ended the taxation necessary to pay interest on the
consolidated bonds, cut the interest rate on those bonds from 7
percent to 2 percent, and offered consolidated bondholders the op-
portunity to exchange their consolidated bonds for yet another
new issue, bearing interest at 4 percent but available at an ex-
change rate of 75 cents per dollar of consolidated bonds tendered.
Angered non-Louisianan consolidated bondholders promptly
brought suit in federal court, claiming these provisions violated the
Contracts Clause, and seeking an order compelling Allen Jumel,
365 92 US 531 (1875).
'" Id at 541.
"e See note 363.
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the state treasurer, to pay interest on the consolidated bonds in
accordance with the prior terms. In 1883 the case, Louisiana v
Jumel,3 68 reached the Supreme Court. By a seven to two margin
the Court concluded that the claim was really against the state and
thus foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment. McComb was im-
plausibly distinguished and the Court admitted that it was forced
to its conclusion by the difficulty of enforcing a judgment for the
bondholders:
The remedy sought... would require the court to assume all
the executive authority of the State... and to supervise the
conduct of all persons charged with any official duty in re-
spect of the levy, collection, and disbursement of the tax in
question until the bonds.., were paid in full.... It needs no
argument to show that the political power cannot be thus
ousted of its jurisdiction and the judiciary set in its place. 6 9
In the same term as Jumel the Court was faced with another
challenge to the Louisiana debt readjustment caper. Following the
advice of sophisticated legal counsel, the states of New Hampshire
and New York enacted legislation authorizing their attorneys gen-
eral to accept assignments of Louisiana bonds, prosecute the as-
signed claims, and remit the net proceeds collected to the assign-
ors. The strategy was a frank gambit to avoid the Eleventh
Amendment, for its jurisdictional denial did not in terms extend to
suits between the states. Yet, in New Hampshire v Louisiana-37
the Court found that the Eleventh Amendment barred cases where
the state was acting as a collection agency for citizens seeking to
assert claims against another state. 7 1
In reaching this decision, the Court in effect endorsed
Chisholm's view that state sovereignty was superseded to the ex-
tent of the jurisdictional grants of Article III. Chief Justice Waite
noted that New Hampshire was seeking to assert a sovereign's
right to collect from other sovereigns debts owed to its citizens.
That right "is well recognized as an incident of national sover-
eignty" but American states lacked it because they had surren-
dered such sovereign powers with the constitutional union.3 7 1
Waite found some proof for this proposition in Chisholm; if Article
368 107 US 711 (1883).
369 Id at 727-28.
370 108 US 76 (1883).
371 Id at 89.
372 Id at 90.
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III originally permitted private claims against states by citizens of
another state there was no reason to suppose that states had re-
tained the duplicative remedy of suing on behalf of their citi-
zens.37 3 Of course, with the Eleventh Amendment the citizen went
remediless, for she no longer could sue another state directly and
her own state had surrendered the sovereign prerogative of suit on
her behalf. Put another way, if Waite had thought that Chisholm
was wrong, he should have concluded that Article III did not di-
minish the sovereign capacities of the states, and thus, that New
Hampshire could continue to possess the right to press claims
against other states on behalf of its citizens. In fact, he concluded
exactly the opposite and thereby validated the reasoning of
Chisholm.
As was the case with Chisholm, the New Hampshire Court
failed to address the possibility that the Tenth Amendment's res-
ervation of sovereignty to the states might place limits on cessions
of state sovereignty that could be inferred in Article III. Unlike
Chisholm, which involved an explicit jurisdictional grant, New
Hampshire involved an implicit Article Ill limitation on state sov-
ereignty. The Tenth Amendment is surely most relevant to such
implicit constitutional invasions of state sovereignty. The New
Hampshire Court's failure to address this issue indicates either
that it thought the Tenth Amendment hortatory or, more likely,
that it wished to skirt the issue in order to avoid the fundamental
problem, admitted in Jumel, that there was no practical way to
enforce an adverse judgment against Louisiana.
The rationale of the Court's decision in New Hampshire
makes the holding in Hans v Louisiana3 74 all the more curious.
Hans was a suit by a Louisiana citizen who was attempting to en-
force against the state the terms of its repudiated consolidated
bond obligations. The action was dismissed in the trial court on
Eleventh Amendment grounds even though the party alignment
was not within the text of the amendment.3 7 5 The trial judge had
concluded that "a state can no more be sued contrary to its contin-
uing assent than can the dead"37 6 but never made clear the connec-
tion between this assertedly "settled idea[] ' 3 7 and the Eleventh
Amendment. The connection was in no way textual, but rooted in
373 Id at 91.
374 134 US 1 (1890).
371 Hans v Louisiana, 24 F 55 (Cir Ct E D La 1885), aff'd, 134 US 1 (1890).
376 Id at 66.
377 Id.
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"the inability of a court to deal directly with the treasury of a
state. 17 8 Stripped of euphemism, Louisiana possessed sovereign
immunity because the federal judiciary was unable, and the Presi-
dent and Congress unwilling, to enforce decrees adverse to
Louisiana.
When the Supreme Court decided Hans it eschewed any such
policy rationales but wholeheartedly endorsed the broad grant of
sovereign immunity created by the trial judge. To do this, Justice
Bradley first had to repudiate in principle, if not explicitly, the
New Hampshire conclusion that Chisholm was a fundamentally
correct exposition of the interplay between state sovereignty and
Article III. Justice Bradley simply declared it wrong: "[i]n view of
the manner in which... [Chisholm] was received by the country,
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the light of history and
the reason of the thing, we think we are at liberty to prefer Justice
Iredell's [dissent]. . . .,s In fact, Bradley preferred his own
filtered view of Iredell's dissent, for he treated it as a constitu-
tional opinion rather than as an interpretation of the 1789 Judici-
ary Act. While it is true that Iredell finished his Chisholm opinion
with the bald dictum that congressional action to subject the states
to suit in the federal courts would likely be unconstitutional, he
never provided any clue to the rationale for his conclusion. Un-
deterred by Iredell's omission, Justice Bradley found a rationale in
Justice Gray's intemperate dissent in United States v Lee,38 0 in
which Bradley had joined eight years earlier.
United States v Lee involved the efforts of George W.P.C.
Lee, Robert E. Lee's son, to recover Arlington, the family home,
from the United States government. In 1862, Congress had passed
a direct tax to finance the Civil War. Of the Virginia portion,
$92.07 was assessed against the Lee estate. Lee's mother, who held
title at that time, sought to pay the tax through intermediaries but
her tender was refused because it was not made in person. Accord-
ingly, Arlington was seized and sold to the federal government for
non-payment of the tax. After the war, and while Arlington was in
the process of being converted into a cemetery, George Lee
brought an ejectment action in the Virginia courts against Kauf-
man and Strong, the federal agents in charge of the property, and
numerous other federal officers occupying the land. The case was
removed to federal court and the United States intervened in de-
178 Id at 68.
"' Hans, 134 US at 18-19.
380 106 US 196, 223 (1882).
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fense of its seizure. Following a jury trial, verdict was rendered in
Lee's favor, and sustained on appeal to the Supreme Court. To the
contention that the United States was immune from suit, the ma-
jority offered the long settled view that suits against governmental
officers to obtain assets unlawfully held by them were not against
the sovereign.38'
The surprise in the case was Justice Gray's dissent, in which
Chief Justice Waite and Justices Bradley and Woods joined. Gray
initially contended that the United States possessed immunity be-
cause "it is essential to the common defence and general welfare
that the sovereign should not, without its consent, be dispossessed
by judicial process of... military posts ... necessary to guard the
national existence. 38 2 From there he quickly began to blend to-
gether authorities dealing with the common law notion of sovereign
immunity of nations38 3 and cases construing the Eleventh Amend-
ment.38 4 Gray introduced the Eleventh Amendment cases in order
to demonstrate that "[iun those cases in which judgments have...
been rendered by this court against individuals concerning money
or property in which a State had an interest, either the money was
in the personal possession of the defendants and not in the posses-
sion of the State, or the suit was to restrain the defendants by in-
junction from doing acts in violation of the Constitution .... 385
The point of this exercise was that, in Gray's view, the Lee case fell
outside this description. Not only was Gray's characterization of
dubious accuracy,88 it unnecessarily invested the Eleventh
Amendment with an aura of sovereign immunity. Gray hardly did
better with the claimed immunity from suit asserted by the United
States; he simply endorsed such immunity as a fundamental "ax-
iom[] of public law, '38 7 notwithstanding the limited federal sover-
eign immunity that the Marshall and Taney Courts had created as
a matter of federal common law.3 8 In short, Gray's opinion was
38' Id at 209-18.
382 Id at 226.
3 Id at 226-42.
384 Id at 242-47.
385 Id at 242.
388 The decision in Osborn v Bank of the United States, 22 US (9 Wheat) 738 (1824)
defies Gray's characterization, for in that case the tax that the Bank sought to recover was
most definitely in Ohio's possession. Although the $100,000 at issue had been kept "separate
from the other funds of the treasury," id at 833 (emphasis added), it was nevertheless sit-
ting in a chest in Ohio's state treasury and had already been entered as a deposit on the
books of the treasury. Id at 833, 868-69.
387 Lee, 106 US at 226.
388 See, for example, The Davis, 77 US (10 Wall) 15, 19-21 (1869); The Siren, 74 US (7
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overbroad and intellectually slovenly, no doubt the product of his
indignation that a Lee heir was about to reclaim the family manor.
However shoddy Gray's effort, it found a lasting reprise with
Bradley in Hans. Building on the confusion of sovereign immunity
and the Eleventh Amendment that Gray had started, Bradley
fused the concepts of state sovereign immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment as a seemingly principled way to let Louisiana escape
the consequences of its debts. Reasoning that it would be "anoma-
lous" to restrict the amendment to its literal scope since the
amendment had been intended to secure the prior understanding
of a general grant of state sovereign immunity,"5 9 Bradley simply
ignored history and created the myth of the Eleventh Amend-
ment's union with state sovereign immunity.
Bradley could have taken an entirely different approach. If he
had been faithful to Iredell's views, he might have contended that
state sovereign immunity was part of the residual state sovereignty
preserved by the Tenth Amendment. Congress had the power to
abrogate this immunity in the furtherance of the jurisdictional
heads created by Article III, but Congress had never clearly done
so. Anticipating Atascadero State Hospital v Scanon390 Bradley
might have argued that the general federal question jurisdiction
created by the 1875 Judiciary Act was not sufficiently plain and
unambiguous in its intent to abrogate that immunity. Had this
been the thrust of Hans, the monkey of southern bond repudiation
would have been placed on Congress's back. Moreover, state sover-
eign immunity would have acquired a doctrinal sense that it now
lacks. Congressional abrogation would be a simple matter: when-
ever Congress acts pursuant to any of its powers it could remove
the claim of state immunity inherent in the Tenth Amendment
concept of residual state sovereignty. Similarly, the notion of a
state's consent to suit would not carry with it the uncomfortable
baggage that a party can unilaterally expand the Article III juris-
dictional limits of the federal courts.
In fact, courts after Hans have acted very much as if the case
had announced a Tenth Amendment immunity rule, rather than
one grounded in the Eleventh Amendment.3 91 Sixteen years later,
Wall) 152, 153-55 (1868) (limiting the sovereign immunity of the United States to govern-
mental functions).
' Hans, 134 US at 10-11.
... 473 US 234 (1985).
391 Justice Blackmun has also come to this conclusion. See Atascadero State Hospital,
473 US at 303 (Blackmun dissenting) (quoted in note 23).
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in Gunter v Atlantic Coast Line Railroad92 the Court thought the
proposition that a state may waive its immunity was elementary.
Even prior to Hans, the Court had declared Eleventh Amendment
immunity to be "a personal privilege which... [a state] may waive
at pleasure."393 If the Eleventh Amendment is a pure denial of ju-
risdiction, such decisions make no sense. If these decisions respond
to waivers of retained Tenth Amendment sovereignty, they make a
great deal of sense. 94
In Monaco v Mississippi9 5 the Court rejected the idea that:
the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restric-
tions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the
words of constitutional provisions are postulates which limit
and control.... There is... the postulate that States of the
Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be im-
mune from suits, without their consent, save where there has
been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention.'3 96
Putting aside the validity of Monaco's perceived postulate,9 7 this
passage frankly embraces sovereign immunity as a concept existing
outside "the letter of the Eleventh Amendment."
Monaco is not an aberration. To the Welch plurality:
[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity plays a vital role in our
federal system. The contours of state sovereign immunity are
determined by the structures and requirements of the federal
system.... The rationale has been set out most completely in
the Court's unanimous opinion ... in Monaco v Mississippi
.... The Court has never questioned this basic framework
398
That framework, of course, is one that the Court admits is found
largely outside the text of the Eleventh Amendment.
392 200 US 273 (1906).
M' Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436, 447 (1883).
3" The concept of state waiver of its sovereign immunity first developed in the heat of
the Southern "bond wars," the same time when the Eleventh Amendment was being trans-
formed into a broad Tenth Amendment doctrine. See Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436 (1883).
The nonexistence of the state waiver concept during the development of Eleventh Amend-
ment law in the Marshall and Taney Courts is a further suggestion that, in that era, the
amendment was seen as purely jurisdictional.
395 292 US 313 (1934).
191 Id at 322-23 (footnote omitted) (quoting Federalist 81 (Hamilton)).
317 See text at notes 388-91.
38 Welch, 107 S Ct 2941, 2953.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF RECONCEIVING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. Sovereign Immunity as a Tenth Amendment Doctrine
While the present Court is loath to admit it, the Monaco
Court's framework of state sovereign immunity is textually rooted
in the Tenth Amendment, a provision admirably suited to this
purpose.39 9 Its function is to address and define the sovereignty re-
lationships between the people, the states, and the national gov-
ernment. It does this by placing limits on governments and
presuming that sovereignty flows from the people to the govern-
ments they form in accord with the wishes of the people. "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." The national government is confined to
its delegated powers. State governments are barred from exercising
those powers prohibited by the Constitution or those delegated to
the national government that have been exercised so as to preempt
state authority. Everything else is "reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people. 40 0
Here, at last, is the kernel of truth. The states exercise sover-
eignty to the extent that it has been conferred upon them by the
people. The state constitutions mediate between the people and
their state agents. Those powers not granted to a state by its peo-
ple in the state constitution are "reserved... to the people."40' To
the extent that a state constitution fails to grant immunity to the
people's agents-the state government-the state lacks immunity
in either state or federal court.402 By their refusal to clothe their
state government with immunity, the people have simply reserved
3" The revisionists and I share some common ground here, although we may disagree
on the meaning of Tenth Amendment state sovereign immunity. See Fletcher, 35 Stan L
Rev at 1108-13 (cited in note 2); Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1484-92 (cited in note 2).
40 The theory advanced here does not depend on freestanding notions such as "federal-
ism" or "state sovereignty" being rooted in the Tenth Amendment. Rather, the theory views
the content of the amendment as being defined by the limits of Article I congressional pow-
ers. Some of the problems that arise in the context of limitations on Article I powers are
therefore avoided. Whether such freestanding notions could apply in the sovereign immu-
nity context is beyond the scope of this theory.
'10 See Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1900 at 752-
53 (1833) (state constitutions are the dividing line between Tenth Amendment rights re-
served to the states and those reserved to the people).
410 Of course, this view requires abandonment of the conventional notion that a state's
waiver of immunity in its own courts does not operate as a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity in the federal courts. See Pennhurst, 465 US 89, 99 n 9 (1984); Smith v Reeves,
178 US 436, 441 (1900).
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the power that immunity would confer.
If a state's constitution does contain a grant of immunity,40 3
then the state is immune from liability in its own courts except
where the people, acting as a single national unit, have contra-
vened the state choice through the national Constitution's
Supremacy Clause and the exercise by Congress of its delegated
powers.40 4 In federal court, the state's immunity depends on
whether the claim is rooted in the Constitution or a federal statute.
If Congress has acted to abrogate the state's immunity pursuant to
its delegated powers, the state is amenable to suit. If Congress has
not so acted, the grant of immunity is a power "reserved to the
State[]." But if the state has exercised a constitutionally prohib-
ited power it is amenable to suit, for its unconstitutional grab of
power "cannot be corrected, without a suit against the state. ' 40 5
The doctrine of state amenability to federal suit for constitu-
tional violations derives even more force from the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the wake of incorporation of most of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, con-
stitutional prohibitions upon state powers have been greatly ex-
panded. Unlawful state excursions into the arena of these newly
prohibited powers are just as surely beyond the zone of Tenth
Amendment immunity as any other attempt to employ a prohib-
ited power. States are as surely prohibited from forcing criminal
defendants to incriminate themselves as they are from coining
money.
There are thus three considerations involved in assessing
Tenth Amendment state sovereign immunity. First, there is no im-
munity unless a state government has been invested with such im-
munity by its people in its state constitution. Second, that immu-
nity is held at the grace of Congress: so long as Congress has not
acted under its delegated powers to abrogate state immunity, a
state retains its immunity. Finally, immunity may be abrogated by
the Constitution's prohibitions upon state power, both in the origi-
nal Constitution and through the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike
the Fitzpatrick v Bitzer4°6 rationale, however, in Tenth Amend-
4o This grant of immunity may be explicit in the text of the state constitution (for
example, see Penn Const, Art I, § 11 (quoted in note 150), or it may be judicially created.
The federal courts would, of course, be bound by the interpretation of the state constitution
by the highest state court.
404 See text at.notes 391-98.
405 Chisholm v Georgia, 2 US (2 Dall) 419, 422 (1793) (oral argument of Edmund
Randolph).
406 427 US 445 (1976). See text at notes 47-49.
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ment sovereign immunity there is no need for Congress to act pur-
suant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, although such statu-
tory action would surely be efficacious to eradicate a state's
claimed immunity. The prohibitions upon the states imposed by §
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment are self-executing abrogations of
such immunity.
B. The Eleventh Amendment as a Party-Based Denial of
Jurisdiction
If the Eleventh Amendment is reconceived as a party-based
jurisdictional ouster provision and state sovereign immunity as an
attribute of Tenth Amendment sovereignty, federal statutory and
constitutional claims may be asserted against states by their own
citizens but not by foreigners or citizens of another state. Short of
outright repeal of the Eleventh Amendment, how are we to solve
this anomaly?
One solution is to build upon the analytical edifice of Testa v
Katt,407 which compels state courts to hear suits seeking to enforce
substantive rights created under federal law whenever the state
would entertain a parallel substantive claim under state law. The
Court in Testa did not actually hold that state courts must hear
federal causes of action that are barred in federal court, nor did it
implicate any issues of state sovereign immunity, since the case in-
volved only private litigants. Rather, the holding in Testa com-
mands states to provide a state forum for federal claims to the ex-
tent the state courts would entertain parallel state claims under
established jurisdictional rules of local law. Thus, a state could
theoretically deny a forum for a private federal claim against the
state on the ground that, pursuant to its sovereign immunity from
suit in its courts, it does not permit parallel private state claims.
However, General Oil Co. v Crain40 8 suggests that this obligation
may not be so evaded. Similarly, Justice Thurgood Marshall thinks
407 330 US 386 (1947).
408 209 US 211, 226 (1908). A taxpayer had sought to enjoin, in the Tennessee courts,
collection of an allegedly unconstitutional state tax. The Tennessee Supreme Court held
that the Tennessee courts had no jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
determined that the tax was valid and so never reached the issue of whether Tennessee
could deny General Oil a forum for the vindication of its claimed constitutional right. The
Court did observe, however, that if it was permissible for Tennessee to close its courthouse
doors on claims barred from the federal courts by the Eleventh Amendment "it must be
evident that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the
Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be
nullified as to much of its operation." Id.
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that since the Eleventh Amendment is "nothing more than a regu-
lation of the forum" and that "federal law stands as the supreme
law of the land, the State's courts are obliged to enforce it, even if
it conflicts with state policy" and the states are obliged to open
their courts to private claims against them rooted in federal law. °09
Professor Tribe regards Justice Marshall's view as an im-
proper application of Testa,4 10 and Professor Fletcher thinks Mar-
shall's view is at odds with the intentions of the adopters of the
Eleventh Amendment. Fletcher points out the overwhelming Con-
gressional rejection of a proposal to suspend operation of the Elev-
enth Amendment in those instances where a state had failed to
provide a forum for the private claim against the state.411 While
the proposal may have implied a fear that private claims against
states would go unremedied, its rejection says very little about the
theoretical existence of an independent obligation of the states to
provide fora for the vindication of federal rights. Given the then
prevailing assumption that federal question jurisdiction was left to
state courts, it is doubtful that this rejection can be read as a final
repudiation of the principle that state courts must provide a forum
for federal claims. The nation operated for nearly a century with-
out federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts, relying on
the premise that state courts would apply federal law to vindicate
federal claims.41 2 Thus, there is nothing disharmonious in Congres-
sional action to compel the states to provide such a forum for the
vindication of federal rights.
If these judicial intimations are extended and combined with a
reconstituted view of sovereign immunity as a Tenth Amendment
right, a partial solution emerges in which Congress plays a vital
role. Even though a state has acquired sovereign immunity in its
own courts by its own constitution, Congress may act to abrogate
that immunity so long as it acts pursuant to its delegated powers.
Thus, Congress need only enact legislation that unequivocally ab-
rogates the sovereign immunity of all states with respect to claims
'19 Employees v Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 US 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall con-
curring). Some commentators also contend that Congress could require state courts to hear
cases barred from the federal courts by the Eleventh Amendment. See Louis F. Wolcher,
Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own
Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 Cal L Rev 189 (1981); Allan D. Cullison, Interpre-
tation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5
Houston L Rev 1, 35 (1967).
410 Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 184 n 45 (cited in note 2).
Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1059, 1095 & n 243 (cited in note 2).
412 See note 280. Compare Martin v Hunter's Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
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made against them by out-of-staters that are founded upon federal
statutes, treaties, or the Constitution. But since the Eleventh
Amendment bars Congress from conferring jurisdiction upon the
federal courts over such suits, Congress could only demand, pursu-
ant to the Supremacy Clause, that states afford all such litigants a
state forum. Of course, in order to assure even-handedness, review
of such state judgments would be available in the United States
Supreme Court.
While the solution of forcing states to provide a forum for vin-
dication of federal claims made by non-citizens may not be ideal, it
is likely that not every state court will exhibit open hostility to
claims made against it by a non-citizen. If state immunity were to
be reconceived in the fashion urged here, states would soon grow
accustomed to the posture of defendant in both federal and state
courts. In time, the employment of the state forum for such federal
claims asserted by non-citizens would become simply a quaint ves-
tige of the eighteenth century reaction to Chisholm.
Of course, this solution is jerry-rigged; the proper solution is
repeal of the Eleventh Amendment. Were that course of action
taken, state sovereign immunity would become a wholly Tenth
Amendment problem devoid of the jurisdictional anomaly created
by the Eleventh Amendment. State sovereign immunity with re-
spect to federal statutory claims would ebb and flow with the ac-
tions of Congress under its delegated powers. More importantly,
claims of private citizens against states founded on the Constitu-
tion would always be assertable in federal court, without the neces-
sity of congressional action. The benefit, if any, to the proposed
interim solution is that it would both insure the existence of a fo-
rum for all claims against states and would highlight the jurisdic-
tional absurdity of the Eleventh Amendment.
C. Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co.: An Application of the Theory
On the Supreme Court's docket for the October 1988 Term is
Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co.,41 a case that provides a handy
vehicle for exploring the proposed theory. Under prevailing Elev-
enth Amendment doctrine, Union Gas presents a narrow, albeit
important, issue: the scope of congressional power under Article I
to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. In the
1986 amendments to the "Superfund" legislation Congress appar-
413 Cert granted, 108 S Ct 1219 (1988), reported below as, United States v Union Gas
Co., 832 F2d 1343 (3d Cir 1987).
1989]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ently stripped the states of their Eleventh Amendment immunity
in suits seeking to recover from owners or operators of toxic waste
sites the monetary costs for cleaning up the sites.414 If the Court
concurs that Congress intended to do just that, it will then be re-
quired to address directly the scope of congressional abrogation
power. It may do this in one of several distinctly different ways.
First, the Court may leave intact the conventional post-Hans
view of the Eleventh Amendment as a source of a waivable state
immunity doctrine, and simply focus on the scope of congressional
Article I powers. This approach has been adopted by the federal
appeals courts that have confronted the question415 and is favored
as well by such commentators as Professors Tribe and Nowak, who
contend that the Eleventh Amendment was not intended to limit
congressional Article I powers, but only to limit the judicial power
in construing the scope of the Article III jurisdictional grant.4 6 In
Union Gas, this approach also necessarily requires examination of
the contention that "only the amendments following the eleventh
may override it," 41 7 since Superfund was enacted pursuant to Con-
gress' Commerce Clause power.
The fundamental problem with this analytical method is that
any result that retains the Hans doctrine will be flawed. It is his-
torically inaccurate to conclude that the Eleventh Amendment did
not intrude upon congressional power under Article I. Rather, be-
414 The original "Superfund" act, entitled the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act, is codified at 42 USC § 9601 et seq (1982). In 1986, Con-
gress amended the statute via the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,
Pub L No 99-499. The original Superfund legislation permitted private suits for recovery of
clean-up costs against "any person" who owned or operated a toxic waste site. 42 USC §
9607(a) (1982). While the statute defined "any person" to include states, 42 USC § 9601(21)
(1982), the statute was nevertheless read as failing to abrogate state immunity because,
other than the definitional inclusion, it lacked a clear and explicit abrogation of such immu-
nity. See United States v Union Gas Co., 792 F2d 372, 380 (3d Cir 1986). Most persuasive
to the court was the fact that the original Superfund Act contained an express waiver of
federal sovereign immunity, 42 USC § 9607(g) (1982), but no parallel abrogation of state
immunity. That defect may have been remedied in the 1986 Superfund amendments. See 42
USC § 9601(20)(D) (Supp 1987) and United States v Union Gas Co., 832 F2d 1343, 1348-50
(3d Cir 1987).
415 See cases cited in note 50.
416 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law 185-89 (cited in note 2); Laurence H.
Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation: Separation
of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv L Rev 682, 693-99 (1976);
Nowak, 75 Colum L Rev at 1442, 1469 (cited in note 2).
417 Union Gas, 832 F2d at 1351 (discussing the theory of Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US
445 (1976), which held that Congress may waive state immunity pursuant to its powers
granted in the Fourteenth Amendment since the Fourteenth Amendment effectively
"amended" the Eleventh.)
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cause it was intended as a device to oust jurisdiction, the amend-
ment necessarily prohibits Congress from vesting the federal courts
with jurisdiction over suits against states brought by out-of-staters,
even when the subject matter of such suits involves questions of
federal law enacted pursuant to an uncontested Article I power.
Moreover, this method completely fails to address the deeply
rooted conceptual error of Hans. If the Court treats the Eleventh
Amendment as a jurisdictional rule, it cannot simultaneously re-
tain the Hans fiction that this jurisdictional limitation can be
waived by a state or abrogated by Congress. Yet, if the Court re-
jects reading the Eleventh Amendment as jurisdictional, it per-
petuates historical error and ignores the legal text.
Second, the Court could repudiate the Hans doctrine and
adopt the revisionist approach that the Eleventh Amendment has
no applicability to actions founded on federal question jurisdiction,
as is Union Gas's claim against Pennsylvania. The advantage of
this approach is its conceptual neatness and simplicity. If no state
sovereign immunity exists with respect to federal question claims
there is no need to inquire into the limits of the congressional ab-
rogation power. Moreover, the federal forum would be open to all
litigants asserting a claim against a state founded on a federal
question, whatever their citizenship. The principal disadvantage of
this approach is that it is not congruent with the text, history of
the adoption, and early interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment.
Third, the Court could apply the theory advocated here. Con-
struction of the amendment as a jurisdictional ouster provision re-
quires repudiation of the Hans doctrine. With the demise of the
Hans doctrine and its notion that state immunity is rooted in the
Eleventh Amendment, the Court would be forced to either locate
that principle elsewhere in the constitutional design or abandon it
altogether. Relocation of the immunity principle in the Tenth
Amendment makes the case relatively easy. Since the Eleventh
Amendment operates to oust the federal courts of jurisdiction of
all claims made against a state by an out-of-stater, and Union Gas
is a Pennsylvania citizen,418 its claim is not foreclosed. Pennsylva-
nia's claim of immunity from suit is bound up in its residual sover-
eignty preserved by the Tenth Amendment. If Pennsylvania's Con-
stitution had failed to confer immunity from suit by its citizens
upon the state there would have been no need to examine the elu-
"' Telephone conversation with Robert A. Swift, counsel for Union Gas Co., October
12, 1988.
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sive frontier between the Tenth Amendment and congressional
power under Article I. But since Pennsylvania has such immu-
nity,41 the question of state immunity will turn on whether con-
gressional action in the 1986 Superfund amendments abrogating
state immunity is properly within the scope of the commerce
power delegated to Congress. That is an issue beyond this article,
yet were the focus placed there, the structure of the constitutional
design would be more clearly examined. Since the underlying pol-
icy of the conventional Hans formulation is to limit the encroach-
ment upon state sovereignty of federal power, the theory advanced
here accomplishes that objective in a more straightforward man-
ner. It focuses thought where it should be-upon the frontier be-
tween legitimate exercise of delegated powers and the retained sov-
ereignty of the states.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conventional view that the Eleventh Amendment states a
constitutional rule immunizing states from private suit in federal
court without their consent or congressional action to abrogate
their immunity is flawed conceptually and historically. Its concep-
tual error lies in the perversion of a constitutional amendment that
limits federal court jurisdiction into a privilege that may be waived
or abrogated. If the amendment is jurisdictional, this conceptual
baggage is offensive to long-settled notions of subject matter juris-
diction. If the amendment is not jurisdictional, a very long step has
been taken beyond "non-interpretive" constitutional adjudication;
we have now ventured into a twilight zone where plain text is to be
ignored.
The conventional treatment of the Eleventh Amendment has
been sharply criticized, yet the alternative, revisionist view ad-
vanced by the critics is almost as deficient. The revisionists seek to
reconstrue the Eleventh Amendment into an innocuous pruning of
diverse party jurisdiction, without having any effect on federal
question jurisdiction. While this exercise is appealing in its sim-
plicity-eliminating problems created by reading the Eleventh
419 Article I, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[s]uits may be
brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts, and in such cases as the
Legislature may by law direct." An identical provision appeared in the prior Pennsylvania
Constitutions of 1790 and 1838. The provision has been interpreted by the Pennsylvania
courts to mean that Pennsylvania is immune from suit without its consent. See Common-
wealth v Berks County, 364 Pa 447, 449 (1950); Bell Telephone Co. of Pa. v Lewis, 313 Pa
374, 375 (1934); Collins v Commonwealth, 262 Pa 572 (1919).
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Amendment as a jurisdictional ouster-and is consistent with no-
tions of popular sovereignty that surely animated the founding
generation, it ignores important historical realities. The Eleventh
Amendment was intended to oust the federal courts of jurisdiction
even of claims that were rooted in federal treaties or the Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court initially construed the amendment to do
just that, and that construction was never repudiated, even by
such a nationalist Court as John Marshall's. Moreover, while the
founding generation believed in popular sovereignty, there was a
division of opinion whether the proper focus of that sovereignty
was the undivided people of the nation, or the separate peoples of
each constituent state. The Eleventh Amendment represents a par-
tial victory for states-rightists, who succeeded in obtaining a party-
based ouster of federal court jurisdiction but could not obtain an
explicit recognition of state sovereign immunity. That principle re-
mained where it had always been: in the Tenth Amendment.
The legacy that has been bequeathed to us is irrational. View-
ing sovereign immunity as an attribute of residual state sover-
eignty preserved by the Tenth Amendment simplifies and harmo-
nizes state sovereignty with both federal union and sovereignty of
the people. But the Eleventh Amendment remains as a jurisdic-
tional joker that frustrates the realization of a unified state sover-
eign immunity doctrine under the Tenth Amendment. In order to
ameliorate the effects of the Eleventh Amendment it is necessary
to push Supremacy Clause doctrine to extreme lengths. A better
solution, were there the political will to achieve it, is the repeal of
the Eleventh Amendment. Until then, a proper reconceptualization
of its role in relation to sovereign immunity would be of service to
historical accuracy, state sovereignty as preserved by the Constitu-
tion, and, most importantly, to the people, who are the ultimate
sovereigns.
1989]

